A critical theory of Eurocentrism. by Hostettler, Nicholas D.
A Critical Theory of Eurocentrism
Nicholas. D. Hostettler
School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London
ProQuest Number: 10673000
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10673000
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
The work presented in this thesis is my own.
Nicholas D. Hostettler
Abstract
Conventional accounts of Eurocentrism tend not to recognise their own Eurocentricity. 
Critical theory mitigates this lack of historical reflexivity by disclosing the deep 
structures of Eurocentrism in the modem tradition of political and social theory and in 
the forms of modern social relations and social formation,
‘Eurocentrism’ tends to express negative judgements about the world and its 
representation from the perspective of civil sociality and its sense of commutative 
justice, and to point to distorted distributions of modem goods. That perspective is 
treated here as the ideologeme which provides the conceptual framework of the 
Eurocentric, ‘Modem Imaginary’. This ideologeme it establishes the forms of civil 
sociality as transhistorical, universals. It also operates as an empirico-transcendent 
doublet, generating the tradition’s contradictory and antinomial categorical structure. 
The Eurocentric nature of this contradictory structure is disclosed in terms of the critical 
realist conception of anthropic irrealism.
A similar- work of categorical transformation discloses the Eurocentric forms of the 
modem world system. Concretely, Eurocentrism emerges through the competitive 
universalisation of European (and neo-European) states; their tendencies towards the 
institution of transnational hegemony; and projects for the Europeanisation and/or 
functional subordination of the non-European. In terms of abstract social relations, 
Eurocentric universalisation tends to the creation of global social totalities mediated by 
the really abstract relations of civil society.
A general account of the contradictions between the abstract and concrete dimensions of 
Europic social formation is provided with an interpretation of Marx’s Capital in terms 
of real irrealism. Also, the epistemic and sociological critiques of Eurocentrism are 
drawn together as internally related dimensions of the Europic .Problematic: the 
combined and uneven dialectical universalisation of the categories and forms of civil 
sociality. The implications for critical theory, meanwhile, are that it comes to be 
understood as critical-theoretical anti-Eurocentrism in contrast to the theoretical- 
Eurocentrism of traditional theory.
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Chapter 1 - Eurocentrism, Critical Theory, Dialectics and Form
Being inside Eurocentrism means being enmeshed in certain forms of relations; It 
means being tangled up in the constraints imposed by specific forms of seeing and 
knowing as well as of being and doing. These entanglements mean that our 
understanding of ourselves and our world has a limited and partial character. Coming to 
understand Eurocentrism means having to work through these limitations and disclose 
their forms to ourselves. European universal social relations exert a powerful influence 
on our capacities to conceive our world, reinforcing the illicit universality of the 
dominant forms of thought. However, amongst their many contradictions are tendencies 
towards deeper self-understanding, and the critical theory of Eurocentrism is oriented 
towards the identification of these internal constraints and contradictions. This does not 
mean stepping outside the modem; it means realising an immanent possibility for 
change which this form of life makes possible.
Critical theory develops out of its confrontation with problems of social form: a critical 
theory of Eurocentrism evolves through the critique and disclosure of the essential 
forms of European modernity.
The real, essential, forms of social life are neither ideal nor changeless. Our theories of 
such forms need to be able to give an account of the many, varied and changing 
relations that constitute a given mode of existence. Peter Winch, when he used the idea 
of a particular ‘form of life,’ was drawing our attention to something of fundamental 
significance about the nature of culture in general and about cultural diversity: what 
really distinguishes different cultures from each other is not just one or other peculiar 
characteristic, or even distinctive sets of characteristics, but the particular ways in which 
their characteristics are related to each other.1 So, for Winch, there can be no reduction 
of cultural diversity to, say, the simple fact of different languages. When detached from 
the proper context of its form of life, language is abstracted and reduced to little more 
than a collective idiosyncrasy. Instead, Winch speaks of a ‘form of life’ so as to insist 
on the intemality of language to a way of life. On this account, forms of life are 
complex wholes and active modes of being in the world: the tasks of social theory,
1 Peter Winch, The Idea o f a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958.
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politics, sociology and history, meanwhile, are to give accounts of the ever-changing 
structural complexities of such wholes.
Winch offered his considerations as a contribution to a general philosophy of culture, 
i.e. to a philosophical anthropology, one with many implications for political and social 
theory. One implication of the internality of language to forms of life is that culture 
necessarily has a hermeneutic dimension, demanding the rejection of any kind of 
positivistic naturalism that seeks to bypass language and meaning. It follows from the 
philosophical presupposition of forms of life that there can be no comprehension of 
cultural being without an understanding of forms of representation. The forms of life 
and of representation are internally related: the ways that a given culture understands 
and represents itself, its wider world and its relations to that world, cannot be divorced 
from how that culture organises its relations with others and with nature: the structures 
and organisation of modes of representation are related, to put it no more strongly, to 
the structures and organisation of the broader culture.
These general categories, ‘form of life’ and ‘form of representation’, do not imply 
anything specific about the kind and degree of organisation, differentiation, internal 
consistency, etc. of any particular culture. Such questions are the proper subject matter 
of historical and sociological inquiry. However, the philosophical presuppositions of 
these disciplines make them more or less open to different kinds of conceptions of form 
and of historical change. For instance, critical theoretical engagement with 
Eurocentrism demands a coming to terms with the emergence and the specificity of 
forms of modem life, and therefore depends on an adequate ontology. This, I shall be 
arguing, is what Roy Bhaskar’s realism provides.2 Realist ontological presuppositions 
can sustain general conceptions of historical change as well as the special characteristics 
of modem forms of social relations, forms of representation and the relations between 
them. One very general characteristic of modern forms is that they are essentially 
contradictory.3 In order to sustain its theoretical accounts of modem social relations, 
critical theory needs to embody an ontology which opens up a conceptual space in 
which to disclose the nature, extent and development of these really contradictory 
relations and processes. That is, it must be able to ground social and historical
2 Roy Bhaskar, Dialectic, Verso, London, 1994.
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dialectics. Without ontologically grounding such dialectics, critical theory denies itself 
the possibility of disclosing modem forms and remains unable to fully explore their 
implications. Talcing it as a given, for the moment, that Eurocentrism is essentially 
constituted by modem social forms, a critical theory of Eurocentrism depends on being 
able to conceptualise dialectical forms and dynamics, and so it depends on realist 
ontology.
Eurocentric forms of representation and self-understanding presuppose the absence of 
realist ontology: they are essentially ‘irrealist’. That is, they are unable to sustain 
conceptions of real contradiction and/or real change and are therefore inadequate to the 
task of self-theorisation. Critical theory, though, is a response to the irrealism of 
traditional theory: it is a programme dedicated to overcoming the incapacity of modern 
social theory to theorise its own contradictions; its aim is to understand the complex and 
contradictory relations which constitute that form of life, including the internality of 
traditional theory to such forms. Critical theory confronts these problems and faces the 
task of conceptually reconstructing the form of life we inhabit.
These remarks, though, barely even sketch out an argument which needs to be made in 
much greater depth. Indeed, while the next part of this chapter will stake out a more 
substantive account of these matters, the dynamics of the relation between Eurocentrism 
and critical theory will remain an important theme running through the thesis as a 
whole: there is an intimate relation between the two, one that shapes the very nature of 
critical theory.
For its part, Eurocentrism needs to be approached as a special form of ethnocentrism, 
whose peculiarity derives from its emphatic self-universalisation. The concept of 
Eurocentrism that emerges from the critique of this will be developed in terms of a 
‘Europic Problematic’: the ensemble of Eurocentric, universalising, thought and social 
relations. Aside from establishing this somewhat broader meaning of ‘problematic’ than 
is conventional, the primary theoretical innovation of this account is a sociological 
development of the concept of ‘dialectical universalisation’.4 The Europic problematic
3 Marx, Capital, Ben Fowkes (trans.), Harmondswortli, London, 1976.
4 The term is taken from Roy Bhaskar, though its meaning and significance are 
quite different to those he develops.
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will be elaborated in terms of a dialectical co-evolution of ‘universal’ social relations 
and forms of representation: its relational universals, and their dialectics, will be seen to 
have quite peculiar political, economic and social forms, as exemplified by capital; its 
equally manifold ‘universalist’ modes of representation will be seen as so many 
theoretical elaborations of these relations of civil society.
As these remarks indicate, the development of a critical theoretical account of 
Eurocentrism is intimately related to existing critiques of civil society and political 
economy. However, as they stand, such critiques do not constitute a fully developed 
theory of the nature of Eurocentrism. Nor does critical theory possess an adequate 
understanding of the significance of Eurocentrism, either as a dimension of the theory, 
practice and social foimation of civil society, nor in terms of what it means for the 
development of critical theory itself. The critical theory of Eurocentrism, as it is 
developed here, emerges only through the mutual interrogation of positions within the 
wider field of debates around various modes of critical theory. Only by drawing out the 
implications of questions related to universalism and relativism, for instance, or to ideas 
of Eurocentrism in literature and social science disciplines, has it been possible to begin 
to develop the outline of the theory of Eurocentrism as set out in the following pages.
The following two sections of this infroduction provide air outline of the cognitive 
problem that Eurocentrism poses for critical theory and a brief statement of the direction 
that this work takes in setting out a solution to that problem. The final section then 
provides a brief summary of the chapters that follow.
I. Prefatory Infroduction: Inside the elephant.
A critical-theoretical account of Eurocentrism is needed to address a theoretical 
absence. The need arises not because there are no accounts of Eurocentrism which draw 
on forms of critical theory. Indeed, there is some diversity here. Rather, there are serious 
questions about how adequate such accounts are. As it stands, critical theory is to 
Eurocentrism as the blind men of the fable are to the elephant.5 The stoiy gives us a 
metaphor for how religions reveal god, with blind men standing in for religion and an
5 See Appendix.
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elephant for god. Each man encounters only a part of the elephant and uses his curtailed 
faculties to feel his way around. Each one offers up rival accounts of what he had found 
to the others, insisting that they alone had experienced the truth about the animal. So 
one, having grasped the trunk, is able to tell of the texture of the skin and its hair, its 
length, what its movement is like, and so on. Another, having deftly traced over the 
surface of a leg, can detail what he has found. Still others have investigated, say, the tail 
or a tusk. The moral of the tale, of course, is that each description offers a doubly partial 
truth, one which acquires both its validity and its limitations from the fact of its limited 
perspective. The lesson we are supposed to draw is of the need for the humility to 
recognise that our own perspective is like this, and for the charity to accept that we can 
learn from others in similar but different positions.
The story, though, is not quite adequate to our situation. True, there are strong 
similarities between the relation of modern theory to Eurocentrism and that of religion 
to god: each is partially constitutive of its object of inquiry. What this means for critical 
though is quite different. If the men in the story had risen to the occasion, each one 
would have provided the others with the best account that could have been given from 
their limited vantage point; each of them would have come to know what all of the 
others did. Yet, the creature would have remained mysterious to all of them. They 
would still not have known how each part related to each of the others; they would still 
have yet to find out how it all fitted together. Despite all their endeavours to discover 
and communicate, they would have continued to be without what they set out for: an 
adequate account of their common object - the elephant. They might have been able to 
speculate, drawing on their shared knowledge of other creatures, but these conceptions 
would have been necessarily incomplete, constituted by absences which would have 
been papered over in some way or other. Their collective understanding of the elephant 
would have been far superior to each individual, isolated and reductive view, but it 
would have remained a partial and limited form of understanding. The best idea of the 
elephant they could reach would bear the traces of their social and historical cultural 
conditions: their social relations to the elephant would have conditioned, and been 
‘reflected’ in, the kind of understanding they would have been able to reach.
Eurocentrism, like the apocryphal animal, is also of a piece. Like the elephant it is a 
large and complex organism. It too has many features, some of which are to be found on
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the surface, but many of which lay hidden below it. The labour of uncovering the 
mechanisms at work and of linking them with the evidence to hand poses a considerable 
challenge. Like the blind investigators, theorists of Eurocentrism have accumulated 
fragments of knowledge. They too have approached their object from a range of limited 
perspectives; they too face the difficulty of assembling these fragments into a more 
coherent whole. What they do not yet have, what they have so far been unable to 
construct from their collected fragments, is their equivalent of the idea of the elephant: 
their theoretical object.
The social sciences are no less disputatious than the fabulous wise men: they are not 
some special preserve of humble and charitable seekers after greater truths. They are 
riven by disciplinary distinctions and divergent intellectual traditions, and by personal 
as well as political contentions. Rivalry and competition may be spurs to the pursuit and 
growth of knowledge, but the ways in which the disciplines have been institutionalised 
have not made these unequivocally virtuous qualities: there is no necessary connection 
between academic competition and the emergence of truth. It may also be that the 
conditions under which modern social sciences exist foreclose on the emergence of 
consensus, that its concepts and categories are essentially unstable and are therefore 
irreducibly contestable. Such considerations, however, still suggest that it is possible to 
pursue the virtues indicated by the fable. One way of addressing the multiplicity of 
ideas is by seeking to ground them more clearly in their common conditions of 
existence. Critical reflexivity demands a strong sociology of knowledge concerned with 
disclosing its own relation to the historical world it seeks to know. Ideas of 
Eurocentrism which do not relate their own forms and contents to the formal, 
substantive and processual qualities of the world from which they arise must be lacking 
in important respects. The greater the extent to which such connections can be made, the 
more the limitations of existing ideas can be explained.6
There are, of course, many accounts of ‘the rise of West’ from different traditions only 
some of which belong to the West itself, but all of which have been profoundly touched
6 Against this it could be argued that while enhancing a capacity for self- 
contextualisation is necessary there is no guarantee it will be sufficient for 
producing a definitive theoretical object. Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that 
the development of cognitive capabilities will always be marked by the 
constraints imposed on them by their conditions of existence.
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by it. Some are glorifying, others wrestle with some internal problems, while still others 
are more critical of this experiment in human existence, of what it does to those who 
pursue it and to those subject to it. That European powers have risen to global 
prominence during the course of the past half millennium is not contested. A series of 
imperial ventures, related to the dynamics of state formation toward the end of the 
feudal period in Europe, saw European states consolidate their positions domestically 
and extend their political and economic relations out into the wider world: Spain and 
Portugal, Holland, France and Britain, as well as the neo-European United States of 
America. While recent administrations in Washington have sought ‘full spectrum 
dominance’, by no means all of this expansion can be accounted for in terms of 
technical or military superiority. Some of the most devastating weapons deployed in 
imperial and colonial struggles have been deception and disease, while many individual 
conquerors took more than their fair share of luck with them. Nevertheless, connected to 
the growing reality of political-economic-military superiority has been a strong sense of 
cultural superiority. Historically, two broad themes emerged. There has been a broad 
shift from ideas couching European superiority in terms of its Christianity to those 
emphasising the development of its secular institutions and outlook. Within this, there 
has been a growing emphasis on accounting for Europe’s place in the world in terms of 
its capitalist economy rather than its political institutions, a shift in emphasis which has 
broadly accompanied the rising significance of science and technology as a force of 
production.7
For very many commentators, there is little doubt that rationalisation, under one or other 
description, has played a most significant pail in the development of modem European 
culture: Law, bureaucracy, civil society, science and technology, culture and the arts 
have all been related to rationalisation and secularisation. For some, an essential 
characteristic of the modem is the rationalisation of relations with nature and of social 
relations more broadly. Max Weber, in The Protestant Ethic, presented religion as the 
unwitting vehicle of secularisation, thanks to its incubation of a certain mode of 
rationalisation. For others there are even longer term continuities, characterised as a 
‘western metaphysic’, stretching back to the classical antiquity of Mediterranean and 
Levantine cultures. Either way, a distinctively ‘rational’ outlook has been widely
7 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure o f Men: Science, Technology and 
Ideologies o f Western Dominance, Cornell University Press, London, 1989.
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attributed to European culture and has been used to explain the rise and dominance of 
the West.
Such accounts are, of course, contested, giving rise to the rich and diverse tradition of 
reflecting on the condition of modernity. While rival understandings of this condition 
need to be treated on their individual merits, one of the fundamental issues raised by the 
question of Eurocentrism concerns the standards by which this social formation and 
reflections on it should be judged. Broadly speaking, political philosophy can be 
understood as raising two kinds of questions: one revolving around the distinctions and 
relations between universalism and relativism; the other concerning relations of power 
and knowledge.
Making a claim for the universality of either a form of knowledge or some other aspect 
of a form of life is to make claims about social nature. It is to imply some ontological 
extrapolation fi'om particular ways of knowing and being: it is to make the claim that 
this particular form is of general relevance, far beyond its localised existence. To 
attribute relativism to some aspect of life, on the other hand, is to affirm its localised 
significance. Where universalism implies transcending the spatio-temporal boundaries 
of culture, relativism implies socio-historical containment.
The culturally transcendent implications of universalism involve an apparent paradox, 
for it implies a sense of both cultural neutrality and, at the same time, of cultural 
superiority. Universal reason, for example, is represented as culturally neutral on the 
grounds that it is a common feature of all cultures. The form and categories of universal 
reason are neutral between cultures because they are applicable in all cases. Their 
formalisation is merely a way of representing that commonality. However, the kind of 
reflexivity which produces the universalist mentality, and the kind of culture generated 
by acting on it, implies a cultural superiority. It is one tiling for universal truths to exist, 
another to know and act on them. This ambiguity arises from the theory and practice of 
universalism, and is a constitutive feature of the modem political tradition.
The power/knowledge distinction raises the problem of how forms of power and 
knowledge are related. The most common positions tend to oscillate between illicitly 
separating them and reductively collapsing one into the other, while positions asserting
12
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that they axe internally related are advanced to overcome these splits and reductions and 
related categorial errors.8 Autonomised accounts of knowledge understand forms of 
knowledge as developing quite separately from forms of power; they are concerned with 
the development of ways of knowing whose form and content cannot be accounted for 
as effects of power. The common epistemological tactic for separating power and 
knowledge is to cut out the possibility of social mediation by naturalising a form of 
knowledge, or by claiming that some particular form of knowledge has a privileged 
relation with nature. Such a tactic involves a more or less explicit deployment of 
ontological claims about knowledge and is readily recognisable as a universalising 
strategy. By contrast, a concern for the internal relations between power and knowledge 
leads to emphatically sociological, as opposed to ontological, strategies. Questions may 
be asked, for instance, about the extent to which the development of the distinction 
between manual and theoretical labour, on which all modem forms of knowledge 
depend, itself depends on the development of class relations.9
When the universalism/relativism distinction is brought together with power/knowledge 
it generates a pattern of possible perspectives on the politics of modernity. Universalist 
accounts imply, more or less explicitly, that the success of modern social formation is 
due to some special relation to nature. Modern forms are held to transcend their social 
and historical origins because of some essential affinities with natural and/or human 
being. They are, in some sense, a realisation or fulfilment of what it means for humans 
to exist, and/or of what it means for humans to know.
Universalism can serve to legitimate modem institutions, portraying them as the ideal 
conditions of self-realisation. It also provides a vantage point from which any form of 
life, including actually existing modern ones, can be criticised. Ontologised conceptions 
of the modem can be projected as deontological idealisations against which its mundane 
realities can be found wanting. Such idealisations can also be invoked to show how the 
practical organisation of actual institutions imposes unnecessary limitations on
8 While Winch remains largely content to assert the internality of social relations 
others have given greater attention to what this means. See for instance Bertell 
Oilman’s ‘The Philosophy of Internal Relations’ in Dialectical Investigations,
Routledge, London, 1993. An internal relation is constitutive of the things so 
related, meaning that they cannot be fully understood in the abstract.
9 See Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour: A critique of  
epistemology, MacMillan, London, 1978.
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possibilities of human realisation. Either way, the condition of modernity is translated 
into a generally applicable, universal, ethic.
Universalist representations of power and knowledge are similarly ethicised. On the one 
hand, actual forms of power and knowledge can be presented as free from systematic 
bias or distortion and therefore as the effective means of removing cultural distortions 
to, or obstacles in the way of, human development. Alternatively, the universalist ethic 
is critical, exposing the distortions of power tied to particularistic ends and its negative 
effects. Such ethical idealisations are behind demands to properly harness modem 
powers to the project of bringing the modem back to the truth of itself. They provide an 
endlessly renewed impetus for pursuing the universalistic vision. In this way, 
universalism generates a strand of critical theory, one which supports visions of a de­
politicised, neutral, reason, as Rawls and Habermas do in their different ways.10
Other strands of critical theory have different problems. Given that the universalising 
strategy entails the illicit transformation of self-conceptions into ontological ones, there 
is a double task to perform. The first is the anti-philosophical task of deconstruction, 
closely identified with Wittgenstein and Derrida. This project attacks the forms of 
abstraction produced by the dominant tradition as illicit universalisation. Wittgenstein’s 
‘philosophical pictures’ and Derrida’s writing under erasure are both forms of immanent 
critique designed to reveal the implausibility of traditional attempts to produce 
transhistorical generalisations. The second task is the reconstructive one of replacing the 
old philosophies. While the first form of critical theory is engaged in this, it tends to 
reproduce the problems of the tradition. Deconstruction, meanwhile, draws on the 
experience of the tradition to deny the distinctiveness of philosophical questions and, as 
a consequence, effectively neglects philosophical and ontological questions. This gives 
rise to the curious spectacle of relativism raising philosophical questions only to avoid 
them. Having undermined the overly self-confident aspect of modern philosophical self 
consciousness, this mode of critical theory cleaves to its more sceptical side. There is, 
though, no escaping the problem of universals: social theory demands a philosophy, and 
any serious attempt to abandon the pursuit of philosophy simply undermines the
10 See, for instance, Jurgen Habermas on the differentiation and autonomy of social 
spheres. The Theory o f Communicative Action, Vols. 1 and 2, Polity Press,
Cambridge, 1986, 1989.
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possibility of theory. A critical theory without a philosophy cuts the ground out from 
underneath itself.
Critical theory proper, then, begins with relativistic criticism of the universalist claims 
of modernity but it must lead on to a radical, deeper, critique of the forms of those 
universals. It must combine a strong sociological programme with an equally effective 
philosophical one which, unlike both other modes of critical theory, encompasses an 
ontological dimension. A critical relativism of this kind will locate modem institutions 
in space and time; it will treat their tendencies to universalisation as only relatively 
superior, being produced by mechanisms which just happen to be the most powerful and 
successful contemporary experiments in being human; it will recognise that their 
success is due, at least in part, to the universalistic self-conceptions which inform them; 
it will show how claims for the universality of the modern are intrinsically contradictory 
and, ultimately, indefensible - for both universalist self-legitimation and idealisation 
illicitly collapse particularity into universality, and must do so continually as conditions 
change; it will show that the efficacy of universalism depends on minimising any 
appearance of ethical hypocrisy by continually ‘resolving’ the symptoms of real 
contradictions as and when they appear. Such a perspective on illicit European 
universalism and universalisation will show that, in practice, the ontological and 
deontological strategies of universalism are intimately related. The ethical ideals of 
universality, informing the establishment of and reform of modern institutions, cannot 
be separated from the obstacles and distortions found in practice and associated with the 
effects of power.
Many of these issues have been addressed by the tradition of Western Marxism, one of 
whose persistent features has been the investigation of the internal relations between the 
forms of modern theoretical universals and the structures of dominant social relations. 
Lukacs, in his critique of reification, relates analytic forms of thought to class relations; 
Adorno relates the problems of identity thinking to modern forms of political 
domination; Althusser drew out the relations between the inner structures ‘theoretical 
humanism’ and bourgeois class relations; Bhaskar, similarly, deals with the 
contradictory forms of the modem tradition, allowing for the forms of modern
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universalism to be theorised in terms of anthropic irrealism.11 Although not explicitly 
directed to questions of Eurocentrism, they make an indispensable contribution to them.
Only by developing these approaches will it be possible to address the problem posed 
by the fable of the elephant. As it stands, the various perspectives on Eurocentrism 
provide divergent accounts of Western political, economic and social domination: 
Eurocentrism appears in many guises, such as Imperialism and Orientalism, 
Westernisation, globalisation and so on. While they all reveal something about 
Eurocentrism, these accounts tend to be what Wallerstein calls Eurocentric anti- 
Eurocentrism.12 That is, they tend to reproduce the Eurocentricities of the philosophical 
and theoretical discourses on modernity. They are immanent, but partial, critiques 
belonging to traditions which are both of and for modernity: ways of thinking which 
have emerged out of the modern and have largely been intended to feed more or less 
directly back into it. These kinds of critique are in fact the dominant ways in which 
moderns have understood themselves.
The analogy between the elephant and the historical object of Eurocentrism, however, 
has its limits and should only be taken so far. In the first place, theorists of 
Eurocentrism do not approach their real object from the outside. Rather, they are 
already inside it, they inhabit it. Eurocentrism is the very milieu of theory, constituting 
its encompassing environment. More importantly, perhaps, and here is the second limit 
. on the analogy, the object of theory is inside it. Eurocentrism is a part of what modem 
theory is. The starting point for a critical theory must be the fact that the theories and 
realities of Eurocentrism are inside one another, mutually constituting one another, with 
each making the other what it is.
n Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness; Studies in Marxist Dialectics, 
Merlin Press, London, 1971; Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London, 1973. Bhaskar, Dialectic, Verso, London, 1994. At this 
stage, ‘anthropic irrealism’ need only be taken to gesture towards Bhaskar’s 
expansive elaboration of the themes raised by Lukacs, Adorno and Althusser.
12 ‘Eurocentrism and its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science’, New Left 
Review, 226, November/December 1997.
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II. Introductory Conclusions: A thoroughly problematic universalism.
The account of Eurocentrism towards which this thesis is working is as follows: 
Eurocentrism is the Europeanisation of the world through word and deed. It is the 
. theory and practice of universalising the modem. It designates the changing intellectual 
and practical capacities for developing modem social forms and for extending them into 
the world. Theoretically, Eurocentrism is the illicit self-universalisation of the 
European. Eurocentric theory is the systematic misrecognition of the abstract 
generalities belonging to modem societies and putting them forward, illicitly, as 
universals; it is a distorting mirror held up to modem society in which the European 
appears to be universally valid. Practically, Eurocentrism combines historical processes 
of universalisation and their effects, where Eurocentric processes tend towards 
eliminating real cultural difference, and/or subordinating such difference to its own ends 
or otherwise constraining its significance. Eurocentrism entails the development and 
exercise of capacities for universalistic social transformation; it is the ensembles of 
processes through which these capacities are set to work in the effort to eradicate 
cultural differences and cultural autonomies; the means by which real identities between 
the European and the rest are established.
These forms of theory and practice are oriented towards the institution of ‘universal’ 
social relations. Equally, the institution of such relations provides a stronger social 
grounding for these forms of theory and practice. The ensemble of forms, and its 
dynamics of development and expansion, shall be dealt with here as elements of the 
overarching ‘Europic Problematic’ and elaborated in terms of ‘dialectical 
universalisation’.
The significance of dialectics, in this context, derives from the contradictions and 
absences which reside in the core of both the theory and practice of European 
universalisation, Eurocentric theory is constituted by generalities abstracted from 
modern social forms, but which are treated as if they were validly applicable to all 
social life. As Eurocentric theory systematically ‘forgets’ the particularity of the 
European it constitutes itself as a web of absences and contradictions.
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However, while its constitutive holes make it prone to critique, the intellectual problems 
they generate are hardly sufficient to bring the edifice of modem theory crumbling to 
the ground. For while theoretical claims to universality lack internal consistency, such 
theory does not want for purchase on the world. Indeed, so long as this form of theory 
continues to feed into modem institutions,, and through them into capacities for 
changing the world, theoretical doubts can be subordinated to political ones. Eurocentric 
tendencies to universalisation do not rest solely, even primarily, on the abstract 
coherence of claims to universality. Rather, the real validity of Eurocentric theory is a 
practical one: its continuing ability to ‘resolve’ apparent problems and to reproduce and 
enhance capacities for universalisation. Theory works in as much as it helps to create 
the conditions under which modem categories can be practically applied to the world. 
The dynamics of the theory and practice of universalisation entail the identification of 
those parts of the world from which modem social relations are absent, so that they 
might be extended into them.53
Nevertheless, the internal contradictions of universalism, and their effects, are of real 
significance for the processes of universalisation. While they are constitutive of the 
processes of cultural expansion, they are most keenly felt at the internal and external 
limits of this form of life. Externally, both the natural world and other forms of cultural 
life persistently pose obstacles, some of which are more or less easily overcome, others 
of which might threaten catastrophe. At these limits the particularism of the Eurocentric 
project, the attempted subsumption of all forms of life under its own categories, is 
starkly exposed: A truly universalising project does not face ‘no go’ areas.
The internal contradictions of Eurocentrism are less readily expressed so succinctly. 
Here it is necessary to turn away from the processes of global expansion and look 
inwards, to investigate the deep inner structures of this dynamic social foimation. It is 
necessary to inquire into just what it is that is being universalised by delving into the 
specificities of modem European social relations. Hidden in the depths of these social 
relations, as it were, are the well springs of Eurocentrism. Modern social relations, 
following Marx’s analysis of capital, have a characteristic duality: the simultaneity of
lj On this view, universalistic ‘critical’ theory, as sketched in the above section, 
becomes a vital moment in the overall process of universalisation. Universalistic 
criticism is simply criticism of die absence of the universals in question.
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the concrete and the abstract. What is more, the abstract dimension is the dominant one. 
Indeed, it is this abstract dimension, rather than any specific concrete form of life, 
which is the real object of universalisation. It is also the abstract dimension which 
appeal’s in theory as. universals. What this means is that Eurocentrism has to be 
understood as the contradictory universalisation of contradictory universals, i.e. it is 
essentially dialectical.
The expression used at the very beginning to describe Eurocentrism, ‘the theory and 
practice of universalisation,' now has this double significance: an internal inflection and 
an external inflection; both of which are essentially contradictory. On the one hand, the 
self-referential side. refers to self-constitution in terms of ‘universals’, to the 
development of a society dominated by really abstract general social qualities, qualities 
which appeal’ to transcend this form of life by assuming universal status. On the other 
hand, there is a relation to otherness, an overreaching process of cultural expansion, 
through which others are re-constituted in terms deriving from the self, but under the 
sign of the universal.
Commonly, ‘dialectic’ brings together process and contradiction. There are two types of 
dialectic: good and bad respectively. Good dialectic implies a process which is 
motivated by contradictions but through which those contradictions are overcome: 
dialectic as transformation through the transcending of internal contradictions. Bad 
dialectics are processes in which constitutive internal contradictions are preserved, or 
even intensified. Bad dialectics continue until such contradictions can no longer be 
sustained, at which point a crisis emerges.
These two senses of dialectic can be applied to the understanding of Eurocentrism. The 
first sense of dialectic here relates to the process through which we come to a critical 
theoiy of Eurocentrism: this first dialectic is the progressive one of critique.14 It is the 
process through which the internal contradictions and illicit universalism of 
Eurocentrism are disclosed and articulated. As an internally contradictory form of 
knowledge, the universalist problematic is unable to disclose its own contradictions 
adequately. Disclosing these contradictions requires that a new sense of universality is
14 Critique is distinguished from criticism in that the former goes beyond pointing 
out errors and limitations by offering an explanation for them.
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established. This involves the dialectics of real change to the conceptual form of 
existing universals, such that the deep, underlying conditions of theoretical production 
are transformed. It is here, in the development of a distinctive theory of the form, i.e. 
categorial structures, of the illicit universalism of Eurocentrism, that realist philosophy 
is of the utmost importance.
There are three moments to this process of critique.15 Firstly, immanent critique 
discloses contradictions. Secondly, omissive critique explains those contradictions by 
grounding them in what is missing or absent. Illicit universals lend historically specific 
categories transhistorical status, so the key absence or lack within their categorial 
structures is an adequate distinction between the levels of particularity and generality. 
Without a sustainable distinction between these levels, the categories of universalism 
generate a dual language in which the two levels are fused together: the transhistorical is 
treated as the historical, while the historical becomes transhistorical. This fusion of 
levels, the effective collapse of any distinction between the philosophical and the 
sociological, however, generates the contradictory symptoms on which immanent 
critique feeds. The third move in this dialectic is explanatory critique: here the 
categorial errors and absences of theory are explained in relation to their broader social 
milieu. In the case of Eurocentrism it means explaining illicitly universalistic theory as 
the self-understanding of those enmeshed in really abstract, universal, social relations.
In addition to tins epistemic inflection of dialectic, there is also an ontic one concerning 
the object of investigation: Eurocentrism. The process of universalising abstract social 
relations is itself dialectical. This time, though, we have a bad, regressive, or negative, 
dialectic. While constituted by contradictions in its theory, practice and social relations, 
it is not oriented towards their real resolution, let alone the transformation of their 
conditions of existence. Far from it. The negative dialectics of universalising European 
abstractions are those of the expansion, intensification and displacement of its 
constitutive contradictions. This bad dialectic is internally differentiated, with many 
interlocking aspects. For instance, it encompasses processes of subjectification, in 
which the universalist abstractions become the means of social communication and co­
ordination. It also entails processes through which modern subjects are subordinated to
15 See Bhaskar Dialectic, Verso, London, 1993.
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the often harsh realities of abstract social relations. Moreover, this dialectic tends to 
universalise its own conditions of existence, drawing in the world as a whole. To this 
end it extends its own internal absences and contradictions into other forms of culture, 
at the same time seeking to displace its worst effects onto them. This requires the 
■ removal of all constraints standing in the way of its doing so, producing a quite specific 
sense of universalisation as dialectics: the removal of the obstacles in the way of 
overcoming the absence of universals.16
This gives us a provisional definition of Eurocentrism as the Europic problematic which 
encompasses the dialectical universalisation of theoretical and real abstractions 
appearing under the guise of universals. Fortunately, for the possibility of critical 
theory, the contradictions within the historical processes of the Europic problematic 
constitute it as the ground horn which dialectical critique emerges. That is, the Europic 
problematic is constituted by a double dialectic, with the good dialectic of critical 
understanding subordinate to, but emergent out of, the bad dialectics of our present 
mode of being. The task of critical theory is to realise the possibility for a positive 
theory of Eurocentrism which is immanent within the negative dialectics of Eurocentric 
universalisation. Indeed, as the above references to Marx and others have intimated, it is 
horn this tradition of critical theory that many of the most valuable resources for 
addressing Eurocentrism have emerged.17
16 Bhaskar gives a special place to this conception of dialectic: he speaks of ‘the 
removal of the absenting of constraints on the absenting of absences, or ills’, e.g. 
Dialectic p. 396. This conception of dialectic is central to his ethical ideal o f the 
process of securing conditions of human flourishing. However it can be applied to 
modern universalisation, which generates its own perspective horn which 
absences or ills are judged. Whether good or bad, this conception of dialectic 
presupposes a state of fullness or completion horn as the perspective from which 
the dialectic must be understood.
17 It is commonplace to take the opposite view and affiliate Marxism with 
Eurocentrism, not least because of the political practices of many communist 
parties acting in Marx’s name. Marxism generally has also been one o f the 
principal targets of postmodernist accusations of reproducing a Eurocentric 
‘grand narrative’ of history and civilisation. It is not my intention here to rebut 
such accusations. Rather I will be concerned to show that the Marxian tradition is 
irreducible to these strands. Marxism possesses intellectual and political 
resources of a quite different kind.
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III. Chapter Outline
This work, then, sets out to develop an integrated account of Eurocentrism. It will seek 
to do so through a series of mutually enhancing critiques of existing ideas, carrried out 
on two broad fronts. The first opens up an epistemic perspective on Eurocentrism, one 
oriented towards consolidating a self-understanding of critical theory as a critique of the 
forms assumed by Eurocentric universals. This self-understanding remains incomplete 
if it does not develop an appreciation of the process of critique, i.e. the dialectics of its 
own emergence and of the development of the categorial forms specific to critical- 
theoretical knowledge. This aspect of the work draws considerably on Louis Althusser’s 
conception of a bourgeois-humanist problematic and Roy Bhaskar’s account of a critical 
realist dialectics.18 Both writers thematise the ‘centrism’ of dominant modes of thought, 
with Bhaskar setting out a detailed account of the irrealist, anthropocentric, forms which 
underlies it . By drawing Bhaskar’s general theory of anthropo centric contradictions 
onto the more specific terrain of Althusser’s problematic, it becomes possible to outline 
the problematic of Eurocentric universalism and to understand critical theory as a 
conceptual field within which this problematic can be theorised.
The second perspective on Eurocentrism is ontic. This involves a shift from the 
investigation of forms of knowledge to that of social relations. Of primary interest here 
are the deep structures and developmental tendencies of modem social relations, i.e. the 
forms of real universals and processes of universalisation. This dimension is developed 
through an integration of sociological critiques of civil society and political economy, 
on the one hand, with philosophical-anthropological critiques of universalism often 
associated with relativism. Emerging from this encounter is an account of Eurocentrism 
as the dialectical universalisation of the categories of civil society, i.e. the penetration of 
culture throughout the world by the forms of value, law and rationality specific to the 
modem social formation.
18 While this work draws heavily on Bhaskar’s work, there are significant problems 
with Bhaskar’s oeuvre. Bhaskar’s commitment to philosophy, i.e. to the 
elaboration of abstract, real, universals, is ultimately ‘traditional’. That is, he has 
a tendency to disregard the strictly formal character of philosophy and to collapse 
distinctions between the abstract findings of philosophy and the progressively 
more concrete ones of sociology and history.
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While there are shifts between these epistemic and ontic concerns, throughout the 
following chapters, they are always treated as mutually related perspectives on a whole: 
Eurocentric knowing and being are considered to be internally related, as one another’s 
mutual, and co-evolving, conditions of existence. The theoretical account of this 
wholeness draws- the epistemic and ontic together under the overarching concept of 
‘combined and uneven dialectical universalisation’. It generates a deeply unsettled sense 
of wholeness: one characterised by partialness, precariousness, awkwardness, whose 
tendencies to completeness are combined with opposite tendencies to dissolution or 
collapse.
These themes will be elaborated in the next chapter, ‘Critical theoretical Anti- 
Eurocentrism’, which establishes the basic framework for the project as a whole. The 
work of this chapter pushes Althusser’s conception of a ‘problematic’ in the direction of 
Winch’s account of a ‘form of life’. In so doing it offers a certain counterbalance to the 
emphasis that Althusser is understood to place on ideology and theory as the primary 
moments of a problematic. The conventional use of problematic is expanded in such a 
way that it comes to encompasses theory, practice and social relations as elements 
within a broader complex and contradictory ensemble.
The imaginary and lived dimension of this theoretical object are developed in teims of 
what Fredric Jameson has called ‘ideologemes’, and by treating Charles Taylor’s 
account of the Modem Imaginary as the basic ideologeme of modern social theory. This 
‘master’ ideologeme provides modem theory with its basic ontological and 
anthropological presuppositions, its peculiar vision of social order and its sense of 
commutative justice. This aspect of the problematic can be understood as the ‘ethical 
economic problematic’.
The key points of reference for the relational dimension of this first attempt to sketch 
out the theoretical object of Eurocentrism are Trotsky’s ‘uneven and combined 
development’ and Gramsci’s account of hegemony and the extended state.19 The former 
inspires an account of the various modes of universalisation implied by the fragmentary 
expansion of forms of civil society, while the latter is deployed to illuminate modem
19 See Christine Buci-Glucksman, Gramsci and the State, David Fernbach trans.,
Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1980.
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political struggles as conflicts over their institution and co-ordination. Gramscrs 
understanding of the institution of hegemony in terms of ‘unstable equilibria’ also 
makes it possible to give an account of the conditions under which it becomes possible 
to represent political formations as ‘realised’ versions of the ethical economy.
Subsequent chapters are devoted to elaborating various aspects of the Europic 
problematic. In chapter, 3: ‘Universal Ethnocentrism’, the Eurocentric nature of modem 
social formation is explored through developing a contrast between modern universals 
and realist categories. The realist critique of the form of the ‘universalist’ categories of 
social theory is used here to emphasise the specificity, i.e. non-universality, of these 
categories. From the perspective of philosophical anthropology, ‘ethnocentrism’ is 
examined as a general, genuinely universal, feature of cultural life. From a sociological 
perspective, modern universalisation is established as a form of ethnocentrism. These 
moves are undertaken through an exploration of the emergence of the discourse of 
'Eurocentrism', understood as a foim of social criticism linked to movements for refoim.
The public sphere within which this discourse emerged possesses a certain 'logic' of 
cultural and political representation, a logic which at once enables and constrains social 
criticism. Criticism politicises and/or depoliticises social ills, bringing existing visions 
of political reality into question, thereby exposing the illicit nature of their claims to 
universality. However, the fonn criticism takes means that the alternative visions it 
generates possess the same, illicit, form of universality. This tends to guide political 
practice into the reproduction of the underlying causes of social ills -  causes which 
remain underrepresented, if not altogether unrepresented, in the public sphere.
A full and proper understanding of Eurocentrism only emerges through an interrogation 
of the deep structures of modem ‘universalism’ and its consequences for the possibility 
of historical reflexivity. The fourth chapter ‘The Imaginary of Dialectical 
Universalisation,’ deepens the preceding work by showing how the 
universalism/particularism antinomy is a basic structural feature of social theory. A 
critical theory of the ‘universalist problematic’ is developed through critiques of 
Ricoeur’s discussion of universalism and Mannheim’s account of ideology and utopia.
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This resulting ‘dialectic of ideology and utopia’ provides a certain level of explanation 
for the limited nature of social criticisms of Eurocentrism. Constrained by this inner 
structure, the term can only be deployed as a partial form of ideology critique. It 
exposes forms of distributive injustice whose presence blocks the possibility of 
representing the world in terms of the connnutative justice proper to civil society. The 
‘resolutions’ for this kind of problem of ‘Eurocentrism* are essentially policy 
recommendations for forms of redistribution, which generally lack any strong 
conception of the forms of political struggle required to bring them about. They also 
completely fail to disclose the realities of dialectical universalisation, reproducing its 
inner form and logic.
Chapter 5, ‘The Dual Dialectics of the Ethical Economic Imaginary,’ further deepens 
and broadens the concept of the Eurocentric problematic. In addition to the dialectics of 
ideology and utopia, the internal contradictions of the problematic also generate a 
second, transformative, dialectic. This locates the tendency to realist critique inside the 
Eurocentric problematic. The primary tensions of the problematic are shown to be a 
consequence of the systematic ambiguities between transhistorical and historical 
categories, and the strains they produce. Much critical theory is symptomatic of both 
tendencies, but tends to be drawn back into the Eurocentric problematic. The rationality 
debates and disputes over relativism provide clear illustrations of these opposing 
tendencies at work, and of the ‘gravitational’ effect of ethical economic thought.
Chapter 6, ‘The Anthropic Form of Europic Universalism,’ is the first of two chapters' 
drawing out the significance of Bhaskar’s account of ‘realism’ and ‘irrealisnT for the 
disclosure and critique of the forms of Europic Dialectical Universalisation. It provides 
a thorough examination of Bhaskar’s development of the concept of ‘anthroporealism’, 
and explains how the categories and forms of realist dialectics are essential for 
comprehending the full range of real contradictions internal to modem universalism. On 
the one hand, Bhaskar’s conception of anthropic irrealism is presented as a 
generalisable critical theory of universalism in philosophy, social and political theory. 
On the other, it suggests some direct parallels between Bhaskar’s critique of philosophy 
of science and Marx’s critique of political economy. The latter aims to show how the 
ethical economic imaginary posits a denaturalised world that lacks its own substantive 
essence and how it envisages a reconstitution of nature on the basis of desocialised
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abstract relations. Within this imaginary, concrete realities are denaturalised and de- 
essentialised, only for this insubstantial reality to be sublated under the desocialised 
abstract essences of civil society.
Chapter 7, ‘The Dialectics of Irrealist Social Forms’, further elaborates the concept of 
the forms of Eurocentric universalism, showing how it can be informed by the dialectics 
of critical realism. Moving from the categorial structures of symbolic representations to 
those of social relations, Bhaskar’s account of the analytic-dialectic distinction is 
translated into a, somewhat abstract, sociological account of the dominant forms of 
Eurocentric modernity. The peculiarity of modern, universal, social relations is their 
really abstract and analytic character: the process of their institution, meanwhile, is an 
over-arching dialectic. The institution of such relations is a process of universalisation, 
a process which entails the formal and real subsumption of concrete forms by these 
abstract relations. The dialectics of this form of universalisation are shown to 
presuppose the (coercive) mediation and reconstitution of concrete realities and the 
institution of the profoundly contradictory social forms of Eurocentrism.
Finally, chapter 8, ‘Capital and Europic Dialectical Universalisation’, moves towards a 
more substantive conception of Europic Universalisation. This is achieved by offering 
an account of Marx’s work on the value relation and fetishism. It shows how the value 
relation must be understood in terms of the anthropic, irrealist, forms of both its 
symbolic representation and social relations. Once this has been established, the 
development of capital comes to exemplify the conception of Europic dialectical 
universalisation advanced in previous chapters. This, in turn, makes it possible to 
understand Europic universals more generally in terms of the form of the value relation.
The concluding chapter sketches out ‘The Mutual Implications of Critical Theory and 
Eurocentrism’. It gives a brief account of the real object of critical theoretical anti- 
Eurocentrism, i.e. the Europic Problematic. This can be understood as the combined and 
uneven multiple and complex dialectical universalisation of the Europic universal 
categories of civil society. It also reiterates the profound centrality of the question of 
Eurocentrism to the context, nature and purpose of critical theory. The theoretical 
contradictions grounded in the experience of Europic realities provide critical theory
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with its teleonomic push, driving it on towards their disclosure and explanation. At the 
same time, its search for its proper theoretical object provides its teleological pull.
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I. The critique of civil society and the disclosure of Eurocentrism
A genealogy of this thesis would highlight the significance of Louis Althusser’s work 
and his account of the modern tradition and the problematic of ‘theoretical humanism’. 
This is, though, somewhat counter-intuitive for two reasons. The first is that the work of 
other thinkers has a far more prominent role in what follows than does his: his influence 
being more implicit than explicit. The second reason is that it would not be possible to 
locate this work within what has passed for the ‘Althusserian tradition’ of structuralist 
anti-humanism. This tradition, bearing his name and interpreting his work to the world, 
has not done him justice.1 Going against the grain of much, though by no means all, 
reception of his work, my work intimates, if no more, that Althusser’s work belongs at 
the very heart of any project to develop critical theory.
The Humanist Controversies revolved around the argument that Marxism, at the leading 
edge of the evolution of the critical theoretical development of social science, comes 
into its own through its opposition to ‘theoretical humanism’. Marxism emerged as a 
‘theoretical anti-humanism’: a form of politically engaged intellectual inquiry into its 
own conditions of existence which ‘broke radically with every theory that based history 
and politics on an essence of man'.2 From the perspective of theoretical anti-humanism, 
its antagonist, theoretical humanism, was revealed as the hard core of the ideologies of 
bourgeois cultural revolution: Marx’s critique of political economy indicated how the 
various strands of humanism belonging to the realm of symbolic representation all 
possessed a common structural form which made possible a wide range of strategies for 
legitimating the various manifestations and configurations of bourgeois society.
1 See Robert Resch, Althusser and the Renewal o f Marxist Social Theory,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992, for a sympathetic account of 
Althusser and a positive account of his legacy.
2 Louis Althusser, ‘Marxism and Humanism,’ in For Marx, Verso, London, 3990. 
p. 227. Althusser’s rhetorical announcements of a definitive break from 
humanism were a source of much difficulty for him and have harmed subsequent 
assessments of his work. Modern social theory is best understood as being 
dominated by forms of theoretical humanism, but containing within it tendencies 
towards theoretical anti-humanism; the Marxian tradition is just that region of 
modern intellectual terrain in which these counter tendencies are at their 
strongest. The present work is meant to both clarify this distinction and contribute 
to its Marxian pole.
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Theoretical humanism could be deployed in settings as diverse as Eighteenth Century 
Britain and the Twentieth Century Soviet Union and still retain its ethico-political 
functions of both normalising the present and moralising projects for the future.
In order to show how it was able to play these legitimating and adaptive functions, 
Theoretical humanism’ had to be identified with the philosophical anthropology of 
bourgeois cultures. It provided a mode of conceiving of human being and of human 
association which made it possible to speak in positive ethical terms about both the 
social relations which constituted those societies and the inequalities they engendered. 
From an individual standpoint, substantive inequalities are legitimate consequences of 
their endeavours, given the framework within which those endeavours are undertaken. 
From a social perspective, inequalities are rendered ethical through their links to wealth 
creation and social order. That is, inequalities can be represented as mutually, if 
asymmetrically, beneficial.
Humanism makes it possible to represent the structures and consequences of capital, 
political sovereignty, and the other dominant transformations of modernity, in terms of 
an overarching ethical norm. The most significant theoretical/ideological achievements 
of theoretical humanism is to have established the arena of civil society as both the 
locus of humanist realisation and as the ethical standard by which all forms of life were, 
ultimately, to be judged. Crafted to suit the needs of the essence of man, as it appeared 
within theoretical humanism, the many theories of civil society mediate the institution 
of modern societies. These societies are defended, promoted and developed in terms of 
universal, humanist, interests transcending class and nation to encompass all members 
of the species.
It is in forms of civil society, in its broadest sense, that theoretical humanism establishes 
the identification, between modem European culture and wider humanity. So it is here, I 
shall be arguing, in the universalist notions of this form of society, in the ideological 
habitus of humanist ‘man’, and in the historical processes through which the categories 
of bourgeois culture are universalised, that we find the true location of Eurocentrism.
None of this should be taken to imply that these connections between Bourgeois, 
Nation, Europe, and Humanity are either easily established or that once they are in place
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they are stable and durable. Rather, theoretical humanism is what Gramsci might have 
called the ultimate ‘universal plane’ on which political and cultural endeavours to forge 
and sustain such links are undertaken. How such disparate identities are characterised, 
identified and differentiated, and how they are related to one another, co-ordinated or 
brought into conflict, is the very stuff of struggles for and over hegemony. Meanwhile, 
the possibility of ideological success comes from the remarkable flexibility afforded by 
theoretical humanism and from its capacity to ‘resolve’ social contradictions, even if it 
can only do so for relatively limited periods and only in restricted spaces
As it stands, most accounts of Eurocentrism are produced on the terrain of ‘theoretical 
humanism’. They display the symptoms of traditional theory in their profound 
ambiguity towards Eurocentrism: they decry some aspects of it while theoretically, 
normatively and practically advancing others. They can be expected to approach 
Eurocentrism as an ethical problem in relation to the (Eurocentric) development of 
forms of civil society; they can be expected to treat Eurocentrism as a problem which 
appears from the perspective of some or other (Eurocentric) political project on the 
terrain of civil society.
This connection between Eurocentrism and theoretical anti-humanism also suggests that 
the critique of Eurocentrism must be an extension of existing critiques of civil society, 
although the sense in which this is so needs further clarification. To begin with, this 
thesis attempts to produce theoretical objects which provide answers to the question: 
what really is Eurocentrism? How can its structures be understood? What kinds of 
tendencies does it exert? What kinds of effects does it have? It answers these questions 
through an interlocking set of theoretical investigations into the nature of the 
Eurocentricity of the theory and the reality of modem social formation.
The framework within which these questions have been approached has emerged 
through the pursuit of three intimately related lines of inquiry into Eurocentrism and the 
social sciences. Coming from one direction, ‘Eurocentrism’ opened up a critique of the 
modem traditions of political and social theory. This requires an extensive engagement 
with the reflective and critical strands of the modern tradition, and, in particular, it 
means addressing the problematic character of philosophical debates over the nature of 
the knowledges produced by this tradition. The theoretical object towards which this
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first line of inquiry has been working is what I shall be calling, with due deference to 
Althusser, ‘theoretical Eurocentrism’.
Coming at things from another direction, the thesis also contributes to a social scientific 
understanding of the Eurocentric realities of modern social formation. Making progress 
. along this avenue demands working through accounts of the nature of modem social 
practices and relations, and tackling problems related to the social world they have 
engendered. The object with which this second line of inquiry is concerned is what I 
shall be calling ‘real Eui'ocentrism’.
Thirdly, this work confronts a defining characteristic of the terrain of ‘theoretical 
Eurocentrism’: it makes adequate self-understanding impossible, being structured in a 
way that makes it impossible for the theoretical objects ‘theoretical Eurocentrism’ and 
‘real Eurocentrism’ to appear within its horizons. A necessary condition for the 
production of such theoretical objects is a distinctive terrain, i.e. ‘theoretical anti- 
Eurocentrism’. The pursuit of this alternative form of representation is the third 
orientation of the present work.
The theoretical results of this investigation are best appreciated when approached from 
four vantage points, with each perspective providing a more finely tuned answer to the 
questions about the nature of Eurocentrism. The first take on this is to say that the three 
theoretical tasks just outlined are intimately related to one another. This follows from 
the ways in which Eurocentricity in social theory and Eurocentricity in society are 
internally related, as discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, the distinctive 
theoretical terrain of theoretical anti-Eurocentrism emerges in the course of a critical- 
reflexive theoretical struggle with the structures and effects of Eurocentrism in theory 
and reality. Two kinds of theoretical struggles are therefore indissolubly linked 
together: that for the disclosure of theoretical and real Eurocentrism and that for 
development of theoretical anti-Eurocentrism. Put in these terms, the extent to which 
the social sciences engage in the struggle for a theoretical anti-Eurocentrism serves as a 
way of defining the very nature of those sciences. To the extent that the modern 
tradition is indeed a reflective movement towards the self-understanding of modernity, 
then the development of social science is a continuous struggle for critical-theoretical 
anti-Eui'o centrism.
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A second perspective enriches the first by lending it a greater measure of specificity. 
The illicit universalism of Eurocentrism is both one of its defining characteristics and an 
essential feature of the armature of modem social formation. It is though also a weak 
point: the problems of both tire theory and practice of modem social formation are at 
their most concentrated in their universalism and universalisation respectively. Working 
towards theoretical anti-Eurocentrism means exposing both the explicit claims for, and 
the unacknowledged implications of, universalism. So, the argument goes, the ‘royal 
road5 to theoretical anti-Eurocentrism is to critique the universalism of theoretical 
Eurocentrism -  attacking the modem tradition at its Achilles5 Heel.3
A third take provides further specification. The dialectics of universalisation are neither 
concerned with ahistorical notions of the European, nor with European categories in 
general. Rather, they are a matter of the specifically modem character of the European 
associated with the emergence and pursuit of ‘bourgeois cultural revolution5, or with the 
global implications of the development of civil society and what I am calling ‘ethical 
economy5.4 ‘Bourgeois cultural revolution5, as used here, is a doubly broad conception 
of modem social transformations. On the one hand, it is sufficiently wide to encompass 
the philosophical, political and historical dimensions of a whole culture. On the other 
hand it is sufficiently abstract and loose a notion to allow it to encompass regions of 
modernity whose appearance bears little if any similarity to the European but which 
would be unintelligible in the absence of Europeanisation in some sense.
A persistent temptation of political and social theory is to understand Europeanisation 
as the expansion of, and dominance by, specific concrete forms of culture. This can be 
done at the expense of recognising, say, underdevelopment as more than the effects one 
culture has on the development of another. An adequate understanding of 
underdevelopment, rather, will acknowledge its modernity; it will be able to account for 
it not only in terms of relations between cultures, but also in terms of the 
‘internalisation5 of modem social relations by peripheral locations within a world 
system. Today, Americanisation, for instance, is spoken of in terms of the spread of
3 Roy Bhaskar uses this idea of an Achilles Heel critique: Dialectic, Verso,
London, 1993. Chapter Two-, Section 3.
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specific institutions and commodities, from the prescriptions of structural adjustment 
and good governance, to MNCs, schools of management, fast food or troops on the 
ground. However, while the dialectical universalisation of the categories of civil society 
can have such substantive implications, they do not necessarily do so. Their 
universalisation is transfactual, i.e. they produce effects which are apparently and 
substantively quite varied. Ghanaian farmers who mill rice using passing cars and trucks 
bear no resemblance to any European or neo-European farmers. Yet this practice is 
unintelligible outside the context of the combined and uneven development of the 
categories of civil society on a global scale. The penetration of Ghanaian society by the 
relations of state and capital is a form of real Europeanisation, but the structures, 
appearances and functions of social formation here are quite individual. Ghanaian 
modernity is the result of a specific history of becoming European and being, 
problematically, integrated into a European dominated world order.
The universalisation of modem relations, then, is compatible with very different 
pathways into a singular, encompassing, modernity. What is needed is a way of 
understanding the Eurocentricities of modernity in terms which cannot be reduced either 
to the effects that bourgeois culture revolution has produced in societies in Europe, nor 
to these local configurations (and trajectories) of relations between state and law and 
capital and ideology. Instead, Europeanisation is a process in which the universalisation 
of the categories of civil society entails their continuing disaggregation and 
reconfiguration: Europeanisation is the uneven and combined dialectical
universalisation of the categories of civil society.
The fourth and final take indicates how this idea can be fleshed out. What I have said up 
to now implies that ‘theoretical Eurocentrism’ and ‘real Eurocentrism’ are both modes 
of the uneven and combined dialectical universalisation of the categories of civil 
society. What I want to point to here are the three main sources for ‘critical-theoretical 
anti-Eurocentrism’.
What has already been said about Althusser indicates that Marx’s theory of capital 
provides one of the most important resources for developing a theoretical account of
4 The term ‘bourgeois cultural revolution’ is used by Fredric Jameson in The 
Political Unconscious, London, Routledge, 2002.
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dialectical universalisation. I will show how capital is indeed a form of dialectical 
universalisation, and how it is possible to generalise from this to other modem forms of 
social relations.
The reference to Althusser can also be taken to suggest two other primary resources. 
Althusser development of non-reductive political-economy depended, in part, on his 
engagement with Gramsci’s writings, and it is to Gramsci that I have turned for similar 
reasons. In the present context, however, Gramsci’s writings on hegemony will also be 
taken to be directly dealing with the political, philosophical and wider cultural problems 
arising from the uneven and combined dialectical universalisation o f the categories o f 
civil society.
Lastly, elsewhere it has been argued that Roy Bhaskar’s work on critical realist 
philosophy can be seen as the most valuable elaboration of the philosophical 
implications of Althusser’s work.5 Broadly accepting the spirit of this judgement, I shall 
be treating Bhaskar’s work as a philosophical elaboration of Marx’s account of capital. 
In effect I shall be arguing that dialectical critical realism takes the philosophical 
dimension of ‘theoretical anti-humanism’ forward. What is more, Bhaskar has also 
developed a conception of dialectical universalisation. While I use his work in a very 
different way to that he intended, I nevertheless use it to make a fundamental 
contribution to this development of ‘theoretical anti-EurocentrisnT.
These then are, in outline, the main themes taken up in the course of this work: how the 
efforts to produce the two theoretical objects of ‘theoretical Eurocentrism’ and ‘real 
‘Eurocentrism* demand that ‘theoretical anti-Eurocentrism’ is driven by a real 
engagement with the relativity of the modern tradition; how coming to terms with 
historical relativity means confronting the illicit universalism of the modern tradition 
and by implication, relating that universalism to the social conditions under which it has
5 Resch, Althusser. This verdict was reached before the publication of Bhaskar’s 
Dialectic and could not have anticipated later works such as From East to West 
London, Routledge, 2000; Meta-Reality, Sage, New Delhi, 2002; Reflections on 
MetaReality: Transcendence, Emancipation and Everyday Life, Sage, New Delhi,
2002.1 draw primarily on Dialectic, though not on those parts which most clearly 
anticipate Bhaskar’s subsequent trajectory. I have explored the tensions in 
Bhaskar’s work elsewhere. See Hostettler and Norrie, ‘Are Critical Realist Ethics 
Foundational?’ in Critical Realism: The Difference it Makes', Justin Cruickshank, 
ed., Routledge, London, 2003.
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flourished, and to whose ongoing reproduction and change it contributes; how 
addressing European forms of universalism and universalisation demands a more 
specific engagement with the theories and practices of the bourgeois cultural revolution 
that engenders the spread of civil society; how holding onto the principle that civil 
society does not expand as a piece, but evolves through a movement in which its 
constituents move into the world in an uneven and combined maimer; how developing 
‘critical-theoretical anti-Eurocentrism, means drawing together the most advanced 
contributions to theoretical anti-humanism, i.e. the political, economic and 
philosophical dimensions of the critique of civil society.
II. Marxism and Eurocentrism
Contemporary critical theory voices a widespread concern with issues related to 
Eurocentrism. This includes numerous criticisms of Marx and Marxism. Not only do 
many currents of critical theory flow away from Marx’s work, they are often motivated 
to do so by a concern that Marxism has been complicit, philosophically and/or 
politically, with the darker, negative, sides of modernity. Given the available streams of 
critical theory, then, it might appeal' perverse to identify the critique of Eurocentrism so 
closely with strands of Marxism. However, thinking about Eurocentrism has been 
severely hampered by this self-denying ordinance, and ways need to be found to 
overcome this by examining some of the problems faced by these negative assessments 
of Marxist critical theory.
A brief examination of the most important resources I draw on is sufficient to show how 
weighted it is towards ‘Western Marxism.’ For a general account of modem politics I 
have turned to Antonio Gramsci’s work on hegemony and to others who have taken up 
his ideas; for the critique of political economy, of course, I draw on Marx’s work on 
capital, but also on the writings of later commentators such as Derek Sayer and Moishe 
Postone who pay special attention to the abstract qualities of the culture of capital; for a 
valuable take on the spatial dynamics of capital I used David Harvey’s Limits to 
Capital; Harvey has also contributed to contemporary European cultural theory, but it is 
Fredric Jameson’s work, notably The Political Unconscious, which provides greater 
scope for a more general account of ‘bourgeois cultural revolution’. All these are, of 
course, in addition to the philosophical contributions of Althusser and Bhaskar.
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I have not turned to these writers because an explicit concern with Eurocentrism is 
either widely shared by many of them, or even given a very high priority by any of 
them. Indeed, they have notably failed to produce any sustained engagement with the 
problems of Eurocentrism. There are some, such as Jameson, who have been personally 
drawn into disputes about their portrayal of the realities of Eurocentrism, and others 
have attracted criticism on the grounds of their supposed Eurocentrism. Western 
Marxism as a whole has been largely preoccupied with the critical elaboration of 
Marx’s legacy under the socio-political conditions of twentieth century Europe and neo- 
Europe, conditions which changed in important ways since Marx grappled with them. 
With Fordism and Post-Fordism, post-modemity and the culture of late capitalism as its 
primary substantive objects, it might reasonably be objected that Western Marxism has 
had too narrow a focus to be of great value for theoretical anti-Eurocentrism.
Also, Marx’s own writing, along with that of many who adopted them as a way of 
understanding the world, have been identified with the plainly Eurocentric notions of 
progress prevalent during the nineteenth century. 6 Marx’s account of capital has 
appeared to some as yet one more attempt to grant European culture undue world- 
historical status. In terms drawn straight from the very political economy Marxism is 
meant to be so critical of, we find the forward looking creative dynamism of capital 
contrasted with the sluggish, aimlessly gyrating, backward looking cultures whose death 
and decay is further hastened with capital’s every advance. Marx’s story of capital 
appeal's as just another telling of the familial*, Eurocentric, tale of the miracle birth of 
modem Europe and its subsequent diffusion into a world which ought to be grateful (at 
least for the prospect of socialism).
However, the critique of civil society can be understood in terms of a developing 
theoretical anti-Eurocentrism. This is largely due to the often unstated implications of 
this tradition and its tendencies towards theoretical anti-humanism. The critique of civil 
society operates at a number of different directions at once: it has a general,
6 Prominent ‘anti-Eurocentric’ writers, such as Rajani Kanth and John Hobson, in 
their very different ways, try to locate Marx’s work within a Eurocentric 
framework. Their respective assessments, however, fail to recognise the tensions 
within Marx’s work. Rajani Kanth, Against Eurocentrism, Palgrave MacMillan,
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philosophical, dimension concerned with transhistorical categories; it has an epoch 
specific dimension, exemplified by the general theory of capital; it has a substantive, 
political and historical sociological dimension concerned with the specifics of historical 
processes and conjunctures. Within Marxism, this theoretical differentiation has of 
course long been recognised, with the distinction between dialectical and historical 
materialism being only one of the most prominent expressions of this. However, these 
various tendencies can all be seen in realist terms. Its philosophical dimension is 
oriented towards philosophical realism: a general, ontological, theory: its ‘middle range’ 
orientation is towards a sociology of modernity; substantively, it pursues historically 
specific ensembles of structures, processes and events.
Against this, Eurocentric social science systematically fails to sustain the distinctions 
between these levels of historical generality: its categories are reductive/antinomial, 
running together and/or splitting apart the transhistorical, the capital specific and the 
historically specific. Its categories are necessarily ambivalent, making it impossible to 
properly disambiguate the level at which categories are pitched. When Althusser asserts 
the realist thrust of Marxism in terms of its opposition to all forms of reductive 
essentialism, it is this categorial structure he is working against. The critique of 
essentialism and theoretical humanism hinges on developing the novel categorial forms 
able to sustain the necessary distinctions and connections between levels of generality 
needed for greater internal coherence. The critique of Eurocentrism is no more than the 
further development of these tendencies.
However, theoretical developments within and between each of these dimensions are 
never even: the development of realist, theoretical anti-Eurocentrism has its own 
complex and uneven temporality. Not only does realist theory struggle to keep up with 
the combined and uneven developments of capitalist modernity, it also struggles to hold 
the various senses of reality together. The stratification of theory into these different 
dimensions means that establishing a coherent field of theory is an extremely difficult 
task. There is a constant danger of theory losing its way when it becomes divorced from 
the reality it seeks to comprehend, a danger which is reproduced within theory when the 
development of each dimension is divorced from the development of the others. While
New York, 2005: John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins o f Western Civilisation,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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the underdevelopment of realism in one dimension can retard it in another, it might 
equally be the case that the overdevelopment of the realist thrust in, say, philosophy, 
can be at the expense of its underdevelopment in, say history.
For example, recent decades have witnessed an intensification of those trends initiated 
within the Frankfurt School which have gradually led to a marginalisation, not to say to 
exclusion, of Marx’s work within the field of cultural criticism. These developments 
have led to a retrospective broadening of the field of critical theory, a field whose 
genealogy encompasses many ‘masters of suspicion’ including Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein as well as Foucault and Derrida. The related emphasis 011 language has 
been associated with an inclination to philosophical relativism and a repudiation of 
realism. As a consequence, while much of great value has come from these 
developments, this tuna has often been at the expense of a sufficiently broad view of the 
social, with some critical approaches risking a linguistic reduction of social life, and 
even falling into the hap of eschewing any sense of the reality which lies beyond the 
language used to deal with it.
This critical-theoretical project requires that the criticisms of Eurocentrism levelled at 
Marx and subsequent writers .are properly addressed. Broadly speaking, as mentioned 
above, two kinds of problem have been raised. The first is historiographical, and it takes 
issue with representations of Europe which identify, or fuse, it with capital, at least in 
the first instance, while separating, or splitting capital off from the non-European. The 
various schemes of successive modes of production are regarded as grounding the 
theory of capital in a grand narrative which culminates in European modernity. This 
identification is deemed to be illicit in the sense that it denies the universality of 
possible cultural progress. Alternative histories argue for the immanence of capital in all 
of world’s cultural zones, or else argue that capital developed in the non-European 
world but was appropriated by Europeans.7 In general, this strand of criticism associates
7 Hobson’s account locates the development of capitalism within a history of world 
economic development. Europe was the first country to fully develop it, but the 
ground had been prepared by others, especially China and tire Muslim world, 
which might otherwise have made ‘the breakthrough to modernity’ on their own 
account. Blaut’s similarly argues that capitalism was emerging in non-European 
locations within a world system, but that Europeans imposed colonial control 
over that system.
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Marxism with a failure to sustain universalist humanist commitments. Marxism appears 
Eurocentric in the sense that it lends support to the idea of a special relationship 
between Europe and cultural progress and lends a measure of justification to European 
domination of the modern world system.8
The second kind of criticism is more philosophical in character, and takes the opposite 
view of the first. Where the historiographic issue is cast in terms of a failure of modern 
universalism, the philosophical critique is advanced in terms of Marxism’s essentially 
modernist commitments.9 From this perspective Marxism is complicit with the defining 
European tradition of ‘rationalism’ and ‘materialism’, where these terms are used in a 
strongly negative fashion. From this perspective Marxism appears Eurocentric in a 
rather different way. In keeping with the post-structuralist and deconstructionist 
impulses which drive such criticism, Marxism appears to be complicit with the illicit 
universalism of modem tradition.
The stream of critical theory on which I draw, then, is regarded more as a source of 
Eurocentrism than as a possible resource for theoretical anti-Eurocentrism, but its critics 
place Marxism on both opposing sides of philosophical debates about the nature of 
modernity and reason. These kinds of criticism cannot be dismissed out of hand: both
illicit particularism and illicit universalism are found in Marx’s writings and in writings
of those who use his name; there is no question that these forms of Eurocentrism are 
present in this tradition. However, criticisms of these strands have been made from 
within the Marxist tradition itself. Not only has the grand narrative of modes of 
production, for instance, been rejected after Marx but, as Etienne Balibar points out, 
Marx personally wrestled with this issue. 10 Any claim that Marx’s writing or the 
subsequent tradition can be defined by its Eurocentrism greatly overstates the case and 
ignores all evidence to the contrary. At the very least the ambiguities need to be 
recognised. More importantly, the full implications of such criticisms can only be 
realised by pushing them forward on Marxian, realist, terrain.
Identifying Europe with capital is akin to denying primitive accumulation by 
making a claim for original possession. This in turn serves as a justification for 
the unequal profits that accrue from a distorted political-economy.
8 The form of these kinds of arguments is dealt with in chapter 7.
9 See, for instance, Rajani Kanth’s Against Eurocentrism, Palgrave MacMillan,
New York, 2005
10 Etienne Balibar, The Philosophy o f  Marx, Verso, London, 1995.
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The arguments supporting this run parallel to the one Althusser makes about reading 
Capital. Althusser developed a theory of Capital as a step in the evolution of a 
distinctive problematic. This means that it cannot be properly interpreted or understood 
when read in the idiom of political economy, which belongs 011 the irrealist terrain of 
theoretical humanism. In the absence of a full appreciation of the transformative 
tendencies at work, perspectives on Capital make it appeal' wrong-headed or as 
something of a mystery, because it is assumed that the meanings of the theory should be 
translated back into those of theoretical humanism. However, critique works on the 
forms of appearances embedded in reality to produce a novel substantive theory of that 
reality, and it also has unavoidable implications for a novel form of philosophical 
realism. Misquoting Kuhn, after such critique one lives both with the sense of a new 
reality and with a new sense of reality, only the first of which is available within the 
horizons of theoretical humanism.11 A great deal of commentary on Marx’s work, and 
most criticism levelled at Marxist and critical theory, emanates from the terrain of 
theoretical Eurocentrism. These interpretations are shaped by their own presuppositions, 
and by the patterns of presences and absences they reproduce.
None of this should be taken to imply that the Marxian tradition can be simply 
exonerated in the face of accusations of Eurocentrism. To the contrary, it needs to be 
acknowledged that some of Marx’s own writing, and a great deal of the subsequent 
writing in his name, have reproduced the conventional forms of wisdom that critical 
theory seeks to overturn. More seriously, it also needs to be recognised that some 
strands of the Marxist tradition have been profoundly implicated in Eurocentric political 
projects. However, there is much more to this work than any simple verdict would 
allow. Althusser argued that theoretical production takes place on the terrain of 
hegemony, and is therefore marked by class struggle. This can be read in the relatively 
narrow terms of class antagonisms being inflected through theory or, more broadly, as a 
site of potential resistance to bourgeois cultural revolution and the institution of the 
modem Imaginary and the vision of civil society. There needs not only to be a 
recognition of the intense struggle that goes on between tradition and critical theory, but 
also of that which takes place within the Marxian tradition itself. The benefit of doing
11 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago 
Press, 1962.
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so is that Capital provides resources without which Eurocentrism is unintelligible. 
Belittling, never mind excluding, its disclosure of the realities of modernity only closes 
down the possibility of theoretical anti-Eurocentrism.
Ill: Eurocentrism. ethical economy, hegemony.
The above general comments offer some vindication of pursuing the tendencies of 
Marxian theory. The following offers some rather more substantive thoughts on its 
relation to Eurocentrism. Drawing out the intimate relations between the problems of 
philosophy and those of politics can set the scene. For an account of the former, 
Bhaskar’s work 011 philosophical irrealism is most valuable, while Gramsci’s work on 
hegemony is indispensable for the latter. The following step turns to the symbolic 
terrain on which these two sets of problems co-mingle: what shall be called ‘ethical 
economy’. The account of ethical economy given here will provide an outline of the 
essential form of theoretical humanism, and it begins with what Charles Taylor has 
called the Modem Imaginary -  a vision of social order whose parameters provide the 
conceptual and nonnative limits of visions of modem society. The fonn of the ethical 
economy provides a more general object of critique than the discipline of political 
economy, and it provides the starting point for a broad critique of theoretical 
Eurocentrism. There shall be a brief account of the implications for understanding 
modernity within the horizons circumscribed by this Imaginary which turn on its illicit 
universalism and ethnocentrism. Finally, the suggestion that dialecticisation is the 
appropriate response to the illicit universalism of ethical economy will be taken up. 
Dialectics, here, will be understood as submitting given forms and categories to a 
radical historicisation. The dialectics of critique will be presented as the undoing of 
illicit universalism and the simultaneous generation of theoretical anti-Eurocentrism. 
Finally, this dialectic generates an account of both theoretical Eurocentrism and real 
Eurocentrism: it shows how the illicit universalism of ethical economy operates as a 
dialectic, and it discloses the dialectical universalisation of the social relations 
underpinning the ethical economy.
Turning first to the relations between the philosophical and the political. Modern 
philosophy and politics confront what appeal' to be analogical problems: on the one 
hand there are issues of identity and alterity, while on the other hand there are problems
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of order and change. More than this, these problems are intimately related to one 
another. Firstly, philosophy and politics mutually interpenetrate so that their respective 
problems are not merely analogical but have in practice become two aspects of a single 
problem, i.e. they are both aspects of the problematics of hegemony. Secondly, both 
problems have a certain ‘shape,’ i.e. they have a common character. They are both 
attempts to resolve problems of the ‘ethical economy’.
Within philosophy, Bhaskar has argued,
Two great problems have dominated philosophy: (a) the problem of the one and 
the other, of diremption from an assumed original unity, of negation and of 
change -  the dialectical problem par excellence; and its analytical counterpart,
(b) the problem of the one and the many, of order and its opposition, the 
problem of chaos.12
He goes on:
The immediate origin of both for us lies in the Platonic response to worrying 
change and diversity -  the problem of relativism, bounding the tradition. The 
analysis of negation in terms of difference and the establishment of a 
(potentially) dialectically accessible hierarchy among the Forms, aligned under 
the primacy of the Form of the Good, provides, as Whitehead correctly 
appreciated, the base-line for all subsequent philosophy.13
Bhaskar goes on to argue that the way in which these questions were answered 
established the tradition of philosophy as irrealist. 14 Irrealist philosophical 
representations of the world are (i) constituted by anthropic contradictions and (ii) have 
the effect of normalising past and present changes. Its contradictions mean that the 
irrealist tradition is essentially antinomial/reductive: splitting human existence from the 
world and/or collapsing the two together. The result is a set of internally related 
anthropocentric and anthropomorphic fallacies. Meanwhile, these contradictions allow 
philosophical and political theory to function as ideologies. They make possible the 
basic task of the dominant symbolic order, i.e. the formal resolution of real 
contradictions.15
12 See Bhaskar, Dialectic, p. 309. Italics in the original.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid, passim. The next two chapters, 4 and 5, give a full account of irrealism and 
how it relates to the problematic o f Eurocentrism.
15 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious. Jameson draws on Levi Straus’s 
account of the symbolic order.
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Bhaskar’s work 011 the anthropic categorial structures of irrealist philosophy and theory 
shed light on the workings of theoretical humanism. However, in order to realise their 
full worth for this project, it is necessary to historicise these very general claims about 
anthropic irrealism. The tradition of theoretical humanism is certainly anthropic, but in 
its own peculiar' way, i.e. it is Eurocentric. This cultural specificity of theoretical 
humanism is due to its internal relation to modernity, its essentially political role in 
informing and stabilising bourgeois cultural revolution, i.e. its participation in real 
Eurocentrism. 16 These ties give its anthropic irrealism a determinate, bourgeois, 
character,17 and imbue the irrealist anthropic contradictions and absences of theoretical 
humanism with their specific form, i.e. forge theoretical humanism as theoretical 
Eurocentrism.
It is Gramsci’s work which best informs our* understanding of the relations between 
modem philosophy and politics. His critique of traditional political theory pivots on the 
‘expansion’ of orthodox conceptions of the state.18 Regarded as the ‘master noun’ of 
modern political thought, the state has been treated largely in legal and constitutional 
terms and/or instrumentally.19 However, Gramsci relocates the ‘master noun’ within the 
problematic of hegemony, moving political theory away from theoretical humanism and 
towards a realist historical sociology of political modernity. Hegemony is a complex 
concept, providing a framework within which to draw together the social processes of 
the ‘integral state’: an emergent, complex, social location, formed through the 
development, articulation and interpenetration of the dominant social relations of 
modernity - value, law, democracy and reason.20 Hegemony involves the struggle to 
achieve political and cultural leadership within (developing) bourgeois societies, and its 
success can be measured by the extent to which it establishes a dominant sense of 
identity and alterity, order and change. Such a political achievement depends on 
establishing a philosophical world-view capable of mediating moments of relative 
stability between relations of social forces.
16 Ibid.
17 Bourgeois is used in the most general sense possible, and does not refer to any 
specific bourgeoisie.
18 Christine Buci-Glucksman, Gramsci and the State, (trans. David Fernbach),
Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1980.
19 On the ‘master noun’ of political theory, see Quentin Skinner’s Visions o f Politics,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
20 This basic idea was taken up by Althusser and Poulantzas and is now regarded as 
a distinguishing feature of what became known as ‘structural’ Marxism.
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The imperatives of Hegemony demand that philosophy is turned to the task of world 
making. The problems of philosophy, on the other hand, arise from the problems 
generated on the terrain of hegemony. Modem European philosophy and the problem of 
sustain order social order in processes of modem social formation merge into one 
another. Together they delineate the horizons of Eurocentrism. The most significant 
form they produce is the ‘ethical economy’.
Moving on to the ethical economy and the ‘Modem Imaginary’. Charles Taylor’s 
considerations on the place of modem political theory in modem society have close 
affinities with those of both Durkheim and Gramsci who have argued, in their different 
ways, that theory or philosophy must be understood as an essential modem social 
mediation. Taylor, for instance, has spoken of modernity as ‘theory saturated,’ meaning 
that political theory is one of the chief intellectual means by which modern societies 
constitute themselves. That is, the political practices, institutions and relationships 
required for the ongoing reproduction and transformations of modernity depend on this 
intellectual tradition. Collective and institutional practices need to be informed, 
coordinated and guided by political visions which, while perhaps intimated by practice, 
are only crystallized by more or less specialised theoretical work.
Taylor develops this idea in his work on the ‘modern imaginary’ where he advances a 
concept of a common core for the modem tradition. The modem imaginary is a 
specifically modem vision of the nature of social life, significantly contrasting with 
those of non-modem societies. This vision ‘enables, through making sense of,’ the 
practices of modem society, and thereby serves to give a general definition to modem 
social formation.21
Prior to the rise of the modern, moral orders were bounded by a strong sense of fixed 
moral horizons. These were of two kinds. Some were conceptions of natural justice 
based on timeless, given, laws. Such a shared sense of the just would bind together a 
given community and provide the standards of justice by which unequal relations could 
be judged and, if need be, forced to conform. Where this first kind of vision could
21 Taylor, ‘Modern Social Imaginaries’ in Public Culture, 14(1), 2002, pp. 91-124. 
p.91.
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inspire the active restitution of a just order, the other kind of moral vision conceived the 
world as an integrated and self-regulating socio-cosmic order. Disturbances to social 
relations were understood to ripple out through the natural order as a whole, which 
would then be expected to reassert itself in no uncertain manner.
For present puiposes, it is useful to introduce the term ‘ethical economy’ to describe the 
modem vision of sociality as outlined by Taylor. The term ‘ethical’ is useful here 
because it suggests kinship with conceptions of pre-modem ‘moral economies’ whilst 
also clearly distinguishing the modem imaginary from them. The term ‘moral economy’ 
has been used by Edward Thompson and James C. Scott to describe pre- or non-modem 
social visions, and their distinctive forms of commutative justice.22 Moral economies are 
predicated on ties of personal interdependence within hierarchies of wealth, power and 
social standing. The justice of exchanges between unequal individuals is assessed in 
terms of the highly differentiated obligations and duties attached to relative power and 
wealth. This provides a fertile ground for competition over relative moral standing. 
Scott, for instance, provides vivid accounts of poorer members of communities 
attempting to diminish the moral standing of its stronger members by playing up 
discrepancies between the means the wealthy have at their disposal and their failure to 
use them to meet the obligations they have to others. At the same time they play down 
their own means and stress their own worthiness as recipients of largess. The rich, 
meanwhile, do exactly the same -  enhancing their own status by emphasising their own 
good conduct and playing down their means. They too stress how well off and unworthy 
those making claims on them really are. The ‘moral’ quality of this discourse is 
inseparable from the concrete and interpersonal characteristics of the disputes.
Taylor speaks of the modem social imaginary as ‘a new conception of the moral order 
of society.’23 Since Grotius and Locke, this modern view has been displacing pre- 
modem visions of moral orders grounded in the nature of things. With the new 
conception of moral order comes a new meaning of commutative justice.
22 Edward Thompson, The Making o f the English Working Class, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1980: James C. Scott, The Moral Economy o f the Peasant: 
Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, Yale University Press, London, 
1976.
23 Idem. p.92.
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It is a commonplace to assert that modem theory revolves around asocial, abstract, 
individuals, and that it lacks any sense of the social.24 Emile Durkheim, in ‘Intellectuals 
and Individualism’, for instance, argued the necessity for just such an abstract subject of 
ethics.25 Prevailing conditions, because they engender such a high degree of substantive 
social differentiation, demand an abstract, rather than substantive subject. So varied are 
concrete conditions of modem life that no ethics can be derived from any substantive 
conception of persons or the ties between. The ethical quality of modern relations must 
begin from the premise that individual circumstances were wholly accidental: The 
individual as such, stripped of the specificities of substantive identity and status, 
became the only stable point upon which a widely applicable ethical language could be 
developed. Taylor though, argues that modern ethics requires more than this, that some 
sense of the sociality of such an abstract individual is required. Indeed, he argues, it is 
already present in the fabric of modem social theory.26 In effect, what Taylor adds to 
Durkheim’s account is the need for modern ethics to have an abstract social context, i.e. 
a sense of society in the abstract. “The flip side of the new understanding of the 
individual is a new understanding of sociality: the society of mutual benefit, whose 
functional differentiations are ultimately contingent and whose members are 
fundamentally equal.”27
The most significant distinguishing feature of the modem vision of moral order, the 
‘ethical economy’ is that it is no longer grounded in a view of natural law, justice or 
hierarchy. Instead, the modern view, Taylor argues, derives the boundaries of moral 
order from the nature of human sociality itself. The modem view entails (i) consenting 
or contractual association and exchange for mutual benefit, (ii) regulation by natural 
rights between (iii) equal individuals. This sense of sociality provides the otherwise 
missing ontic limitations on possible moral order which were previously provided by 
either natural law or cosmic hierarchy.
24 Taylor makes this point himself, with great force, in ‘Overcoming Epistemology.’ 
This can be found in After Philosophy, Baynes et al (eds.), MIT, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, 1987.
25 Durkheim, ‘Individualism and the Intellectuals’ [1898] (trans, S. and J. Lukes), 
Political Studies 17(1): 19-30, 1969.
26 Taylor, ‘Modern Social Imaginaries’. Unlike Durkheim, Taylor does not attempt 
any explanation for the necessity of such abstractions. Taylor, in what can appear 
as a rather one sided rejection of functionalism, tends to see modernity as having 
been produced by a particular kind of Imaginary.
27 Taylor, Ibid, p. 99.
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Another distinctive feature of this vision of sociality is that the parts are integrated into 
a system of mutually beneficial efficient causation.28 We might say that the parts of the 
whole are conceived as being mutually functional. In drawing attention to this, Taylor is 
actually showing how the idea of mutuality in relations between individuals has its • 
sociological corollary in various kinds of impersonal relations, regardless of personal 
intentions. That is to say, the idea of interpersonal relations is projected onto the 
impersonal organisation of society “The crucial thing in the new conception is that our 
purposes mesh, however divergent they may be in the consciousness of each of us. They 
involve us in an exchange of advantages.”29
To bring this point home, Taylor not only refers to Adam Smith’s ‘hidden hand, but also 
to Smith’s idea that the common attitude of respect for status distinctions helps to 
sustain social order. At this point the formality of ideas of equality, as expressed in 
concerns for mutuality and the ‘exchange of advantages’, comes into contact with the 
realities of substantive inequalities. Unlike pre-modern visions, the modem imaginary 
does not valorise any particular hierarchy.30 Instead, it makes the justification of social 
hierarchies dependent on how they function with respect to the above form of social 
relations. In A Theory o f Justice, for example, John Rawls’ develops his ‘difference 
principle’ precisely in order to establish a balance between functional inequalities of 
wealth on the one hand, and the need for such inequalities to be limited, on the other.31
The modem vision of sociality also provides a terrain on which the normative aspects of 
substantive issues are staged and fought out. However, struggles over the regulation of 
impersonal relations, with their stark separation between interpersonal exchanges and 
facts of relative wealth, stand in clear contrast with moral economic ones. The term 
‘ethical’, with its connotations of depersonalised, abstract and generalised, normative 
imperatives, is more adequate to the character of modem discourse. It also relates to the 
abstract character of this vision of sociality which dissociates it from any particular 
substantive moral vision of social order.
28 Taylor, Ibid, p. 101.
29 Taylor, Ibid, p. 101
30 Taylor emphasises the way that pre-modern visions privilege legal or natural
orders over other concerns. Modem visions, by contrast, are said to subordinate 
all other considerations to the special character they accord to social relations.
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As for * economy’ , it is more appropriate to use this term in relation to the modem vision 
than pre-modem social forms. It is, after all, a specifically modem usage to refer, to 
wider social relations as an economy. Specifically, Taylor notes that for Locke social 
relations in general are conceived as ‘economic’ in that they are relations of mutual 
service, viewed as ordered, peaceful and productive, and regarded as forms of profitable 
exchange. Taylor’s line of argument can usefully be developed to encompass two senses 
in which the economic nature of the modem vision can be understood as universal. In 
the first place, the economic becomes the common quality of all social spheres, not only 
the economy as such. The ‘economic’ relationship, i.e. the efficient exchange of mutual 
benefit between consenting individuals with equal status, has become the model for all 
social relations, with the qualities specific to the narrowly economic sphere being 
projected onto other spheres. Secondly, the idea of economic relations is also projected 
onto relations between spheres of life, onto society as a whole. This second moment of 
universality is that of concrete universality, generating the vision of society as a set of 
interlocking and mutually functional institutions. This allows for conception of the self- 
equilibriating mechanism of the economy to be relocated at the more general level: the 
de-politicised vision of a self-stabilising society. For his part, Taylor also notes how the 
economy as such becomes the primary concern of modem public life, giving a kind of 
purpose to history and social change.
The ethical economy, it turns out, provides a multiplicity of economic forms with which 
to imagine modem social order and justice. It provides the basic conceptual and 
nomiative terrain on which political economy, along with other forms of modem social 
theory, operates. The vision of an ethical economy makes practical understandings of 
the various concrete realities of modern social formations possible whilst, at the same 
time, investing them with normative value. The ethical economy is a medium through 
which actual political economies become real possibilities and, at the same time, can be 
represented as embodiments of ethical values.
The implications of this for modem social theory, and for its Eurocentricity, cannot be 
understated. Firstly, the ethical economy provides a focus for the critique of how
jl John Rawls. A Theory o f Justice, Oxford, OUP, 1973.
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modern social theory operates, both as a body of ideas and as a mediating social relation 
constitutive of modem social formation. As a concept it has a somewhat broader, if 
more abstract, reference than political economy, belonging to a more general theory of 
theory. As such, it allows for a shift away from the relatively narrow critique of political 
economy to the more encompassing critique of the modern tradition. Secondly, ethical 
economy points to the intersection between modem philosophy and politics, i.e. to 
hegemony. Taylor’s account of the Imaginary constitution of modem societies pays 
little attention to the political mediation of the terrain on which practical and ethical 
considerations are formulated and fought out. As such, the ethical economy needs to be 
seen as framing the formulation of competing substantive visions of the world. It is only 
through the mediation of party and state, through struggles to work out hegemonic 
projects, that the imaginary enters into reality. The institution of the modem imaginary 
is nothing if not political.
Given its relation to hegemony, finally, the ethical economy provides a common focus 
for the wide range of issues associated with Eurocentrism. The ethical economy 
provides the ideal towards which European societies are oriented, as well as the 
standards by which they judge themselves and others. This vision, however, is 
profoundly problematic in many ways, and it demands the manifold critique of its 
theoretical and real universalisation as a necessary response. Such critique provides the 
essential core of a critical theory of Eurocentrism.
The first step of this critique is to recognise the ethical economy as the dominant 
ideologeme of modem social theory. In the ethical economy we have a kind of figure, or 
figuration: a means of lending form to various sorts of ideas. These ideas, as Taylor 
makes clear, are ways of making sense of the modem, of providing its modes of 
practical and moral reasoning with their presuppositions. It gives shape to what, in 
Althusser’s terms, are the lived relations of ideology. In fact, the ethical economy is 
something like the master figure of modem ideology, the primal form around which the 
symbolic and ideological order of modernity is organised,
A basic function of any symbolic order, argues Fredric Jameson after Levi-Strauss, is 
the formal resolution of real contradictions. That is, the dominant symbolic 
representation of social order tends to ‘reconcile’ its real antagonisms. Theoretically,
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this means conceiving the parts in such a way that they can be ‘taken up’ and integrated 
into a representation of the ‘whole’. What the ethical economy provides is a general 
conception of modem societies as a whole. It establishes the framework into which the 
various elements can be integrated and it also contains a general sense of how they are 
integrated with one another. For these reasons we can speak of the ethical economy as 
the meta-worldview of modernity.32
That the ethical economy does play this role has already been alluded to. For instance, 
the establishment of functionally supportive relations between formal equality and 
substantive inequalities ‘resolves’ the contradictions by establishing the parameters 
within which substantive inequalities can be deemed mutually beneficial to all 
concerned. The possible tensions arising from the difference between the two kinds of 
relation are effaced as long as they can be represented in ‘ethicised’ terms. More 
generally, to the extent the social formation ‘as a whole’ is represented as ethical 
economy, the dominant social relations and the relations between their expansion and 
concrete institutionalisations will be invested with a positive normative value. This can 
only be achieved, however, through a systematic disregard for the real nature of such 
relations and the real constellations of forces at work in the social formation.
In his work on the Political Unconscious, Jameson speaks of figures such as the ethical 
economy as ‘ideologemes’. At first sight it might appear unlikely that ideologeme can 
refer to something as overarching as a meta-worldview as, initially, Jameson speaks of 
‘the ideologeme ... [as] the smallest intelligible unit of the essentially antagonistic 
collective discourses of social classes’.33 In the present case, the relevant ideologeme 
would be the ideological conception of bourgeois class relations of exploitation as 
contractually agreed and mutually advantageous exchanges. However, Jameson 
subsequently refers to the ‘projection’ of such a minimal unit into a range of much 
broader figures. 'An ideologeme ... is ... a historically determinate conceptual or semic 
complex which can project itself variously in the form of a "value system" or 
"philosophical concept," or in the form of a protonarrative, a private or collective
32 For reasons I will come to, this tire case for European and neo-European societies, 
but also for non-European societies. Even in regions where the ethical economy 
cannot attain tire same symbolic purchase as it does on European formations, It 
retains its dominant structural role within a wider world system.
33 Political Unconscious, p. 61.
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narrative fantasy.'34 These precisely parallel the terms in which Taylor describes the 
emergence of the ethical economy. What we have is the reality of bourgeois class 
relations being progressively ‘taken up’ into modem theory. In the first place, the 
ideologeme of the class relation is established. Then, through its various ‘projections5, 
this ideologeme is transfigured into a universal imaginary. The visions generated by the 
imaginary encompass sociality, ethics, history and much more.
Philosophically, the ethical economy has been developed as a range of substantive 
positions in most areas. As discussed in Chapter 5, for instance, the case for a universal 
rationality, and for European modernity as its highest development, tends to be 
elaborated precisely in terms of the growth and development of an ‘ethical economy5 of 
knowledge developing out of mutually beneficial exchanges between formally equal 
individuals according to a given set of rules or procedures. For example, Jurgen 
Habermas's conception of the ideal speech situation as the very ground of rationality 
can be plausibly read in terms of ‘ethical economic5 exchanges between formally 
equally individuals.35
Taylor's account of the sense of historicity associated with the modern vision is 
straight-forwardly given in terms of its expansion in time and space, i.e. it possesses a 
strong sense of its own tendency to uni vernalisation. Taylor, though, does not discuss 
the implications of the contradictions this engenders. The ideologeme is established as 
the universal essence of social being by projecting it into philosophy and ontology. 
Projecting the same ideologeme into history makes it the basis of narratives of change 
and development. This means that it is simultaneously an essence that is actualised and 
in a constant process of actualisation. Ethical economic history, indeed, is best 
understood as the progressive actualisation of ethical economy, with development in 
space and expansion through time. There are plenty of accounts of modem history as 
the growth and development of ‘ethical economic5 societies, with the ideas of Progress 
and Development fleshed out as historical projections of the ethical economy. This has 
taken many form, crystallising recently in ‘structural functional5 modernisation theory 
and then globalisation theories. More generally, this double projection produces what 
Foucault called the transcendental/empirical doublet of the modern episteme and
34 Political Unconscious, p. 102
35 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, Heinemann, 1978
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provides the basic most elements of the structural contradictions of Europic 
Universalism.
The ethical economic ideologeme must be given a fundamental place in any account of 
the emergence and development of modernity and modern social theory. As the above 
references to modernisation and globalisation theory indicate, the ethical economy 
ideologeme can also be projected into other disciplines, such as sociology. The 
dominant tendency within sociology is to code modernity in terms of the ethical 
economy: it is seen either as its actualisation, or else judged as having failed to achieve 
its immanent potential. The default position is a conception of society as a functionally 
integrated organic matrix, in which the characteristic processes of modernity, and their 
concrete institutionalisations, form a system of mutually sustaining and regulating parts.
Classically, the sociological tradition has privileged four principle processes of social 
transformation, whose concrete institutionalisations have emerged within the three 
distinct spheres of state, economy and civil society. Each of these four processes 
involve tendencies to the universal mediation of the whole of society by a social 
relation: state formation and social mediation by law and bureaucracy; capital formation 
and social mediation by the value relation; democratisation or the individuation of 
social subjects as a consequence of their being disembedded from relatively stable 
hierarchies and/or collectivities and mediated by the new universals; secularisation, in 
Taylor’s sense of the new imaginary, with social mediation by novel forms of 
‘conscience collective’; These four processes are most closely associated, respectively, 
with Weber and Foucault, Marx, de Tocqueville, Durkheim and Gramsci.
The integration of these processes within a vision of ethical economy gives rise to a 
conception of these processes and their concrete institutionalisation as an interlocking 
cluster characterised by mutual functionality. Their development is synchronic, with the 
development of each providing the conditions for the development of all. Within the 
whole, equilibrium is maintained as each simultaneously sustains and constrains the 
others as it develops and adapts to their needs. The process of expansion, i.e. of the
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universalisation of the ethical economy, can be thought of as the integrated and even 
universalisation of modem social mediations.
Given its centrality, this ideologeme is also the primary focus of critique: the sense of 
sociality and historicity belonging to the ethical economy must be confronted by the 
realities they represent. As these realities cannot be forced into conformity with the 
requirements of the ethical economy, this confrontation sparks off a series of critiques. 
Immanent, omissive and explanatory critiques disclose of a set of conceptual difficulties 
which are simply insurmountable within the horizons of the ideologeme. Amongst the 
areas most vulnerable to critique are conceptions of socio-historical temporality and 
conceptions of the nature of universal relations. Critiques disclose the need for a far 
more complicated sense of the spatio-temporalities of universalisation along the lines of 
Trotsky’s ‘combined and uneven development’, or Althusser’s recognition that social 
science must abandon its ‘simple’ concept for a complex and differential spatio- 
temporality. As far as the social relations of modernity are concerned, their various 
critiques show how these universals are essentially contradictory: Marx discloses the 
categorial structure of the value relation; Althusser and Bhaskar disclose the categorial 
structures of reason and the conscience collective, with implications for theoretical 
humanism and theoretical universalism. Drawing together these critiques of spatio- 
temporality and mediating relations generates features of an alternative conceptual 
framework: ‘combined and uneven dialectical universalisation’.
A further step in the critique of the ethical economy takes us back to the discussion in 
the previous chapter about the representational logic of the public sphere. The 
‘resolution’ of political problems is represented as the establishment, or 
reestablishment, of ethical economic relations. Problems, that is features of the world 
which have been negatively coded as ‘unethical or as ‘uneconomic’ in the sense of 
being dysfunctional, are dealt with through a combination of social transformation and 
new ways of representing the changed world in terms of the ethical economy. In other
36 The translation of this vision from core to peripheiy, though, has always been a 
problem. For example, Samuel Huntington’s account o f political modernisation is 
readily understood in terms of the dangers of dysfunctional uneven development, 
and the need for modern processes to be contained through political action.
Samuel Huntington, ‘Political Development and Political Decay’, World Politics,
17.2, 1965 and Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1968.
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words, the negative is externalised. The critique of this follows from one of the 
problems of theoretical humanism Marx addresses in the German Ideology. Althusser 
takes this up as follows: “Marx commented that the idea of human nature, or the 
essence of man, concealed a coupled value judgement, to be precise, the couple 
human/inhuman: and he wrote ‘the “inhuman” as much as the “human” is a product of 
the present conditions; it is their negative side’.”37 That is to say, the institution of the 
ethical economy is, at one and the same time, the institution of the unethical: its 
‘negative side’ is really internally related to it. There are, though, two meanings this 
has. The first belongs to the discourse of ethical economy, which is where the relations 
between the two sides appear in the form of the antinomial, external, relation: the 
second concerns the contradictions internal to the reality of the institution of the ethical 
economy and is disclosed by showing how the uneconomic is internal to the economic.
Ethical economic discourse deploys the terminology of the couple 
economic/uneconomic in a markedly asymmetrical way. The language of the economic 
is deontological, combining ontic and normative facts: it represents the world in terms 
of a definite conception of social order and, simultaneously, invests it with positive 
value. Ethical economic representations are centred on forms of civil society, which are 
either universal or, where they are not, all other elements are functionally related to it. 
To represent the social in this way implies it is the actualisation of its own essence, that 
it is the achievement of ah essence-actuality identity.
By contrast, the categories of the non-ethical or the uneconomic, like those of the 
inhuman, lack any definite ontic dimension. To represent the world as uneconomic is, 
initially, strictly evaluative. The ‘uneconomic5 registers only the most general kind of 
ontic alterity, the absence of the economic, stripping the actual of even the most abstract 
form. What characterises such ‘uneconomic5 regions is that they appear to embody a 
split between their real essence and their actuality. What we find is only the absence of 
true actualisation -  a failure of self-realisation. Suffering from the absence of 
appropriate form at this level, uneconomic zones are ‘de-ethicised5: they are negatively 
invested with a lack of ethical value.
37 Althusser, ‘Marxism and Humanism’, p. 236-7.
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Unlike the language of the positive dimension of the ethical economy, then, the negative 
language of the ‘uneconomic’ cannot by itself project a vision of actual or possible 
sociality. It cannot function independently as a way of ‘enabling5 social practice or of 
‘making sense5 of those parts of the world to which it refers, except by marking them 
out as the site of a problem. Negatively ethicised regions become candidates for 
political, cultural, transformation. Their ontic lack translates into an ethical imperative 
for the actualisation of the ‘economic5 -  through politically formulated projects of 
universalisation.
When the value couple of ethical economy is projected into the realms of history and 
politics it tends to appear* as a core-periphery antinomy. The limited sense of historicity 
internal to the ethical economy requires that the process of universalisation extend from 
core zones into the peripheries. This allows the world to be represented, at any given 
moment, as zones of synchronic development, of peace and stability, surrounded by 
zones of dysfunction, chaos and instability. Examples include British Imperial policy of 
the late nineteenth century and, more recently, the liberal peace thesis associated with 
the contemporary Imperial role of the United States of America. What is interesting 
about this is that the peripheries enter the picture not just as locations of intrinsic 
difficulties, but as posing problems for, even threats to, the core regions. At this point, 
the peripheries are no longer posited primarily as a moral problem, but as practical 
problems emerging out of the expansion of core regions into the peripheries.38
Once this occurs, the first sense of negativity, as externality, turns into its second, the 
negative as internal. Now, the ‘negative5 sense of the uneconomic is no longer an 
analytic antinomy, but has developed along the lines identified by Marx: the 
uneconomic appeal's as the negative effects produced by the very development of the 
economic. This is significant because the antinomies of ethical economy are not simply 
discursive but are features of the symbolic order of the modem, its lived relations. The
38 Henry Maine’s work is an interesting case in point here. Maine rejected the 
analytic universalism of utilitarian liberalism in favour of a universal, 
evolutionary, history. For Maine, the Indian Mutiny was symptomatic of social 
dissolution generated by the Imperial rupturing of pre-modern organic 
functionality. What was to become institutionalised under the Dual Mandate was 
a universalising project designed to cope with differential stages of social 
evolution being brought under the single umbrella of Empire. ‘Henry Maine and 
the Transformation of British Imperial Ideology’ Unpublished paper by Karuna 
Mantena, presented to the Institute of Historical Research, March 15,2006.
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experience of modern subjects is mediated and constituted by these categories, and by 
investing the world with the category of the negative the symbolic order generates a 
powerful ethical impulse for the negation of the negative.
This production of the inhuman by the present, i.e. the internality of the uneconomic to 
economic universalisation and the ethical drive to its abolition, has a number of 
implications, of which the following are only the most important. Firstly, the negative is 
subject to political contestation. While the ethical economy defines the parameters of 
modem worldviews, it is also the common terrain of diverse representations of core­
periphery geographies and histories. The production and articulation of different 
accounts of the negative, and the struggle to invest some part of the world with it, is 
related, above all, to the consolidation of hegemonic projects and is the very stuff of 
hegemonic struggles.
Secondly, the negative categories of the uneconomic cannot necessarily be negated by 
practices informed by specific visions of the ethical economy. Rather, the intensive 
dynamics of universalisation tend to transform the conditions under which any 
particular- institution of this kind of symbolic order secures its own relative stability. 
Undermined by the very processes they seek to manage, particular visions tend to 
overreach themselves, ultimately becoming dysfunctional to the reproduction of an 
ethical economic order. Inadequate responses to the uneconomic generated at the 
margins develop through the disclosure of their own internal negativity, and provoke 
their own negation.
Likewise, thirdly, the uneconomic is produced by the extensive dynamics of 
universalisation. The peripheries, constitutionally uneconomic, are a necessary 
consequence of the expansion of modem social formation. These regions of cultural 
alterity are necessarily resistant to formal and real subsumption under the forms of the 
ethical economy.
Finally, the universal relations of the ethical economy contain within themselves the 
uneconomic -  as Marx’s critique of the wage relation testifies. The modern principle of 
commutative justice, premised on fair and mutually beneficial exchange between 
formally equal individuals, is necessarily abrogated by relations of domination,
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exploitation and alienation. Given all of this, what is internal to the ‘whole’ represented 
by the ethical economy must be represented as external to it in time or space in order to 
sustain its basic principles of just social relations and their synchronic and functional 
universalisation. Rephrasing Althusser, it can be said that ‘the couple 
economic/uneconomic is the hidden principle of all ethical economy which is, no more 
than a way of living-sustaining-resolving this contradiction’.39
Gramsci’s work does much to bring out the conceptual inadequacy of notions of 
synchronically developing ethical economies for understanding the realities of modem 
social formation while, at the same time, revealing their practical significance. 40 
Gramsci’s critique of the constitutional and instrumental conceptions of the state 
developed into his account of the ‘integral state’: a structured and institutionalised 
complex of relations between the universalising processes of the modern, but one in 
which the appearance of synchronic development and the actuality of a strictly 
temporary period of only limited mutual functionality are both revealed to be the 
political achievements of hegemonic projects within a bourgeois order. That is to say, 
for Gramsci, the integral state is not the product of the synchronic development of 
modem relations. It is instead the defining goal of political projects and the emergent 
terrain on which such projects are fought out.
Gramsci’s work on the state not only affirms its essentially political character, but also 
undermines the antinomies of ethical economic representation which make it possible to 
effectively depoliticise it. Modem politics encompasses struggles over the form of 
hegemony and struggles over establishing its conditions of possibility. It is on the 
terrain of hegemony that philosophy and theory become irreducibly political. It is here 
that they are developed and deployed as solutions to political questions of identity and 
alterity, order and change. Gramsci illustrates this with his account of how Croce's 
philosophy provided a comprehensive worldview which, when mediated by a ‘party’, 
provided one of the contending factions within the leading strata with its coherent sense 
of social order and political purpose. Social parties, whose sense of common puipose is
39 Althusser wrote: “The couple human/inhuman is the hidden principle of all 
humanism which is, no more than a way of living-sustaining-resolving this 
contradiction. Ibid, p. 237.
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cemented by their particular ethical economic vision, can occupy strategically 
significant locations in the ‘integral state5, and use their position in an attempt to bring 
the organs of state and civil society into a relative degree of mutual functionality. To 
become such a vehicle of cultural leadership, an ethical economic vision depends on the 
capacity it affords for formulating a social project which realises dominant interests 
whilst representing them as integral to universal concerns. The ethical economy tends 
towards universality by encompassing broad sections of the population and articulating 
differentiated interests within a negotiated hierarchy of mutual benefit. Those that 
cannot be represented within the whole in this way cannot but appear' on the 
peripheries.41
The general contexts in which Gramsci locates philosophies and parties are the 
historical conjunctures of relations between the universalising social mediations of the 
modem and their concrete institutionalisations. Rejecting the a priori relations 
prescribed by the ethical economy, Gramsci shows how the hegemonic moment is 
achieved by bringing about a more or less unstable equilibrium between them. These 
historical relations between social forces must be understood in terms akin to Trotsky’s 
conception of combined and uneven development. The geographical spaces straddled by 
states, both national and imperial, encompass tremendously disparate permutations of 
social mediation by law, capital, democratisation and ethical economic worldview. The 
social geographic extent, and the historical and structural orders, of these relations are 
all the products of specific histories which have produced specific conjunctures. This 
historical openness contains the potential for catastrophic contradictions to emerge, 
generating a powerful political imperative to forge some form of equilibrium between 
the various forces. The achievement of the hegemonic moment spatio-temporally 
displaces the tensions and contradictions between them, and in so doing creates the
40 Selections from the Prison Notebooks o f Antonio Gramsci, (ed. and trans. Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971: 
Christine Buci-Glucksman, Gramsci and the State
41 Gramsci is primarily concerned with the production of the universal plane as the 
terrain which simultaneously fosters and resolves antagonistic class interests. 
That is, it fosters the dualism of constitutionalism and interests, and the 
containment of the latter by the former. The philosophical world view draws the 
two together, articulating conceptions of the interests of capital in general with 
those of particular capitals, as well as bourgeois and proletarian interests. I have 
deliberated used a more general language here, though not in order to obscure 
capital or class.
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conditions under which their development can appear’ as synchronic and/or mutually 
functional.42
Equally, the peripheral zones generated through universalisation can be understood in 
terms of their relations to hegemony. Ranajit- Guha’s term, ‘dominance without 
hegemony\ is most apposite here.43 These are regions at the margins of hegemony in 
two senses. They are subaltern, in the sense of being subject to the would-be hegemonic 
power, but on the more or less ragged margins of integral state formation. Uneven 
development here has a different significance to that in the core, for these zones are 
disproportionately subject to the effects of dysfunctional and disequilibriating 
modernisation. Lacking, and/or deprived of, the local capacities to secure the political 
regulation of modernisation, these are zones of concentrated negativity. Peripheries can 
therefore also be understood as zones in which the possibilities for localised hegemony 
to emerge are relatively more distant. The exercise of power over them actually prevents 
the emergence of moments of unstable equilibrium.44
IV: The Emergence of Critical-Theoretical anti-Eurocentrism
All of this provokes a range of questions concerning the emergence of the categories 
and foims of critical-theoretical anti-Eurocentrism. Under the force of Marxian 
critiques, to date, the forms of the ethical economy have been subject to a radical 
transformation at a number of levels. The essentially problematic character of these 
forms arises from the structural location and function of ethical economy and of the 
relations it informs. These forms provide something like a ‘fixed point’ around which 
social change revolves. They are the ‘essence’ or ‘substance’ of modern social
42 For more on the spatio-temporal fixes related to the contradictions of capital, see 
David Harvey, Limits o f Capital, London, Verso, 1999.
43 Ranajit Guha, Dominance without hegemony: History and Power in colonial 
India, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1997.
44 The persistence o f an aura of crisis surrounding India’s democracy testifies to the 
absence of the conditions needed before it can be convincingly represented in 
terms of actualised ethical economy. Partha Chatterjee’s introduction of the 
concept of ‘political society’ is probably the most sophisticated attempt to 
theorise this. Interestingly, his assertion that forms of political society must be 
relatively limited in their geographical scope, in contrast to the universality of 
India’s civil society, gives a significant clue as to why the chronic ‘failure’ to 
institute ethical economy has not produced a general crisis for the Indian state to 
date. See ‘On Civil and Political Society in Post-colonial Democracies’ in
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mediations around which their concrete forms congeal and from which they acquire 
their epoch specific character. They provide a ‘centre’: a resolutely un-dialectical point 
of reference in an otherwise changing world. The Marxian, dialectical, critical, realist 
response to these forms rejects the a priori structure they impose on the world. It 
dissolves the appearances of their necessity, coherence and completion. It breaks up 
these given forms and reinscribes their constituent elements within a radical conception 
of the socio-historical.
At the level of sociology, Gramsci’s work on the state affirms the displacement of the 
ethical economy from its position as a framework of sociological thought into the realm 
of ideology. This move requires the development of a distinctive sociology of 
modernity which, in turn, demands a distinctive philosophical anthropology and 
ontology -  what I earlier described as new sense of reality. That new sense of reality 
was already present in Marx’s critique of political economy, having emerged from his 
conception of the value relation, and has been elaborated by both Althusser and 
Bhaskar. The really distinctive features of this critical perspective are its emphatic 
avowal of the extension of reality beyond the level of appearances and its emphasis on 
the intemality of the negative.45 This sense of reality highlights ontological depth and 
orients research towards social structures, their contradictory forms, their tendencies and 
their effects. It also foregrounds the significance of new categories and forms, i.e. depth 
and structure, absence and contradiction. These categories are constitutive of radically 
historicised realities. They are internal to the conceptions and realities of both the social 
formation and its constituent relations.
These categories further reinforce the distinctive character of the sociology of uneven 
and combined dialectical universalisation as against that of the antinomies of synchronic 
development, of which the most basic is that between identity and alterity based on civil 
society. The latter generates the antinomial conception of an ethicised, depoliticised, 
core and politicised peripheries which, in turn, generates a conception of social change 
in which core areas are driven to eliminate, displace or contain the absences constituting 
the peripheries. It also establishes the antinomial forms of the modern social relations as
Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (eds.) Civil Society: History and Possibilities, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
45 See, for instance, Roy Bhaskar’s Dialectic.
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universals: it sets up a split between essence and actuality; and it becomes locked into 
the perpetual project of closing that gap.
The critical sociology of modernity as uneven and combined dialectical 
universalisation, on the other hand, puts the problem of hegemony, and its conditions of 
possibility, to the fore. It treats hegemony as being both constituted by, and as an 
ethico-political response to, the problems arising within and between modem social 
relations. It shows how hegemony is reconstituted in a succession of attempts to 
‘resolve’ the peculiar negativities generated by the universalisation of these relations 
and to establish moments of order amid the ongoing flux of modernisation. It locates 
hegemony at the core of the project of Eurocentrism and its critique as the basis of 
theoretical anti-Eurocentrism.
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Ethnocentrism must be reckoned an aspect of the social imaginary, a pail of how a 
given social order is imagined and instituted. It can also, therefore, become a focus of 
critique and a stepping off point for critical theory: something that is especially so when 
it comes to Eurocentrism.
The term ‘ethnocentrism’, when originally coined, drew attention to ways in which 
social or collective forms of life are partially constituted.1 The ethnocentric imaginary 
privileges some distinctive features of a given form, lending a degree of structure to the 
symbolic order which feeds back into its reproduction and development. The 
ethnocentric dimension of a social imaginary patterns the ways in which people invest 
meaning and purpose in the world they inhabit, and mediates the way they order their 
social relations. An ethnocentric worldview places the given culture at the centre of 
things, establishing it as a general explanation for how and why the world is the way it 
is. Also, by investing this order with a hierarchy of values, it provides its inhabitants 
with their primary orientation. It may also impute this orientation to other peoples and 
even parts of the natural and/or supernatural world.
Ethnocentrism also has implications of a more philosophical character. A strictly logical 
consequence of ethnocentrism is an implicit universalism. Simply by establishing values 
by which to judge other cultures, and by informing a worldview which incorporates 
other cultures, ethnocentrism implicitly presupposes that the forms and categories of 
self-representation have some measure of universal validity.
To the extent that ethnocentrism is a feature of all cultural existence, disclosing the 
nature of Eurocentrism means drawing out the peculiarities of this particular form of 
ethnocentrism. At its most basic, this means identifying European beliefs about its own 
distinctiveness and superiority, and examining the ways in which these beliefs have fed 
back into reproducing what really is distinctive about it and its forms of political and 
social domination. One clearly distinctive feature of Eurocentrism is its explicit
1 William Graham Sunmer, Folkways: a stud)> o f  the sociological importance o f  
usages, manners, customs, mores, and morals, Ginn and Co., Boston, 1911.
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universalism: its claims for the universal validity of the abstract forms and categories of 
ethical economy.
However, few actual uses of the term ‘Eurocentrism’ pursue the implications of this. As 
a result, it is a term of social criticism, but not of critical theory. The conventional and, 
by far, dominant uses of the term, rest on an underlying Eurocentrism located in the 
forms and categories of modem theoretical practice and social relations. Conventional 
theory both reproduces and obscures this more profound sense of Eurocentrism, while 
the project of critical theory is to disclose it.
This chapter will review some of the literature on Eurocentrism in the light of this 
contention. It will discuss various positions and related problems and plot a way 
forward, but it will also do two other things: it will locate the various, and somewhat 
disparate, strands of the putative discourse on Eurocentrism in their historical context, 
and it will draw attention to a fundamental aspect of the above distinction between ways 
of approaching Eurocentrism. Of the two approaches, the first can only generate 
Eurocentric accounts of Eurocentrism, while the second is a crucial move in the 
development of a theoretical anti-Eurocentrism. These two approaches differ in one 
fundamental respect: they treat the relations between ethnocentrism, universalism and 
Eurocentrism in very different ways.
Accounts of Eurocentrism can be divided according to the status they attribute to 
‘ethnocentrism’, treating it as either strictly circumstantial or as a universal category. 
Eurocentric approaches regard ethnocentrism as a mere possibility, allowing for its 
European forms to be treated as historically contingent and therefore amenable to social 
criticism and reform. The corollary of not recognising ethnocentrism as a universal is 
that Eurocentrism institutes an illicit universality in its place, and institutes it in theory, 
practice and reality. By contrast, recognition that ethnocentrism is a necessity, i.e. an 
inescapable, universal, category of cultural life, means that its modem European forms 
are, in turn, recognised as being essential to and constitutive of modem forms of culture. 
Critical theoretical anti-Eurocentrism begins from the universality of ethnocentrism and 
is concerned with understanding Eurocentrism in terms of its constitutive forms of illicit 
universality.
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The chapter explores conventional uses of the term and how they relate to matters of 
representation in public spaces, in the ails as well as politically. It begins by setting out 
the ‘logic’ of conventional debates over Eurocentrism with an analysis of Charles 
Dickens’ rendition of Mr. Podsnap’s ethnocentric worldview. The initial perspective on 
this works up the theme of presences and absences in representations of the world, with 
‘Eurocentrism’ being understood as a demand for (greater) public recognition of the 
marginalised or absent. The subsequent section examines the historical emergence of 
‘Eurocentrism’ in relation to three dimensions of twentieth century socio-political 
change: decolonisation, post-colonialism and multiculturalism. The third part takes up 
the more philosophical issues connecting Eurocentrism with universalism and realism, 
where the problem of universality, and by implication that of Eurocentrism, can be 
shown to be a central feature of the modem philosophical tradition. The final section 
goes into further detail about peculiarity of modem ethnocentrism and its forms of 
universality.
I. Absence. Universal Realism and Historical Change in Eurocentrism.
Compared to its reality, the term Eurocentrism is relatively recent. Below is a quotation 
from Our Mutual Friend in which Charles Dickens lays before us the contours of Mr. 
Podsnap’s world, a world immediately recognisable as ethnocentric and as Eurocentric 
avant la lettre. Like many such terms, the word has come into use under specific 
conditions, but for varied, if more or less related pmposes. It has not figured as the key 
term of a sustained discourse in the way that, say, ‘globalisation’ has recently, but it has 
nevertheless achieved widespread currency.2 Like ‘globalisation’, a term with which it 
has a certain affinity, ‘Eurocentrism’ emerged during a period of historical transition, 
and the controversies over it were integral to some of the political and social struggles 
which occurred during this period. Unlike ‘globalisation,’ which gained ideological 
purchase in the immediate post-Soviet phase of the neo-liberal project, the discourse on 
‘Eurocentrism’ developed in a less well defined period, and it seems somewhat less 
bound to its immediate context. There is some justification for a broader application,
2 For an overview of the debates over the meaning of ‘globalisation’ see ‘What is 
Happening?’, chapter 1 of Jan Aart Scholte’s, Globalization: A Critical 
Introduction, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000. For a critical analysis o f the debates 
see Justin Rosenberg, especially his ‘Globalisation Theory: A post-mortem’,
International Politics, Vol. 42, Issue 1, March 2005.
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and it may well achieve greater longevity for, unlike the more recent term, it has a 
tremendous untapped theoretical potential as it refers to an enduring, essential aspect of 
modern forms of life.
Dickens’ wonderful caricature of ethnocentrism, Podsnappery, provides a good place 
from which to begin. It demonstrates three important features of Eurocentrism as a 
matter of intellectual, political and social controversy: it embodies a characteristic set of 
absences; it indicates different senses in which a given reality is universal; it intimates 
something of the instability of both the reality, and the reality principle, of 
Eurocentrism.
Mr. Podsnap’s world was not a very large world, morally; no, nor even 
geographically: seeing that although his business was sustained upon commerce 
with other countries, he considered other countries, with that important 
reservation, a mistake, and of their maimers and customs would conclusively 
observe, "Not English!” when, P re s to !  With flourish o f  the arm and a flush of 
the face, they were swept away. Elsewise, the world got up at eight, shaved 
close at a quarter-past, breakfasted at nine, went to the City at ten, came home at 
half-past five, and dined at seven.3
The passage continues: "Mr. Podsnap’s notions of the Arts in their integrity” was that 
they should do no more than represent this world of rising, shaving, breakfasting, the 
City, returning home and dining. "Nothing else to be permitted ... on pain of 
excommunication. Nothing else To Be—anywhere!”
The first feature to note about Podsnap’s horizons is that they are defined by absences 
of various kinds, each of which renders his outlook partial and distorted. There are the 
absences of many concrete aspects of the world; there are also the absences of 
abstractions, of the forms needed for a more realistic representation of the world; and 
there are the absences of the really abstract qualities of this world.
Secondly, Podsnap expresses a sense in which a certain reality appears universal, at the 
same time as he inhabits a reality which is genuinely becoming universal. On the one 
hand, there is the striking sense that this particular culture, despite its constitutive 
absences, is being identified with culture in general and is held to possess universal 
significance. Contrasted with this insistent sense of reality is the apparently feeble
3 Charles Dickens, Our Mutual Friend, chapter 11, Podsnappery.
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reality principle of alterity, whose geographical distance is so compounded by seeming 
insignificance that it cannot make its presence in the world felt in the City of London. 
On the other hand, Podsnap’s daily round in this city is at the very centre of a 
historically universal culture, or at least a universalising one, whose essential political 
and economic relations are expanding and extending far and deep into the world beyond 
the City’s walls.
Lastly, Dickens points to the fact that the sense of a real identity and of the unreality of 
alterity is located in specific conditions. This opens up the theme of change in the 
existing differential strength of relative reality principles. Important sources of change 
are the processes of universalisation in which they are embedded, and the struggles over 
them which lend them their particular shape. Dickens’ own literary realist practice is 
one such struggle, playing on the absences embodied in this vision so as to undermine 
its sense of reality and its appearance of universality.
Turning first to the concrete and abstract absences of Eurocentrism. All of these kinds 
of absences are characteristic of the Eurocentric worldview: There are persistent failures 
to represent the concrete, such as “other countries”. There is inadequate representation 
of the relations between Europe and other countries, not to speak of the internal 
relations of other forms of life. Nor is there any rounded appreciation of the impact on 
others of the tendentially universalising relations of modem forms of life.4
Concrete reality encompasses the people, places and things of the world we inhabit: our 
organic and inorganic bodies. It is the sphere of existence which is amenable to our 
sensibilities in their full sense, with its inner as well as outer dimensions. It is our lived 
world, and can be more or less understood, well or poorly described, entered into with a 
higher or meaner sense of purpose, worked on with greater or lesser degrees of 
satisfaction, etc.5 To speak of the absence of the concrete, then, is just to make the
4 In his account of Orientalism, Edward Said makes much the same point.
Orientialism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978.
3 “True great realism thus depicts man and society as complete entities, instead of 
showing merely one or the other of their aspects. Measured by the criterion, 
artistic trends determined by either exclusive introspection or exclusive 
extraversion equally impoverish and distort reality. Thus realism means a three- 
dimensionality, an all-roundness, that endows with independent life characters 
and human relationships. It by no means involves a rejection of the emotional and 
intellectual dynamism which necessarily develops together with the modem
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straight forward point that some significant aspect of our world is not present in some 
depiction of it. It is to say that an author has not presented it to the reader, or that the 
text does not represent it. When such absences become apparent it means that important 
aspects of the lifeworld have not been accorded their due significance, and it implies 
that some ill is being peipetuated as a result.
Concrete absences are at the very heart of Dickens’ literary practice. When he says of 
Podsnap’s world that “it was not a very large world”, he identifies a failure of 
perception: there is scope for far greater recognition; horizons could embrace wider 
difference and diversity. Nor is this simply a matter of narrow-mindedness. It is a matter 
of active exclusion. With a ‘Presto!’ and a flourish, in the manner of an illusionist, 
Podsnap conjures up the absences of his world. Its incompleteness is deliberately 
generated and reproduced through particular kinds of performative utterances. For 
Dickens, alternative, superior, forms of representational production are both necessary 
and possible. Literature is a moralising, and through that a politicising, form of action in 
the public sphere. It is a vital mediation of both public morality and state intervention. 
The activity of the author is akin to that of the journalist working for a radical press. It 
puts concrete realities before the public, and it engages in a process in which absences 
of concrete reality are absented, so that concrete ills might be absented in their turn.
This dynamic of reform is by no means confined to literature. Much the same may be 
said of the social sciences. More overtly political, at least in the sense that their express 
purpose is to mediate legal and institutional interventions in social life, the social 
sciences, with their own patterns of absences and presences, are at least as efficacious as 
literature in shaping the world. The social sciences, though, have some very different 
resources available to them. For instance, not all states of affairs or aspects of reality 
can be represented figuratively. Other, more abstract, forms are called on to stand in to 
relate qualities such as scale or complexity, which might otherwise defy concrete 
representation. Abstractions are also needed for dealing with aspects of the world which 
lay beyond the realm of the sensual or the concrete. Using various kinds of abstraction, 
the natural, as well as some social, sciences have advanced statistical and theoretical
world. All it opposes is the destruction of die completeness of the human 
personality and of the objective typicality of men and situations tiirough an 
excessive cult o f the momentary mood.”
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forms of representation as the basis of various kinds of realism. Equally, abstractions 
are needed in order to refer to the forms assumed by the concrete, i.e. its relations, 
structures and forms of organisation. Indeed, the absence of these necessary abstractions 
from an account of the world will usually mean that the structures of modernity are 
either not represented or that they are misrepresented. Consequently, the internal 
relations of the modem lifeworld are represented in a more or less problematic way.
In representing the world, the requirements of adequacy demand the use of abstract as 
well as concrete references. Nevertheless, controversies over the status of abstractions, 
of terms which make non-empirical references, have been a persistent feature of the 
modern epistemological tradition. Much of the fruitful humanist dialogue between the 
value of literature, in a struggle with romanticism, and of science, in its struggle against 
rationalism, revolves around the value and status of these different forms of 
representation.6
It is not surprising, though, that questions as to what constitutes realism remain highly 
contentious, for these questions are symptomatic of the defining feature of the modem: 
the mediation and constitution of concrete forms of life by abstract relations. What 
Lukacs refers to as the artistic struggle for realism against ‘the destruction of the 
completeness of the human personality and of the objective typicality of men and 
situations’ to be found in forms of literature can be understood as a consequence of its 
practical corollary: the struggle against the destruction of concrete completeness by the 
forms of modem social relations. Given this context, the humanist quest for literary 
and/or scientific realism is indissolubly bound to political radicalism, but, as we shall 
see in the chapters that follow, relations between realism and radicalism are deeply 
problematic.
The second significant aspect of this worldview is that it has a range of philosophical 
implications. Considerations of the philosophical implications of Podsnap’s worldview 
also bring questions of realism to the fore, as it has ontological and epistemological 
implications for both universality and realism. In common with all visions of life, this
George Lukacs, Studies in European Realism, Merlin Press, London, 1978. p. 6.
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one can be subjected to philosophical interrogations, as if it were making philosophical 
arguments, or otherwise implying a philosophical position. As such it, along with its 
philosophical presuppositions, is open to critiques, including explanatory critiques 
which can explain the structure of the absences and presences it embodies.
The most immediate consequence of Podsnap’s efforts to police his own horizons is that 
they sustain a distorted sense of the universality of his experienced world. This world is 
complete, true and good. The real world is identified with this one; it is as Podsnap is, 
does as Podsnap- does. Illicitly asserting the universality of any particularity, however, 
has many consequences. For instance, to the extent the world is really other, to the 
extent it is not identical to his and does not do identically as his does, it has a 
profoundly ambiguous status conferred upon it. By universalising his own world, 
Podsnap makes it the very essence of all worlds. Where other worlds are actually 
different from his it cannot be because they are essentially other. Rather, they are at 
odds with what has become their own essence. If that condition is temporary it may be 
because alterity is simply a moment in the process of becoming identical, of realising 
the true essence. If it is permanent, then we are dealing with some ontological flaw. 
Podsnap, of course, takes the second option: alterity is simply an erroneous mode of 
existence. Pie declares ‘Nothing Else To Be!’ and who is there to argue? Who is there to 
make a case for existential autonomy, significance or representation? This universe is 
populated by a host of anomalies at its outer limits, but ones which lack the capacity to 
makes themselves felt. The fairly robust ‘hard core’ of this universe seems unaffected 
by them.7
There is a sense in which something akin to Freud’s reality and pleasure principles are 
at work here, in a socio-political rather than psycho-analytic context. Freud describes 
infant maturation in terms of a transition between a life dominated by the pleasure 
principle, and characterised by the free play of fantasy and polymorphous perversity, to 
one dominated by the reality principle, in which one’s needs and desires are more
6 See for instance, Wolf Lepenies, Between Literature and Science: the Rise o f  
Sociology, R.J, Hollingdale (trans.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1988.
7 Imre Lakatos uses ‘hard core’ and ‘anomalies’ in his account of research 
programmes. See ‘Falsification and Hie Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes’ in Lakatos and Musgrove, Criticism and the growth o f knowledge,
London, Cambridge University Press, 1970.
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closely aligned to the structured demands of family and social life. The psyche is 
disciplined into an accommodation with reality, in a process mediated by the authority 
invested in adults. For Freud, this was especially true of the figure of the father, the 
representative of the demands of the real world and of the possibilities of the mature 
pleasures of adult life.
Without making any strictly psycho-analytic comments about Podsnap’s world, this 
same language can be used to give a sociological account of how it, and real visions of 
the world similar to it, are organised. This outlook has both realistic and fantastic 
aspects. It plainly draws on the realities of daily life; at home and at work; it is 
disciplined and organised. It is also adequate for practical purposes, and serves as a 
means of channelling pleasures and satisfactions. There can be little doubt that a reality 
principle is at work in its construction. There is an imaginary at work here, an order in 
which a stable identity has come to an accommodation with social reality. It gives rise 
to a powerful sense of reality, one grounded in durable political and cultural structures.
The sense of reality produced by this principle, though, also contains elements of 
fantasy. This is most clearly evident in the dismissal of alterity at the horizons where the 
claims of otherness to be accepted as an integral part of reality are so weak that they can 
simply be wished away. The political and social mediations at work here are of a quite 
different character. They generate only the most feeble of reality principles, making few 
demands on the imagination to accommodate itself to reality, allowing instead for its 
easy assimilation into the realm of fantasy. The appearance of a very partial worldview 
as a complete and coherent universe brings the real and the fantastic together in an 
unstable, ‘irrealist’, compromise formation.8 These fonns of appearance are supported 
by a complex and differential reality principle: what could be called an ‘irreality 
principle.’
The irreality principle sustaining this imagined universe is an effect of its basic 
structures, i.e. the realities of universalisation. The political, economic and cultural 
relations in which this sense of reality is grounded not only extended from the City
8 ‘Irrealism’ is used by Roy Bhaskar to describe philosophical ontologies, implicit 
or explicit, which are constituted by absences and contradictions, just as 
Podsnap’s is. Bhaskar, Dialectic, passim.
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across the globe, but were also expanding and intensifying. Other countries were also 
pushing these processes forward in more or less intense competition. Modem European 
culture was staking a claim to a universal reality: it was, and indeed remains, intent on 
being the first truly world culture. European expansion generated pressures that made 
themselves felt in no uncertain terms, requiring others to accommodate themselves to its 
various demands, while also offering certain benefits to those who would cooperate. 
The City of London had been instrumental in enlarging the circuits and encouraging the 
flows of capital, for instance, around the world since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, if 
not before.9 The political projects of domestic, and foreign, state formation and 
colonialism were inseparable from that of securing the conditions of capital 
accumulation, even if the different aspects of colonialism were not always entirely 
mutually supportive. This, then, is the reality in which Podsnap’s universalism is 
located: a world centred on and mediated by London; a complex of universalising 
processes; subject to more or less intense social struggles world-wide. Podsnap’s world 
rests on the processual penetration, mediation and transformation of ‘other countries’, 
and it relies entirely on their tendencies to subsume cultural alterity under these 
universal relations, tendencies which often put such others under intolerable strain.
However, both the compromise formations of universalism and the irreality principle 
generated by complex and differential modes of universalisation are inherently unstable. 
Both are more or less precarious, conjunctural equilibria whose internal differentiation 
and complexity work against their coherence and stability. As a result, both the 
compromise formations of imagined universalism and the unstable social formations 
produced by universalisation are in continual need of repair and reconfiguration. There 
is a ‘logic’, for instance, to the playing out of the claims for identity and universality. 
They have ever to be reasserted against those of alterities which resist eradication. 
Indeed, the recognition of alterity implied in its active denial is a somewhat back- 
handed acknowledgement of its real significance. The assertion of universality 
immediately establishes a master-slave dialectic in which claims for complete 
superiority can never be realised. This form of irrealist universalism is constituted by a 
potentially fatal contradiction, but one whose disruptive capacities are held in check by 
the irreality principle operating through its historical context. The irreality principle
9 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, Longman, London, 1993.
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works to limit the cognitive and practical significance of internal contradictions, 
allowing instead for universalising processes to occur, and for struggles over them to 
take place, in such a way the both reality and its appearances are changed. In the course 
of such change the differential efficacy of the reality principle is redistributed; the co­
presence of universalisation and the struggles that take place over it generate new 
conditions in which it is experienced and represented.10
Dickens, social critic and reformer, ranks amongst the finest exponents of artistic 
struggle over representation and universality. He shows a keen awareness of the 
practical significance of partial outlooks on the world. When others are put out of sight 
and out of mind, excluded from public consideration by a responsible citizenry, their 
suffering has no prospect of alleviation. For Dickens, literature is more than a strictly 
aesthetic form of representation, as social realism is a deliberate means of politicising 
social issues, of forcing them to become matters of concern in the public sphere. He 
uses literature to remedy absences in dominant modes of representation, demanding 
recognition for those on the margins.11 The realist novel, in this context, is a challenge to 
the complacent Podsnaps of the world. It confers a new political significance on its 
subjects as it represents them in the public sphere.
The dynamics of universalism and universalisation, then, encompass difference and 
change. Their substantive content is not at all fixed. Of course, Dickens, in common 
with most critics of Eurocentrism, only partially remedies these kinds of problems. 
Literary realism is confronted by the same general conditions as the forms of 
representation it criticises. It too is subject to differential reality/irreality principles; it 
too is engaged in struggles over universalism; it too is involved in the transformational 
reproduction of the processes of universalisation.
10 The key texts here include Gramsci’s work on hegemonic struggle and Jurgen 
Habermas’s account of the evolution of the public sphere. Antonio Gramsci, 
Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971: 
Jurgen Habermas, Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere, Polity, 
Cambridge, 1989.
11 Dickens is what Rorty would call an ‘agent of love’, one who is instrumental in 
extending political and legal recognition to those who would otherwise remain 
outside the scope of ‘agents of justice’, i.e. subject to the ethical considerations of 
the state. Rorty, ‘On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz’, in Objectivity, 
Relativism and Truth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. p.206.
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Political and social theory should be understood in similar* terms. Modern theory is a 
vehicle of universalism, as well as a means of producing ‘realist’ critiques. At least 
since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the modern theoretical tradition has been 
more or less self-consciously grappling with the implications and contradictions of its 
universalism for social and political order.12 These forms of symbolic representation are 
subject to the same opposing tendencies: to defend universalism in the face of absences 
and anomalies; to play on these flaws and criticise claims for universal representation; 
to reconstitute and reconfigure universalist representations. However, it is one thing to 
be entangled in the Eurocentric dynamics of universalism and universalisation, but it is 
quite another to properly comprehend things in these terms and come to terms with their 
full implications. Such ignorance, indeed, is a defining characteristic of the Eurocentric 
universalist imaginary.
II. Emerging fragments of a discourse on Eurocentrism.
Modem political and social theory have developed as an integral part of these processes 
of universalisation, and ideas about ‘Eurocentrism’ emerged from within them in a 
particular* period: namely that during which continental European dominance was 
displaced by that of the European settler state, the United States of America. The term is 
generally used in response to perceived failures of universalism, and in attempts to 
address the many and varied absences of political representation, absences which 
acquired greater salience during the long migration of the major centre of the world 
system across the Atlantic.13 Controversies over Eurocentrism have been integral to the 
contests over the democratisation of political and cultural forms of representation, and 
closely related to the tendencies to level social status distinctions, one of the 
distinctively modem processes of social transformation.14 The issues politicised as 
Eurocentric fall under three broad headings: the anti-colonial; the post-colonial; the 
multi-cultural. The first of these concerns international structures of political and 
cultural representation; the second relates to structures of representation within
12 Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood, A Trumpet o f Sedition: political theory 
and the rise o f capitalism, 1509-1688, Pluto, London, 1997.
13 This sense of failed universalism is most clearly expressed in Said’s Orientalism.
14 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Alfred Knopf, New York,
1954. Charles Taylor’s ‘Politics o f Recognition’ also contains a useful discussion 
of this process. ‘The Politics of Recognition,’ in Multicidturalism, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994.
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previously colonised, or otherwise peripheral countries; the last deals with problems of 
representation within the countries of the core regions, often related to migration from 
the peripheries.
‘Eurocentrism’ has a range of meanings, each of which is related to a different context 
of contestation. What they have in common is a decidedly negative connotation, 
invoking some bias, or deliberate distortion, which systematically favours the European. 
Substantive accounts differ as to what such biases consists of, how they should be 
understood, what their significance is and how they should be countered or remedied. 
The diversity of uses is symptomatic of the complex and differential spatio- 
temporalities of history and theory. The relevant political conflicts have been of very 
different kinds and are dispersed across time and space. Developments in social theory, 
on the other hand, occur along a number of crosscutting axes, the most significant of 
which are its disciplinary distinctions, its range of theoretical orientations, and its 
various philosophical presuppositions.
Some of the intellectual battles related to the politics of decolonisation, independence 
and neo-colonialism have taken place in those academic disciplines with global scope, 
such as International Relations and World histoiy, and approaches like modernisation 
theory, world systems theory and dependency theory. ‘Eurocentrism’ has been a 
significant term in debates within each of these and over the relative merits of rival 
approaches.15 At stake in all of these debates has been the nature and consequences of 
the evolution of the global political economy. Charges of ‘Eurocentrism,5 encapsulated 
in such figures as ‘core and periphery,’ identify conflictual and unequal relations 
between the West and the rest, and regard existing political practices as the institution 
and reproduction of systemic injustices.
15 Some key works of interest in the area of global political economy are Samir 
Amin, Eurocentrism, Russell Moore (Trans.), Zed Books, London, 1989; 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism, Verso, London, 1983. In world 
history there is J. M. Blaut, The Colonizer’s Model o f the World: Geographical 
Dijfasionism and Eurocentric Histoiy, The Guilford Press, New York / London, 
1993; B. J. Avari and G. G. Joseph ‘An ethnocentric history of the world; the case 
of Paul Johnson’ in Histoiy Workshop Journal (Vol. 23, 1987), pp. 112-21; 
Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing Histoiy and the West, Routledge, 
London, 1990.
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Opposition to such charges rests on a different account of relations between power and 
justice and tends to support the ethical character of substantive inequalities. The defence 
of inequalities in wealth portrays economic exchange relations as consensual and 
mutual, while the defence of power inequalities emphasises the benefits of colonial 
investments and institutions in laying the basis of future economic growth, peace, and 
stability. Generally, where ‘Eurocentrism’ envisions a denial of autonomy and the 
shaping of peripheral development in the interests of the core, i.e. as underdevelopment, 
this denial presupposes that the peripheries are necessarily actual or potential sites of 
autonomous development. Debates over Cambridge School Indian historiography 
exemplify these kinds of disputes, with Cambridge historians stressing the cooperative 
dimensions of Anglo-Indian relations, while their detractors emphasise the role of 
colonial interests and exercise of force.16
More closely associated with social formation under post-colonial, peripheral and ‘late’ 
conditions are various contests over the nature and status of area studies. These range 
across issues in political and economic development, including the status of 
modernisation theory; the role of anthropology; the various questions raised about 
intercultural historiography and sociology by Subaltern Studies and, more broadly, 
‘post-colonial theory’.17 Parallel disputes to those above are found here too. However,
16 Perhaps the most trenchant of all works dealing with the use of force and the lack 
of moral constraint in modern European dealings with the rest of the world is 
Rajani Kanth’s Against Eurocentrism, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005.
17 Works raising these questions from a comparative perspective within area studies 
include Peter Gran, Beyond Eurocentrism: A New View O f Modern World 
History, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1996. In development economics: 
J. Brohmann, ‘Universalism, Eurocentrism and Ideological Bias in Development 
Studies: from Modernisation to neo-liberalism’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 16, 
No. 1, 1995; Ozay Mehmet, Westernizing the Third World: the Eurocentricity o f  
Economic Development Theories, Routledge, London, 1995; P. Hill, 
Development Economics on .Trial: the anthropological case for prosecution, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986; There are many works in cultural 
studies, the most important of which has been Edward Said’s Orientalism: 
Western Conceptions o f  the Orient, Penguin, London, 1978 and Culture and 
Imperialism, Chatto and Windus, London, 1993. Works on anthropology include 
Talal Asad, Anthropology> and the Colonial Encounter, Ithaca Press, New York, 
1973; Ronald Inden ‘Orientalist Construction of India’ Modern Asian Studies, 
No. 20, 1986, pp. 401-46; M. Searle-Chatterjee, ‘Anthropology exposed’ in 
Anthropology Todays August 1987. Addressing issues of cross-cultural 
interpretation is Charles Taylor, ‘Social Theoiy as Practice’ and ‘Understanding 
and Ethnocentricity’, in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical 
Papers 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985. See also the series of 
Subaltern Studies, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982-. On post colonial theory 
see Patrick Williams and Lama Chrisman (eds.), Colonial Discourse and Post- 
colonial Theoiy, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993; Uma Kothari,
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they were often located on different terrain, with a stronger emphasis having been put 
on relations between power and knowledge. This meant taking up the themes 
foregrounded by Edward Said’s use of Gramsci’s conception of hegemony and 
Foucault’s account of discourse and, relatedly, pursuing the radicalisation of 
representation, inspired by Gramsci’s use of the ‘subaltern’ and E. P. Thompson’s 
‘history from below’. However, exporting European theory, even in its more critical 
forms, has given rise to other kinds of consideration. The organisation of 
power/knowledge, and the possible forms of hegemony and domination differ between 
core and peripheral zones. The result is that relations between theory, practice and 
context are necessarily more awkward in the periphery.18 So while the need for critical 
disclosure of the illiberal dimensions of modernity has at least as much relevance in the 
peripheries as it does in the core, translations of Foucault, for instance, from the latter to 
the former are no less problematic than, say, Bentham. Despite such problems, attempts 
to adapt modem theory to local conditions still face charges of ‘nativism’ etc., 
pressuring intellectuals into a more perverse strain of Eurocentrism than is found in the
19core.
In relation to ‘multiculturalism’, issues arose in connection to first world social 
movements, which tend to be distinguished from ‘traditional’ class-based politics, and 
are vehicles for alternative forms of struggle such as the politics of ethnic and gender 
identity. Such movements have by no means been exclusively confined to the west.20 In
Development Studies and Post-colonial Theoiy, Institute for Development Policy 
and Management, University of Manchester, Manchester, 1996; Stephen Slemon 
and Helen Tiffin, After Europe: critical theoiy and post-colonial theoiy, 
Dangaroo Press, Sydney 1989; Gayatri Spivak, The Post-colonial Critic, 
Routledge, London, 1990.
18 There are many, many different kinds of account of the kinds of awkwardnesses 
that are generated by the attempted universalisation of modern theory, practice, 
institutions and relations. Even if  not all presented as post-colonial theory, 
common ideas, such as Quasi-statehood, highlight theory-practice 
inconsistencies. By and large, modern theory is concerned with explaining these 
recalcitrant realities, and reforming them, i.e. bringing them into greater 
conforming with visions of modernity.
19 This antinomy has also been investigated by John Game in a paper to the 
Department of Political Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, May 
2005.
20 For instance, Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism: 
Multiculturalism and the Media, Routledge, London, 1994. Charles Taylor, ‘The 
Politics of Recognition5 in Multiculturalism, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1994. Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism and Truth, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, especially 
‘Antirepresentationalism, ethnocentrism, and liberalism’ and ‘On ethnocentrism:
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this area too, the structured distortions of forms of cultural and political representation 
were the object of social criticism. Equality of access to public spaces or public spheres 
has been questioned and claims of authority to adequately represent diversity came 
under sustained attack. In the United States in particular, established canons and other 
institutions have been subject to intense criticism for their failures to adhere to avowed 
universalist norms. Here, perhaps more than elsewhere, charges of Eurocentrism have 
been countered by accusations of relativism. Disputes over multiculturalism, no less 
than others, have frequently drawn on philosophical resources or taken oil a decidedly 
philosophical cast, with the dichotomy between universalism and relativism very much 
to the fore.
This period also saw a remarkable transformatory dialogue in philosophy.21 By the 
1980s the emergent field of philosophical positions could be mapped out by reference to 
hermeneutics, deconstruction and realism.22 One of the principal areas within which 
relevant issues have been raised has been the ongoing 4rationality debates’ conducted 
between philosophers and anthropologists, which have drawn on analytical and 
linguistic developments and are concerned with general epistemological and ontological 
questions facing intercultural social sciences.23 These debates necessarily raise questions 
about the universality of philosophical concepts and the ethnocentrism of the 
philosophical tradition.
a reply to Clifford Geertz’. Fred Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism, State University 
of New York Press, Albany, 1996.
21 For an account of this history from a contemporary hermeneutic perspective see 
Paul Ricoeur, ‘On Interpretation’, in After Philosophy, Baynes et al (eds.), MIT 
Press, London, 1987 and Gadamer, Hans-Georg, ‘Philosophy or Theory of 
Science?5, in Reason in the Age o f Science, Frederick G. Lawrence (trans.), MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981. For a partial account from Bhaskar’s 
perspective see ‘Feyerabend and Bachelard: Two Philosophies o f Science’, in 
Reclaiming Reality, Verso, London, 1989.
22 See William Outhwaite, New Philosophies o f  Social Science: realism, 
hermeneutics and critical theoiy, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1987. Also, a 
collection covering many o f the most significant developments in this area is 
After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and 
Thomas McCarthy (eds.), MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1987. 
Alain Badiou offers a concise summary of this shift within twentieth century 
French philosophy. ‘The Adventure of French Philosophy, New Left Review, No. 
35, September-October, 2005.
23 Three important collections of material are Bryan Wilson (ed.), Rationality, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1970; Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality> and 
Relativism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1982; Joanna Overing (ed.), Reason and Morality, 
ASA Monographs 24, Tavistock, London, 1985.
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The figure of Heidegger looms large behind a new found interest in philosophical 
anthropology, inspiring, from an interpretive direction, Gadamer and Ricoeur in 
hermeneutics and Derrida in deconstruction and, from the perspective of the philosophy 
of science, Roy Bhaskar’s dialectical realism.24 This post-Heideggerian field developed 
around critiques of traditional conceptions of the philosophical subject, a central figure 
since long before Kant, and with it the social and historical character of reason debated 
since the Enlightenment.25 In the course of this progressive conversation the nature of 
both the subjectivistic and objectivistic poles, which have been such stable features of 
the last two hundred years of philosophical thought, have undergone such a level of 
revision that it is not difficult to accept Bernstein’s account of this process moving 
philosophy off its traditional terrain and going ‘beyond objectivism and relativism5.26
These developments have reinforced tendencies towards historical and sociological 
accounts of knowledge. For some this has meant a repudiation of virtually all claims to 
knowledge, given that positivistic verification and Popperian falsification have both 
been rendered unsustainable.27 As a result, relativist positions appeal* to have greater 
philosophical justification. The difficulty here though is that ‘relativism5 now covers 
such a wide range of positions that simply referring to any one of them as relativistic is 
no longer very helpful: the linguistic turn means that we are all relativists now and it 
makes no sense not be one.28 Simply identifying the production of knowledges as a 
social process, the minimum condition of a relativistic position, does not, however,
24 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, (second, revised edition by Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall), Sheed and Ward, London, 1993; Reason 
in the Age o f  Science, Fredrick Lawrence (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1981: Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, John 
B. Thompson (ed. and trans.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981; 
The Conflict, o f  Interpretations, North West University Press, Evanston, 1974: 
Roy Bhaskar, Dialectic, Verso, London, 1994; Plato etc., Verso, 1994; 
Philosophy and the Idea o f Freedom, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991; The Possibility o f  
Naturalism, third edition, Routledge, London, 1998; A Realist Theory o f Science, 
Verso Classics, London, 1997.
25 A historical overview is to be found in Understanding and Social Inquiry, Fred 
Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy (eds.), University of Notre Dame Press, Notre 
Dame, Indiana, 1977. Other relevant works include Richard Bernstein, Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983; Richard Rorty Philosophy 
and the Mirror o f  Nature, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.
26 Bernstein, Richard, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983
27 See Roy Bhaskar’s ‘Feyerabend and Bachelard: Two Philosophies of Science’ in 
Reclaiming Reality, Verso, London, 1989.
28 See for instance Barry Barnes and David Bloor, ‘Relativism, Rationalism and the 
Sociology of Knowledge’ in Rationality and Relativism, Hollis and Lukes eds.,
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necessarily entail the collapse of all epistemology. Indeed, one challenge facing 
philosophy has been the development of a philosophical position which can sustain a 
self-consistent sociology of knowledge, i.e. one which is simultaneously realist and 
relativist.
The different accounts of Eurocentrism, then, can be understood against the political 
and disciplinary background of the 20th century. Social theorists engaged with past and 
present political events. They drew on pliilosophy for help with technical and 
conceptual issues, while new philosophical claims about the nature of social being and 
social inquiry also give rise to new schools of thought within existing disciplines.29 The 
issue of Eurocentrism was at the centre of disputes within and over the social sciences.30 
Driven by both philosophical insights and practical interests, social science and social 
theory have staked out a range of what might be called oppositional positions. The 
complex temporalities of social thought mean that not all of these attempts to 
conceptualise Eurocentrism draw equally on contemporary philosophical developments. 
Working within disciplinary boundaries means relying on varying degrees of 
institutional mediation between developments elsewhere, which can result in there 
being considerable lags in time before social theory registers the significance of changes 
in the meaning of science for disciplinary practices. These lags can, to some extent, be 
ironed out by bringing these two areas together in more deliberate way.
and Paul Hirst, ‘Is it rational to reject relativism?’ in Reason and Morality, 
Overing ed.
29 A historical overview is to be found in Understanding and Social Inquiiy, Fred 
Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy (eds.), University of Notre Dame Press, Notre 
Dame, Indiana, 1977. Other relevant works include Beyond Objectivism and 
Relativism, Richard Bernstein, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983; Richard Rorty 
Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.
30 An examples of one debate of a more philosophical character is that between 
Immanuel Wallerstein and Gregor McLennan in the pages of the New Left 
Review: Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘Eurocentrism and its Avatars: The Dilemmas of 
Social Science’, New Left Review, 226, November/December 1997, pp. 93-107; 
McLennan, Gregor, ‘The Question of Eurocentrism: A Comment on Immanuel 
Wallerstein’, New Left Review 231, pp. 153-158; Wallerstein, Immanuel, 
‘Questioning Eurocentrism: A Reply to Gregor McLennan, New Left Review 231, 
pp. 159-160. Gregor McLennan, ‘Post-Marxism and the “Four Sins” of Modernist 
Theorizing’, New Left Review, 218, July/August, 1996, pp. 53-74. Other works 
include Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Science: The limits o f  - a 
nineteenth-centwy paradigm, Polity, Cambridge, 1991; George Gheverghese 
Joseph, Vasu Reddy and Mary Searle-Chatterjee, ‘Eurocentrism in the Social 
Sciences’, Race and Class, Vol. 31, no. 4, 1990.
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Taking these philosophical developments forward is directly related to problems of 
knowledge and evaluation confronting the issue of Eurocentrism. Superseding the 
effects of contemporary philosophical problems on the social sciences and overcoming 
the problems of Eurocentrism within the social sciences coincide at this point. Their 
resolution requires the kinds of sustainable realism suggested above and also needs a 
rejection of any presupposition that present conditions, especially western ones, are an 
instantiation of the good life. The most promising efforts to combine work in these areas 
emerges out of the Marxian tradition as it is here one finds the combination of both 
critical normative and critical realist tendencies.
III. Foregrounding ethnocentrism.
One point of departure for developing an adequate conception of Eurocentrism can be 
opened up through an investigation of its relation to ideas of ethnocentrism. There are 
two general uses of the term, both of which treat it as a general term encompassing 
Eurocentrism but differ by either regarding it as a contingent feature of social life or 
else as a constitutive characteristic of culture as such. In both cases, to describe some 
group or other as being ethnocentric is to imply that it privileges its own culture over 
others in some way. Implicit in most uses, however, is a sense that this self-privileging 
is, in principle, a departure from some more balanced self-assessment and some more 
reasonable practice. It suggests an illicit assertion of particularity over universality. 
Used in this way, the term refers to something like a potential to deviate from a norm. 
The alternative, less common, usage is to regal’d ethnocentrism as an anthropological 
condition: a genuinely universal feature of human cultural existence, but one which is 
realised in particular ways by each form of life. In this case, ethnocentrism is the 
assertion of one particularity over other particularities. Far from being a deviation from 
the norm, it is the realisation of the norm, though in its own particular way.
This distinction between conceptions of ethnocentrism illuminates approaches to 
Eurocentrism. Uses of the first kind contrast Eurocentric imbalances with some more 
balanced state of affairs; uses of the second kind are more concerned with systemic 
European self valorisation and the various forms it takes. Each of these is related to very 
different conceptions of scientific practice and rationality, as they map directly onto
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accounts of ideological biases of social science as either contingent or necessary.31 The 
implication of contingency theories of ideological bias is that there are general criteria 
of scientific inquiry and that departure from them can usually be explained in terms of a 
failure to adopt the appropriate level of disinterest. The necessity of ideology, 
meanwhile, can be accounted for in terms of the forms and functions of the modes of 
thought relative to a given culture.
Approaches to Eurocentrism favouring contingency tend to be epistemically optimistic. 
Joseph et. al., for instance, are typical of many others concerned with multiculturalism.32 
They begin with a standard dictionary definition of ethnocentrism: ‘the tendency to 
view ones own ethnic group and its social standards as the basis for evaluative 
judgements concerning the practices of others - with the implication that one views 
one’s own standards as superior’. Having stressed the sense of an evaluative bias they 
then attempt to accomplish two tasks. The first of these is to show how Eurocentrism, a 
term originally coined precisely to capture the idea of a specifically European 
ethnocentrism, conforms to this general conception. The second is to show that other, 
less culturally biased, ways of approaching the world can be adopted. The contrast here 
is between a self-regarding bias and the possibility of adopting an objective attitude to 
the world, i.e. The View from Nowhere.33
The same approach can be found in the quite different work of writers such as Samir 
Amin and James Blaut. They begin with what at first appears as a much stronger 
conception of Eurocentrism by insisting that Eurocentrism cannot be reduced to 
‘another banal ethnocentrism’.34 Eurocentrism may be a form of ethnocentrism, but 
unlike most others it has world historical significance, having been a crucial feature of a 
half-millennium development of the world system. This form of ethnocentrism is in a 
class of its own. In addition, Blaut, in particular, raises epistemological/ideological 
issues when he identifies a ‘colonialist view of the world’ running through large 
swathes of Western thought. It follows from this that some deeper account of the 
distinctive ethnocentricity of Europeans is needed: what are its differentia specifical
jI See for example Ryan, A., The Philosophy o f the Social Sciences, Macmillan,
London, 1970, ff. 220.
32 Joseph, George Gheverghese, Vasu Reddy and Mary Seaiie-Challerjee, ‘Eurocentrism in the Social
Sciences’, Race and Class, Vol. 31, no. 4, 1990.
33 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986.
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However, even in writings such as these, there remains a sense in which the biases 
within the world system brought about by Eurocentrism are contingent on a set of 
political accidents -  such as Colmnbus blundering into the Caribbean. In the absence of 
these contingencies, capitalism would still have developed across the world, but in a 
more even, just, manner. Even when Eurocentrism is regarded as constitutive of the 
present world, as either political relations or intellectual representation, it can still be 
explained in terms of historical accidents, and remedied through changes to political and 
cultural representation and participation.
Despite according it some significance, then, these accounts of Eurocentrism also render 
it relatively superficial. It is seen as being 011 the wane, challenged by forms of artistic 
and political representation which displace old assumptions and institute new, more 
democratic, relations. Such trends are real enough, and these kinds of account clearly 
give voice to a range of domestic and international changes, but they do not inquire 
sufficiently deeply into the nature of the social formation. This elevates certain short­
term trends, wrongly, into long term, fundamental, transformations. The problem here is 
that these approaches are limited in one important and common respect: they do not 
entertain the possibility of identifying ethnocentrism with cultural universality.
One prominent alternative to this (standing in here to represent the position that 
ideological bias is a necessity) is typified by Richard Rorty and advocates of 
deconstruction. Broadly speaking, these approaches highlight the nature of language 
mid meaning as social relations. They argue that, in mediating between the social and 
itself or nature, it is always-already structured in ways which rule it out as objective 
and/or universal. Instead the form and functions of meaning are related to their role in 
the construction of consensus and/or struggles mid conflict. Deconstruction, in exposing 
naturalistic epistemology, in terms of the metaphysics of presence and immediacy, 
regards linguistic mediation as simultaneously the condition of both the possibility and 
impossibility of knowing the world.35
Rorty is of special interest here because of his explicit identification of the human 
condition as ethnocentric. Although making an explicit challenge to universalism, he
34 Amin, Eurocentrism, p. ix.
35 For instance, R. Young, White Mythologies, Routledge, London, 1990.
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effectively affirms ethnocentrism as a human universal. That is, Roily is using 
‘ethnocentrism’ as an essential category of philosophical anthropology. It is, in effect, a 
principle of social existence. The anthropology he develops also makes much of the 
principle of pragmatism, prioritising the practical worth of ideas over any possible 
abstract truth. The pragmatic nature of ideas means that modes of thought and meaning 
are embedded in specific social relations, such that they are both of and for the forms of 
life to which they belong.36 Ideas are expressive of a given culture, but their real value is 
that they are functional to its reproduction. The essential ethnocentrism of ideas means 
that they are instrumental to their culture, and/or that they should be judged with respect 
to how instrumental they are.
Rorty’s understanding of ethnocentrism draws on his critique of epistemological 
naturalism.37 While philosophical and epistemological investigations appear* to be 
abstracted from their social conditions, he argues that they should be regarded as a 
somewhat misconstrued form of sociological inquiry: investigations into logic or 
reason, for instance, need to be seen as reflections on the solidaristic foundations of 
communal intellectual life.3S It follows that cultural biases, 01* deviations from absolute 
standards of scientific neutrality, are not mere contingencies.39 To the contrary, the very 
idea of such a standard is an expression of a particular* cultural bias.
At the same time, though, Rorty does not regard the universalism of modern, liberal, 
culture as essential. Universalism might have been functional in the past, but to insist on 
it under contemporary conditions is to impose unnecessary, and ultimately 
dysfunctional, constraints on intellectual and institutional adaptation and development. 
The liberal tradition, exemplified by John Stuart Mill, Rorty insists, is open to 
immanent critique. So, in works such Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature, he 
challenges traditional philosophical claims for objectivity, detachment and cultural
36 Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism and Truth, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1991. See the pieces on ‘Antirepresentationalism, ethnocentrism, and 
liberalism’ and ‘On ethnocentrism: a reply to Clifford Geertz’. Rorty’s use of 
ethnocentrism means that his anthropology bears close comparison to Peter 
Winch’s, inasmuch as Winch speaks of the internal relation of meaning to forms 
of life. Peter Winch, The Idea o f a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958.
37 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature.
38 See ‘Solidarity or Objectivity?’ and ‘Science as solidarity’ in Objectivism,
Relativism and Truth.
39 See Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature.
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disinterest by arguing that they make no sense. However, Rorty is not interested in a 
strictly rationalistic critique of traditional philosophy. Rather, he argues that 
contemporary social conditions generate practical, political and institutional problems 
which cannot be resolved on the basis of a universalist tradition. The new realities of 
multiculturalism mean that self-understanding in terms of universalism has become 
inadequate to the task of providing a framework for contemporary social solidarity. The 
solution Rorty advances is to show how liberalism can inform an encompassing 
framework for cultural diversity. Liberalism’s validity does not rest on its ahistorical 
claims to a desocialised truth, but on its capacity to inform much needed institutional 
solutions to the historically specific problems of contemporary cultural cohabitation 
within a unitary state.
There is much to commend in Rorty’s work as it sheds light on the Eurocentric 
dynamics of universalism and universalisation. His intellectual practice is to play, like 
Dickens and other social critics, on the absences and contradictions of existing 
universalism. He recognises its historicity and invokes the need to reconstitute it in 
response to changing circumstances. There are intimations here that the sense, or 
appearance, of universality is historically conditioned, and that processes of 
universalisation alter these conditions. However, fundamental problems remain, for 
once Eurocentrism is identified with projects for the construction and reconstruction of 
modem cultural solidarity there arises a host of sociological questions which cannot be 
adequately addressed within the intellectual horizons of liberal theoiy. That is, the 
problems of the self-understanding of civil society are irreducible to its tendencies to 
ahistorical thinking, important though these are.40
40 Gramsci’s work, in particular, stands out as a critique of ahistorical liberal theory. 
See Christine Buci-Glucksman, Gramsci and the State, (trans. David Fernbach), 
Lawrence and Wishart. London, 1980. Rorty dismisses the intellectual content of 
Marxian critiques of civil society on the rigorously consistent grounds that this 
kind of critical theory is neither reformist nor revolutionary, i.e. it is not 
functional to the development of civil society, nor, with the apparent collapse of 
any prospect of revolution, to any other form of life. Against this it might be 
argued that while critical theory does not intimate any specific alternative form of 
life, it does issue from a profound concern with the prospects for social solidarity 
under modern conditions. Indeed, what critical theory discloses is the structural 
contradiction with this form of life between solidarity and its conditions of 
possibility.
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There is, though, a fundamental difficulty of this account of the anthropological 
principle of ethnocentrism. It maintains, in effect, that there can be no significant gap 
between the vision of the self which informs the institution of the modem and the 
possible forms of self-understanding available to modem subjects. The validity of any 
theoiy of society rests on its (ethnocentric) capacity to inform the reproduction of that 
same society. This involves a de facto insistence that justification and operationalisation 
are the criteria of theoretical validity. It also means that the historical necessity of 
ideological bias becomes an intellectual prison. The cost of freeing theory from the 
constraints of a stifling philosophical universalism that obscured its own ethnocentrism 
is that in becoming aware of its ethnocentrism theory is reduced to the ideological and 
praxiological. What happens here is that the critique of illicit universalism, perversely, 
becomes the justification for closing down political and historical horizons. It becomes 
a call to assert a collective will for self-reproduction over any immanent tendencies 
there might be for self-transformation. This critique of ahistorical self-understanding is, 
at the same time, a profound denial of real historicity.
Rorty’s call for the philosophical-universal mode of self-understanding to be displaced 
by a historical and sociological one collapses under the weight of its particularist 
commitments. The shift in idiom has two consequences typical of Eurocentrism. First, 
the shift in register from the philosophical to the historical is not accompanied by any 
appreciable move to a concern with sociological realities. Specifically, the critique of 
universalism in philosophy has no parallel critique of political economic 
universalisation. This leaves plenty of scope for enriching the idea of Eurocentrism with 
historical and sociological material. On the other hand, the stated orientation towards 
the concrete is at the expense of necessary further philosophical considerations. While 
Rorty invokes ethnocentrism as a general category of philosophical anthropology, he 
eschews any need for a broader exploration and elaboration of such categories. Rorty5 s 
conservative, anti-rationalist valorisation of the concrete over the abstract works as an 
alternative mode of ideological obfuscation, both hiding real abstractions and blocking 
off inquiry into the philosophical abstractions needed to inform an adequate sociology.
Rorty’s attempt to make ethnocentrism an essential category of sociology, then, fails 
both philosophical and sociologically. An alternative is needed: one which takes the full
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range of its locations seriously and one which, rather than being reduced to defending 
the ethnocentrism of the modern, delves more deeply into what makes it special.
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IV. Eurocentrism as a very special kind of etlinocentrism.
Eurocentrism is one form of etlinocentrism amongst many others, but not just another 
‘banal’ instance. Eurocentrism, rather, is a limit case of ethnocentrism. It takes a 
problem common to all forms of ethnocentrism and develops it to the limits: the 
problem of illicit universalism. As far as most foims of etlinocentrism are concerned, 
both their universalism and its illicit character remain largely implicit. What 
distinguishes Eurocentrism from other forms of ethnocentrism is that its universalism is, 
by contrast, very much explicit: universals, and its own sense of universality, are an 
essential and abiding aspect of its self-understanding.41 Nevertheless, the illicit character 
of Eurocentric universalism either remains largely concealed, or else the full extent of 
its implications tend to be contained, so in this respect it remains characteristically 
ethnocentric.42
The most general accomit of Ethnocentrism includes two dimensions: a) a given culture 
or group is placed at the centre of the world; b) all other cultures are scaled or ranked in 
relation to the given culture or group.43 The first part, (a) is what should properly be 
called ethnocentrism, as it places the culture at the heart of the world. In the 
ethnocentric imagination everything that happens in the world does so because of the 
one culture. Other cultures, in as much as they have any significance at all, do not exist 
for themselves but really only exist for the one. What others are and what they do is 
understood and explained in terms of how they affect and are affected by the group at 
the centre. The ethnocentric dimension of any world view produces an idea of others 
who do not really exist or act in their own right; cultural alterity is acknowledged, only 
to be causally or functionally reduced to the central culture. The cosmos imagined by 
ethnocentrism is therefore profoundly ambiguous about the ontological status of others: 
it grants them an existence whilst, at the same time, taking away existential autonomy.
41 Rorty’s successful questioning of a specific form of modem universalism does not 
mean that he has successfully denied the essential internal relation of 
universalism to the modern. He deals with an actuality but does not deal with the 
deeper reality.
42 The limitations of accounts of Eurocentrism are usually a consequence of their 
limited critique of universals. So while historical and sociological critiques 
usually lack a philosophical one, Rorty5s philosophical critique, for instance, is 
not only incomplete, but also lacks the necessary historical and sociological 
equivalents.
43 Sumner Folkways: a study o f  the sociological importance o f usages, manners, 
customs, mores, and morals, Gimi and Co., Boston, 1911.
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With the effective elimination of autonomous alterity, ethnocentrism generates its first 
mode of illicit universality: the concrete universalisation of the ethnocentric culture. The 
world, in the ethnocentric cosmos, is effectively reduced to the central culture. It is 
universalised in the sense that it can be everything, or that it can be the reason or 
explanation for everything.
The concrete universal is commonly contrasted with a second mode of universality: the 
abstract universal. The abstract universal is some feature of the world which belongs to 
many different individuals. For example, one might say that the colour red is an abstract 
universal. Many different individuals can be red, but there is no such Thing’ as red. Red 
is a predicate, a quality, which can belong to a thing, a subject. Another kind of example 
is species terms, such as dog. The general term ‘dog’ is a reference to a type and does 
not have an individual concrete existence, whereas individual dogs do. There is no 
creature ‘dog’ which stands alongside dogs. In the present context one of the most 
significant abstract universals is Man, or human being. Again, these terms do not 
indicate the existence of a particular. Only individual humans can exist. Universals do 
though have a concrete existence where they are the concrete universal, i.e. where they 
exist as that which binds many individuals together. The pack of dogs unites a number 
of individual dogs, so a given pack is a concrete universal. Likewise, a given society 
unites many humans, so that it too is a concrete universal. It should be noted that 
‘society’, like ‘red’, is another abstract universal, and as such it does not have a concrete 
existence. Rather, each society or culture binds individuals together with specific ties, 
uniting them through specific kinds of relationships. So, the pack of dogs is not just a 
disorganised mass of dogs. It is organised, with characteristic features such as hierarchy. 
Within societies, people are bound together by the relationships they have inherited and 
on which they work. The concrete universal, then, exists as the relationships binding 
individuals together and is, therefore, the condition of existence of those individuals. 
The concrete universal exists as that which mediates individuals, giving rise to their 
individuality and their being a part of a greater unity.
A concrete universal is a reality which can explain other realities: it may be attributed 
with causal powers which can be the reason for things. The ethnocentric imagination 
establishes a given culture as the concrete universality of all cultures, representing itself 
as that which binds all cultures together, or even as that which binds the individuals of
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other cultures together. It makes itself the reason for being and activity, in various ways. 
It could be as an efficient cause, seeing its own activity as bringing about the existence 
or activity of others; it could be as a final cause, seeing others only in terms of then* 
functionality for the central group. Either way, it imposes a kind unity on the world and, 
at the same time makes itself the reason for that unity. The ethnocentric concrete 
universal is a form of mediation which grounds its own existence, and that of its 
surrounding world, in itself.44
The second aspect of ethnocentrism, (b) establishes the self as the standard against 
which others are scaled and ranked. In contrast to (a), this should properly be called 
‘ethnomorphism’. As opposed to the problems of illicit concrete universals, the 
problems of ethnomorphism are those of illicit abstract universalisation. Where 
ethnocentrism engenders an illicit concrete identification of self and other, 
ethnomorphism presupposes an underlying identity between apparently different 
cultures which are actually conceived as being essentially or potentially alike. This 
essential or ideal identity is presupposed by the application of a given set of ethical 
predicates to others, for such a move implicitly assumes that others are proper subjects 
of such predicates. Ethnomorphism, in this respect, is like anthropomorphism. The bears 
in the Goldilocks fairy tale, for instance, live in a house in the forest, make porridge, go 
out for walks, use bowls, chairs and beds and enjoy the powers of speech, etc. These are 
all abstract universals belonging to people from many societies, but here they are 
projected onto the bears. Now, these qualities are in fact co-produced by interactions 
between social and biological mechanisms. Projecting them onto the bears suggests that 
the same mechanisms are at work, producing an illicit identity with people. In order for 
human categories to be applied in this way two, apparently different kinds of beiiig have 
to be treated as if they were identical, i.e. (some of) the differences between them are 
effaced. The philosophical implication of anthropomorphism is that real differences 
between humans and non-humans are erased with (some of) the reality of alterity 
subsumed into that of being human: it generates an ontic identity between the two. 
Affirming the specific ontic character of the one entails a dismissal of the others.
44 Moishe Postone argues that self-grounding is what defines a ‘substance’. While 
Marx rejects substance as a philosophical category, he nevertheless uses it to
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Precisely the same kind of illicit identification occurs where one society deems that its 
specific qualities are applicable to others as a means of scaling or rating them: despite 
their different appearances, others are treated as if they were essentially identical to the 
group making the judgement. The Ethnomorphic imagination transforms cultural 
specificities into illicit abstract universals through the inappropriate application of its 
own predicates to other subjects. The application of its own qualities to others illicitly 
generalises them and, implicitly at least, also generalises its own ontic character. The 
other is ontically identical to the self. Such acts of judgement posit the given culture as 
an abstract universal. This is cultural ethnomorphism: the establishment of the self as 
the embodiment of the standards by which all are to be judged. The self becomes the 
ideal of culture, what it means to really be a culture.
Through its self-positing as the ideal of human culture, the ethnomorphic imagination 
generates an essential ambiguity about the meaning of cultural distinctiveness: 
differences are reduced to being no more than greater or lesser degrees of 
approximation to the ideal. Where the one culture is true to itself, others are untrue to 
the one. From this perspective, other cultures are characterised less by the qualities they 
actually have than by those they lack. Of course, what they really lack is the quality of 
being like the exemplary culture. Others, then, are essentially identical with, but actually 
different from, the self. This difference between essence and actuality, however, is 
projected into others as an internal contradiction. The condition of alterity becomes the 
absence of self-realisation. So, just as ethnocentrism engenders equivocations over 
other’s autonomy, ethnomorphism gives rise to equivocation over their distinctive 
being.
Having introduced this distinction between ethnocentrism and ethnomorphism, by 
giving a specific meaning to each, a third term is now needed to denote this pair and 
allow for ‘ethnocentrism’ to be used in its more restricted sense. This third term is 
‘ethnicism’. It encompasses both ethnocentric concrete universalisation and 
ethnomorphic abstract universalisation.
describe the realities of capital and the value relation. See Time, Labor and Social 
Domination, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996,
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This discussion has so far been concerned with the imaginary or the symbolic, i.e. with 
ways of representing the world. However, there are practical counterparts to both 
ethnocentrism and ethnomorphism. That is, these forms of universalisation can be 
understood as real, as opposed to imaginary, relations. Any implications of this, 
however, will depend on the specific forms universals take. So, while the symbolic 
orders of all forms of culture appear' to have a significant ethnicist dimension, the 
implications of each illicit self-universalisation for both their social imaginaries and 
social relations are enormously varied. Eurocentrism, for instance, is not only 
distinguished from others by its explicit universalism, it is also peculiar in that its 
tendencies to universalisation are oriented to totalisation.45
Universalism and universalisation are cultural tendencies amongst many others, and 
they will be of greater or lesser significance depending on the wider structures of 
cultural formation in which they are embedded. Ethnicist tendencies to universality are, 
by and large, checked by countervailing trends emanating from both within and beyond 
cultural boundaries. Consequently, few if any forms of life have been implicated in the 
construction of a real concrete universal centred on themselves: they have not engaged 
in a project of global transformation. Things are very different when it comes to 
Eurocentrism, or what will from now on be called Europism.
The term ‘ethnicisnT was just introduced above, to allow for a distinction between the 
two most significant uses ‘ethnocentrism’. For the same reasons, the term ‘Europism’ 
will be used here to encompass both Eurocentrism and Euromorphism. The Europic 
Imaginary encompasses those forms of ethnicism which take Europe as their primal 
subject. Eurocentrism illicitly projects Europe onto the world as a concrete universal. 
This can take many forms: the European can appeal' as that which creates an 
overarching unity of other cultures by binding them together into a single social 
formation; it can mediate relations between other cultures; it can be the reason that other 
cultures have their being, even the very grounds for their existence and for their 
activities. Such visions of the world include all those in which cultural development
45 The terms ‘totality’ and ‘totalisation’ have several meanings, some of which will 
be considered in greater detail below. It should be noted at this point, though, 
that while totality must be understood to imply a form of unity, the precise nature 
of that form is of the highest significance. Althusser’s suggestion that the
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throughout the world is an effect of the European, characterised as what James Blaut 
has called ‘diffusionismV6 The ‘opposite5 view, where other cultures are understood to 
be functionally related to the centre, is also Eurocentric, such as any vision of a global 
hierarchy of master-slave relations with Europe at the pinnacle.
By contrast, Euro morphism illicitly elevates European categories into abstract 
universals: European categories can become transcendent, invested with meaning far* 
surpassing their real horizons of applicability. The European may be valorised as the 
very definition of what it means to be a culture; its categories can be established as 
those by which all cultures are understood and judged. Take, for example, political 
theories of natural law and rights, or economic theories of value, or world histoiy given 
in terms of economic development. To the extent they impose an ahistorical frame on 
their subject, these intellectual traditions presuppose that their categories either do or 
should apply to any society. Any such ahistorical treatment of European categories is 
Euromorphic. Equally, any attempt to render European categories as ontological, rather 
than culturally specific, is similarly Euromorphic.47
Europism, at its most simple, is just European ethnicism, the fantastic, irrealist, 
transformation of European categories into concrete and abstract universals. Yet this is 
by no means all, for Europic tendencies to know self and others in self-universalising 
ways have their powerful practical, world transforming, counterparts. The Europic 
imaginary is deeply entwined with the totalising processes of modernity. Not only are 
Eurocentrism and Euro morphism expressed in terms of universals, they are embedded 
in social structures whose tendencies are to concretely and abstractly universalise the 
European.
moments of modernity move together with ‘teeth-gritting harmony’ eloquently 
expresses the kind of unity intimated by ‘totality’ here.
46 James Blaut, The Colonizer's Model o f the World: geographical diffnsionism and 
Eurocenti'ic histoiy, Guilford Press, New York and London, 1993.
47 Georg Lukacs insists that Marx’s critical theory was always an ontological 
critique. That is, according to Lukacs, Marx is continually engaged in disclosing 
and undoing the implicit ontological claims of traditional theory. Lukacs 
Ontology, Merlin, London, 1978 Also, see Joao Lonardo Meiros and Mario 
Duayer, ‘Lukacs’ critical ontology and critical realism’ in Journal o f Critical 
Realism, Vol.4, No.2, 2005.
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As discussed above, actual concrete universals mediate the parts of the whole, binding 
them together and constituting them as moments of a greater totality. The European 
really does develop as the concrete universal of the modern to the extent it mediates and 
constitutes the existence and activities of others. The European has achieved a real 
universality to the extent it has come to be established as the grounds of the existence 
and activities of others. For instance, concrete universalisation is the extension of 
powers and capacities across cultural (and natural) boundaries. Centres of modem 
politico-economic power are implicated in such universalisation as they project their 
capacities for legal regulation, economic extraction, military domination, hegemonic 
subordination, governmental and disciplinary subjectification, ideological mystification, 
etc.48 Contemporary power relations not only stretch across the globe, but they are 
increasingly integrated into a global system. Such powers take many forms: direct 
influence over decisions others make; direct and indirect influence, only some of which 
comes about through decisions, over the kinds of decisions that others can make; deeper 
influence over beliefs, structures, practices. Above all it means the institution of 
abstract, impersonal imperatives in the forms of value and law. As such, the evolution 
of modernity constitutes an overarching context which constrains and transforms all 
forms of life and their activities.
One consequence of the exercise of specifically modern forms of power is that abstract 
universals derived from European experience become increasing relevant to other 
societies. To the extent other societies become like European ones those categories 
acquire increasing purchase. The language of modern states and markets, with the 
distinctions between polity, economy and society, has an ever increasing relevance for 
non-European societies. That is, the pragmatic, praxiological validity of Euromorphic 
thought develops to the extent that really Euromorphic change actually takes place.49
Finally, some kinds of social transformation are simultaneously Eurocentric and 
Euromorphic. The global extension of capital, for instance, emanating from Europe, is a
48 There are many accounts of this. An especially clear example is Ellen Meiksins 
Wood, Empire o f Capital, Verso London, 2002.
49 It is worth reiterating that universalisation is neither simple nor linear.
Modernisation engenders tensions between theory and practice, and those 
tensions are often greatest in peripheral regions where die socially disruptive 
tendencies of modernity tend to be displaced. See the next chapter for some 
further consideration of this in relation to ‘hegemony’.
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means of European and neo-European domination, subordinating others to European 
interests and, tendentially, reducing them to mere means to that end. It also means that 
other societies are constitutively mediated by the same social relation as that 
constituting European societies. From this limited perspective, capital establishes a 
universal identity between Europe and others. In addition, there are many other forms of 
modem social relation, such as law and modes of communication, which have also 
developed as significant dimensions of a globally integrated social formation. From the 
perspective of Eurocentrism, though, capital is the most significant instance of a 
concrete universal emanating from Europe. It binds societies together in unprecedented 
ways. In terms of Euromorphism, the development of these relations entails a degree of 
real identity between the various regions of this global social formation. As the concrete 
universal develops, so its social categories are universalised.
V. Europic Universalisation and its contradictions
Stated in these terms it might appeal' that Europic universalisation could be spoken of in 
fairly straightforward terms as a linear or logical process of development. This would be 
misleading. While it remains entirely appropriate to retain the language of universalism 
to discuss Europism and modernity, that language has to be significantly transformed. 
As the introductory chapter indicated, both the forms of Europic Universalism and of 
Europic Universalisation are essentially and systematically contradictory. Europism 
needs to be understood as the theory, practice and institution of specific forms of 
contradictions. In particular, it is the institution of a real contradiction between the 
abstract and concrete dimensions of cultural existence.
The dominant constitutive relation of civil society, capital, is inherently contradictory. 
So too is the kind of social unity to which it gives rise. Marx’s account of these 
contradictions, developed as a part of the critique of civil society, provides a vital 
resource for understanding the dialectics of Europic universals. Capital, of course, is a 
tendentially universal social mediation with abstract and concrete dimensions. Its 
fundamental contradiction is between developments in these two dimensions, and is 
manifest in the tendency to domination by the abstract. What is permanent about capital 
is not this or that site of production, this or that product, or even this or that pole of 
accumulation. All of these concrete moments come and go in the frenetic, destructive
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creativity of evolving capital. Abstract value and the impersonal social imperatives it 
generates are permanent. Value, an abstract and impersonal imperative, is the dominant 
determination of what will be produced, how, where and by whom. The universalisation 
of this relation means that all concrete elements of production tend to redundancy as 
they increasingly exist only for the sake of value. It is as a consequence of such 
imperatives that all that is solid melts into air.50
Abstracting from Capital, it is possible to generalise the form of this contradiction as 
the more general form of Europic universals. This splitting of the world between the 
abstract and concrete, and the institution of abstract domination, can be found in modem 
categories other than capital. For instance, not only is this form of contradiction 
constitutive of the capital relation, it is also constitutive of the conceptual and perceptual 
forms associated with it. Further still, the same contradiction can be found in the other 
social relations and related theories of civil society: its political and legal forms, its 
theories and practices of rationality, history, literature, etc., each of which is subject to 
antinomial universalising tendencies.
This makes it possible to speak of Europism in terms of the dialectical universalisation 
of the categories of civil society. This encompasses the multiple contradictions and 
differentiations of and between its various categories, and the problematic forms in 
which these categories overdetermine one another and mutually reconstitute each 
other’s conditions of existence. This reality of universalisation, contradiction and 
overdetennination both explains the need for critical theory and provides the real 
grounds for its theoretical object. It is this reality, the dialectical universalisation of civil 
society, which demands the identification of theoretical anti -Euro centri sm with the 
critique of civil society.
50 The phrase comes from Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto. It has 
become a defining motif of the modern, assisted by Berman’s book of that title. 
Marshall Berman, All that is Solid Melts into Air: the experience o f modernity, 
Verso, London, 1983.
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Chapter 4 - Ethical Economic Symbolic Representation: Eurocentrism and 
Imaginary Dialectical Universalisation.
I. Introduction.
Eurocentrism is a term of ‘critical’ theory, in as much as it exposes unwarranted 
privileges accruing to the European. However, the kind of criticism of existing theoiy 
and/or states of affairs made possible by this term remains limited as long, as the real 
structures of the ethical economic imaginary and its real historical context remain 
untheorised. In the absence of the disclosure of real and imaginary Europic dialectical 
universalisation there can be no proper understanding of what privileging European 
forms of culture really means.
This chapter is devoted to an exploration of the workings of the ethical economic 
imaginary: Imaginary Dialectical Universalisation. This is the mode of symbolic 
representation capable of representing the contradictions of the modem in such a form 
that they can be ‘resolved’. Three aspects of this will be explored. The first section 
explores universalism by examining some thoughts of Paul Ricoeur. Universalism is 
shown to be a complex discourse providing a complex of related perspectival locations 
from which to generate symbolic representations. The second part explores Karl 
Mannheim’s account of ideology and utopia. This pair of terms can be established as the 
basic form of the normative and conceptual antinomies of modern universalism, 
mapping onto the inhuman/human dual of theoretical humanism.
Symbolic resolutions are achieved with the production of arguments or narratives in one 
or many perspectives. These narratives take the form of a dialectic of ideology and 
utopia, in which antagonistic principles substitute for social realities, and through which 
their resolution is ‘worked out’. While the ethical economic form allows for various 
terms to act as bearers of the principles of inhumanity or humanity, this chapter shows 
how ‘universality* and ‘eurocentrism* are allotted these roles. As a consequence, 
‘Eurocentrism’, far from disclosing the cultural realities of dialectical universalisation, 
is both internal to its political and historical reproduction and functions to obscure its 
real contradictions. Instead of exposing the de-moralisation of culture under modem
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conditions, ‘eurocentrism* belongs to the political processes of hegemony and to 
projects seeking to ‘ethicise’ the modem.
II: Universality and Ethical-Economic symbolic representation.
Charles Taylor’s account of the Modern Imaginary was discussed in Chapter Two, 
where the term ‘ethical economy’ was used to give it a greater degree of specificity: it 
served to highlight the dominant economic, not to say economistic, quality of the 
modem social imaginary; it draws our attention to the foundational conceptions of 
impersonal exchange and commutative justice which shape idea of the good and the true 
form of culture.1 Secondly, ethical economy is, above all, a mode of symbolic 
representation. The figure of the ethical economy is an ideologeme, i.e. the most 
fundamental unit of this mode of representation. As such it can be projected into 
philosophy, sociology, history and so on, where it provides the basic framework around 
which portrayals of the world and its problems are developed. Also, The Modem 
Imaginary resolves contradictions by representing the development of social 
antagonisms into ethical economic forms. That is, the ethical economic ideologeme is 
treated as the form of life from which contradictions have been removed. It provides 
that formal standard against which antagonisms, contradictions and problems appeal’ as 
such, and it provides the standard by which they can be said to have been resolved. It is 
the presupposed criterion of social order and of the internal consistency of the Modem 
Imaginary. Thirdly, the universalist character of Eurocentrism shapes the lands of 
judgement possible within the horizons of the ethical economy. Its illicit and irrealist 
form elevates historically specific forms into transhistorical ones; establishes its analytic 
foims of identity as the categorial presupposition of the problematic; specifies the form 
in which contradictions appear; and structures the practical task of resolving such 
contradictions.
Within the ethical economic problematic, universalisation appeal's as processes of 
expansion from core to periphery. There are two, related, senses of an expanding core. 
The primary sense of universalisation is the process of actualising a core essence. The 
category of the periphery covers those areas of the world in which the universal remains
1 See chapter 2.
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an immanent reality, a potential to be realised. Universalisation presupposes that 
processes of transformation are really ones of alethic self-realisation. The secondary 
sense of universalisation is a ‘diffusionist’ one: self-realisation at the periphery is 
dependent on the activity of core regions which have already attained self-realisation.2 
This kind of universalisation depends on the first, in that the potential for universalistic 
transformation must be present within the periphery, but is somehow blocked. 
Overcoming the obstacles to self-realisation camiot be self-driven but requires external 
purpose and activity. Ambiguities such as this are constitutive of ethical economic 
universalism. Their duality allows for a persistent conceptual slippage between essence 
and actuality, or between the transhistorical and the historically specific. In other words, 
the universals of the modem imaginary embody precisely the essence/actual duality 
which Althusser identifies as characteristic of the problematic of political economy and 
of theoretical-humanism in general.3
This conception of the modern imaginary as a form of symbolic representation needs to 
be developed as a species of dialectic whose specific form is the problematic of 
universal ethical economy. While the term ‘Europic Dialectical Universalisation’ covers 
the internally related symbolic and relational complex of Eurocentrism, ‘Imaginary 
Dialectical Universalisation’ shall refer to the form and dynamics of the modem 
imaginary. The latter dialectic is that of the imaginary relations and processes between 
the of core and peripheral zones of the ethical economy. One of its key characteristics is 
that it generates the categories of ideology and utopia as essential elements of its 
internal operation: these categories are presupposed by the persistent need to ‘represent’ 
and ‘resolve’ the antagonisms thrown up by the real contradictions of dialectical 
universalisation.
The conception of Dialectic developed here draws on four ideas developed by Roy 
Bhaskar: dialectical universalisation; what he calls the negative quadruplicity of 
dialectic; good and bad dialectics; the overarching of the analytic moment by the 
dialectical process.4 In respect of the first of these, dialectical universalisation, Bhaskar 
uses this phrase in a way I have already said is implicit in Imaginary dialectical
2 Diffusionism is James Blaut’s term. See this chapter, below.
3 Althusser, For Marx
4 Roy Bhaskar, Dialectic, passim.
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universalisation. That is, universalisation is a process in which the ontologically real, 
good and true is actualised. It is the processual realisation of eudaimonia in which 
humankind becomes true to the alethia of its species being.5 For Bhaskar, the process 
through which we move from our existing state of lack to one in which we have become 
complete is constituted by four negative moments: (1) the removal of (2) the constraints 
on (3) the absenting of (4) the absence of eudaimonia. This dialectic is a good one in 
that it is a process motivated by the contradictions between our existing state of being 
and our alethia, and in that it involves the dissolution of those contradictions. This 
dialectic must also be understood as polyvalent, i.e. the positive and the negative, the 
present and the absent are co-mingled at all levels of reality and possibility. Against 
this, a bad dialectic is one that preserves and/or develops such contradictions, 
constraints, absences etc. Lastly, Bhaskar develops the distinction between analytics and 
dialectics in two ways. On the one hand analytics are the locus of identity thinking, as 
exemplified by the universals of ethical economy, entailing the absence of real change 
and an adequate sense of historicity. Analytics therefore stands in sharp contrast to the 
historicising thrust of the dialectics of critical realist and Marxian theory. On the other 
hand, analytical moments of identity are in fact located within historical and dialectical 
processes.6
As far as the present context is concerned, analytic universals embody the very 
contradictions which constitute it as dialectic, i.e. Europic universals are situated within 
Imaginary dialectical universalisation. Indeed, they are the categories through which the 
four negative moments of the Imaginary dialectic operate. That this is so can be seen 
with only a brief look at the core-periphery relations and processes of the modem 
imaginary. Applying the four negative moments to the transformation of the periphery 
in terms of the universalisation of the ethical-economic core we arrive at the following 
formulation of the Imaginary Dialectic: the (1) removal from the periphery of (2) the 
obstacles within it which block (3) the transformation of a state of disequilibrium by the 
(4) institution of ethical economy.
5 Bhaskar’s conception of Eudaimonia is pitched at a philosophical and
transhistorical level, rendering it a form of humanism revolving around a 
conception of human essence. Even though Bhaskar develops this form of 
humanism in the context of his realist ontology, there is a case to be made that 
this reproduces the errors of all forms o f humanism precisely because it abstracts 
from the historically specific, and de-centred, conditions of human self- 
realisation.
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This conception of the Imaginary Dialectical Universalisation of Ethical Economy takes 
us one important step beyond Charles Taylor’s conception of the modem imaginary. It 
recognises the centrality of the ethical economic ideologeme to that imaginary, but 
develops an understanding of how this figure sustains its limited and contradictory 
sense of the historical. Within its horizons, modem history is the endlessly repeated 
institution of ethical economy, with its ideologeme always-already providing the point 
of reference from which to develop accounts of order and change; it is the pivot around 
which all historical and cultural developments are imagined to take place. As such, it 
continually provides the primary analytic moment of the overarching imaginary 
dialectic.
An elaboration of the inner dialectics of this imaginary emerges through a critique of 
some remarks of Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur makes the following observations: “I would say 
that this concept of universality may be used in different contexts.” 7 He then 
differentiates three distinct modes of universality. Firstly:
On the one hand, you may speak of universal rules of discourse - what 
Habermas says about rules of discussion, let us say the logic and ethics of 
argumentation. This is one level of universality, but it is too formal to be 
operative.
Ricoeur intends this first mode of universality to be a strictly philosophical one, in that 
he sees it remaining entirely formal. I take him to be making the Wittgensteinian point 
that no such ‘rules’ are to be found in any actual procedural codes, nor would they be 
‘followed’ in any ideal speech situation. Rather, such a situation would come into being 
through participants conforming to these ‘rules’. However, the implications of the 
formal character of this kind of universal were examined in the previous chapter, where 
such forms were discussed as projections of the ethical economic ideologeme. There is 
no need to say much more about it here, though one point worth reiterating is that 
calling this form universal is to make, or at least to imply, a certain kind of 
philosophical claim about the proper form of reason. The assertion of the universality of
6 See chapter 7 for more on this.
7 All of the quotations used here are from Paul Ricoeur, ‘Universality and the 
power of difference’, in Richard Kearney, (ed.) States o f Mind: Dialogues with
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this form is, at the same time, an ontological assertion about the nature of reason. In this 
light, the philosophical function of Ricoeur’s first form of universality can be clarified 
as being ontological.
Secondly, you have a universalist claim within our own culture. For example, 
we may claim that some rights to free speech are universal, in spite of the fact 
that for the time being they cannot be included in other cultures. But it’s a 
claim, and remains only a claim as long as it not recognised by the others. So 
we bring to the discussion not only procedures of universality but also claims of 
universality. The project of universality is central to the whole debate about 
human rights. Take the example of the mutilation of women. I am sure we are 
right to say that there is something universal in our assertion that women have a 
right to pleasure, to physical integrity and so on, even if it is not recognised. But 
we have to bring that into the discussion. It’s only discussion with the other 
which may finally convince die odier diat it’s universal.
Once again, the assertion of universality conflates the transhistorical and the historically 
specific. This is typical of the categorial structures of the Eurocentric problematic. In 
this case, the two are conjoined when a particular idiom, that of human rights, is used to 
assert the moral worth of ‘physical integrity and so on.’ The category of rights is an 
essentially legal and contractual one which presupposes modem social relations. Its 
practical presupposition is social mediation by the legal -bureaucratic state. That these 
two idioms of moral worth and human rights can be run together with such apparent 
ease is, in part, due to the ambiguity of the term ‘right’. Physical integrity can be said to 
be the right condition for human creatines, as it allows for the possible development and 
exercise of potential physical capacities, such as sexual pleasure. Saying this, however, 
does not help to resolve any conflicts there might be between this good and any others. 
It does not follow from affirming something is right in principle that any particular 
hierarchy of goods can be established, or that the social conditions for realising that 
good can be realised without fundamentally changing existing conditions.
The right to bodily integrity, on the other hand, presupposes a certain kind of political- 
legal institution, the social imaginary required to make sense of that institution, and 
agents with the powers to ensure that this particular human good will not be sacrificed 
to others. The actual universalisation of rights, therefore, involves a great deal more 
than just convincing others of the worth of physical integrity and persuading them to
Contemporary Thinkers on the European Mind, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1995, p. 38.
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change their ways. Asserting human rights in any context means intervening in pre­
existing social arrangements and engaging in social struggles, but not on terms which 
derive from those arrangements. Rather, it means bringing the entire problematic of 
rights, i.e. its discourse, institutions and forms of agency, to bear on their 
transformation, albeit unevenly. What can appear as the ‘simple’ moral issue of the 
wrongness of mutilation is really the far more complicated business of drawing a 
particular social antagonism away from its context and onto the terrain of global 
hegemonic struggles.
For Ricoeur the philosopher, however, relating the modem state form to the universal 
moral status of bodily integrity is accomplished quite unproblematically. This move is 
significant not only because it is a category error, for it also reveals some of the 
consequences of such errors. Running the legal and moral together by-passes entire sets 
of problems related to the institution of possessive individualism through modern 
processes which disrupt psycho-physical integrity.8 Indeed, it is possible to speak of the 
institution of modern culture as engendering a structural contradiction: it is a form of 
consensually mediated disintegration brought about through the very mechanisms said 
to preserve both social and individual integrity.
The ideological function of such categories, then, is to naturalise the historical and 
sociological realities of ethical economic forms. What we have with this second mode 
of universal is an investment of human worth in some version of a naturalised ethical 
economy. The philosophical function of this second mode of universality, then, is 
deontological.
And thirdly, I would say that you have a kind of eschatological imiversalism -
the universal as an ultimate project or goal as in Kant’s Essay on Peipetual
Peace.
8 The psychological consequences of rationalisation and other modes of modern 
universalisation have been an abiding theme of modern sociology. Christopher 
Lasch’s Culture o f Narcissism captures the sense in which Fordism engendered 
states of underdevelopment. More recently, Kathryn Dean has examined the 
contradictions between commodification and citizenship in terms of the impact of 
the former on the psychical maturity required for the latter. Kathryn Dean, 
Capitalism and Citizenship: The impossible Partnership, Critical Realism: 
Interventions, Routledge, London, 2003: Christopher Lasch, Culture o f  
Narcissism, Norton, New York, 1979.
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Kant’s conception of universal peace is plainly a projection of an ethical economic 
ideologeme onto a future global state of affairs. However, what is interesting about 
Ricoeur’s formulation here is this account of universality as a goal or project. The 
ideological function of this third form of universal is teleological. It is also a form of 
utopianism, and as this category will be taken up in the rest of this chapter, I will say no 
more about it here. Instead, it just remains to re-establish the comiections between these 
three differentiated modes of universality.
Ricoeur’s own account suggests, when invoicing ‘the project of universalism,’ that these 
universals are distinct yet internally related moments of an overarching imaginary. 
While each mode is distinct, or at the very least different contexts demand different 
functions, these three modes of universality are interdependent. Firstly, any vision of 
realising deontological universality must be firmly grounded ontologically. For 
example, within this discourse it makes sense to speak of the possession of non- 
actualised rights. Actualising such rights, in the sense that being human means realising 
self-worth, implies an individual telos which is both real and immanent. Also, when 
Ricoeur says ‘It’s only discussion with the other which may finally convince the other 
that it’s universal’, he implies that the universal form of discursive relations is 
functionally related to the actualisation of deontological universals, and at the same time 
implying the value of such foims. The grander vision of the eschatological process, 
meanwhile, imagines the global actualisation of both ontological and deontological 
universals.
Recall, too, that Ricoeui* said that ‘this concept of universality may be used in different 
contexts.’ This point can be put in somewhat different terms to those intended by 
Ricoeur: these universal categories are ideologemes which can be deployed in various 
discursive contexts. The universal itself does not change with context, for it remains a 
categorial presupposition of the problematic. It is an analytic category which retains its 
identity throughout, so that meaning, at this level at least, is not context dependent. 
What happens instead is that contexts have the effect of triggering one of the different 
philosophical functions of the category. So, according to context, the universal appeal’s 
in one 01* other of its philosophical guises, the ontological, deontological or teleological.
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In each case contexts can generate positive or negative effects. That is, any state of 
affairs can be represented as embodying, or as not embodying, the right form. It may 
possess the universal essence, or it may be a wholly pathological form of being; the 
universal may have been actualised, or not; the universal may be a potentiality, or not. 
This gives six formal possibilities. The problematic can now be seen to operate through 
the production of a series, or ensemble, of contexts, in which the ideologeme is 
triggered to produce one or more of these effects.
The formal range of contexts available for the deployment of universals is provided by 
the foui- negative moments of the imaginary dialectics of core-periphery universalisation 
and their transcendence. That is, the imaginary dialectic provides what amounts to a 
kind of narrative structure comprised of what might be called scenarios. Each moment 
lays the basis of a possible scenario within which the ideologeme can be made to play a 
determinate role. Finally, the formal narrative structure can be properly understood as 
the terrain on which symbolic antagonisms of universalism are generated and on which 
the symbolic resolution of such antagonisms can be brought about.
These rather formal points can be made a little more substantial with reference to 
disputes over the Eurocentrism of colonialism and some comments on Weber’s inquiry 
into the obstacles facing the emergence of capitalism in India.
The dominant use of Eurocentrism in relation to colonialism is to provide an account of 
the failure of ethical economic forms to emerge in peripheral zones by evoking the 
distorting character of centre-periphery relations: colonialism, far- from contributing to 
the emergence of ethical economic forms has instead instituted obstacles to 
development. Dependency theory, post-colonialism, unequal terms of trade, 
Orientalism: all of these relate the contradiction between core and periphery to the 
dominance of core regions over peripheral ones. In addition, they also deny the centre’s 
claim to be an actualisation of ethical economy. Neither its internal nor external 
relations meet such standards. The realisation of ethical economic potential in the 
periphery requires the (negative) dismantling of colonial institutions and relations and a 
concomitant (positive) development of transformational capacities in the periphery itself
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-  Revolutionary and nationalist anti-colonialism having been conceived in precisely 
these terms.9
The opposite case is the familial' one that the expansion of European political economic 
institutions has been the diffusion of ethical economic relations, or is otherwise a 
necessary condition of ethical economic universalisation.10 On such a view, imperialism 
appeal's as the pioneer of capitalism because the capacities of Empire are precisely those 
needed for both the removal of non-modem cultural obstacles and for the development 
of modem social forms (where removing constraints does not appear adequate). The 
defence of the ethical economic centre means that contradictions between core and 
periphery are located within the colonial periphery, where they appear as resolutely 
particularistic cultural elements, absences or pathologies. Critically, the form of 
symbolic representation determines the significance of peripheral forms of culture in 
terms of their relation to the universality of the core.
Within the tradition of classical sociology, Weber’s work on India is a prominent 
expression of this latter position. To be sure, Weber does not shy away from addressing 
the inner tensions of European modernity, so his work as a whole is no straight forward 
exercise in externalising contradictions.11 Nevertheless, Weber’s work conforms to the 
universalist problematic of ethical economy when he poses the strictly ahistorical 
question as to why capitalism had not developed in India when it had in Europe. For 
Weber, both Europe and India had developed the possibility of capitalism, but only in 
Europe was the possibility realised via Protestantism. The reformation generated a new 
form of religion which became the vehicle for the dissemination of the psycho-cultural 
qualities required to bring about a capitalist transformation. By contrast, the absence of 
any parallel reformation in the Indian context meant that capitalism would remain a 
latent possibility.
9 Wallerstein, ‘Revolts Against the System’.
10 See, for instance, Bill Warren’s Imperialism: Pioneer o f Capitalism,Verso, 
London, 1980.
11 Weber developed an account of the modern which is recognisable in terms of the 
differentiation of spheres and their mediation by specific forms of rationality. He 
can be readily seen as a forerunner to Habermas, in that he foregrounds a concern 
with the susceptibility o f modern cultural spheres to penetration by inappropriate, 
distorting, forms of rationality.
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That the universalist problematic is at work in Weber’s writings on India can be shown 
by drawing out the ambiguity of the context in which he locates religion in India. On the 
one hand, religion is treated as an organic component of Indian civilisation, playing an 
essential role in giving shape to a form of life and to its immanent structure of historical 
possibilities. From this perspective, religion appears as a necessary and positive 
dimension of the cultural formation. On the other hand, the same religion is seen from 
the quite different perspective of emergent capitalism. It is now an obstacle, and it 
appears as a wholly negative aspect of the culture. Both perspectives are brought to bear 
by Weber in the production of a scenario which represents the historical horizons of 
Indian development within the universalist problematic.
The price to be paid for the construction of this scenario is a radical transfiguring of the 
real historical context. That is, the production of the scenario involves a kind of fusion 
of historical horizons which both adds and subtracts to Indian realities. The addition 
comes with the projection of European historical possibilities into the Indian context; 
the subtraction with the elimination of the colonial context. The problems confronting 
the development of capital in India had become real enough, a genuine practical 
problem, but this was a consequence of colonialism and the emerging dominance of this 
specific social relation within a changing world system. As we shall see below, Marx’s 
writings on India were based on the quite distinct premise that British Imperialism and 
its capitalist competitors made this question, and others related to it, unavoidable. The 
nature of the obstacles to the expansion of capital had become a universal question, but 
it was not one that arose organically from within non-European cultures. Rather, just as 
Weber’s question has been posed against the grain of the particular history of South 
Asia, so the actual answers provided by the real processes of universalisation tear at the 
fabric of this cultural zone as they unfold.
Weber’s work clearly shows how quasi-historical antagonisms can be generated through 
the construction of a scenario which belongs to the formal structure of imaginary 
dialectical universalisation. Weber’s scenario triggers multiple philosophical effects of 
the universal, the most obviously apparent of which is the absence from actuality of 
capital. However, without being located within the narrative structures of the realisation 
of ethical economic forms, the absence has the same kind of significance of the absence 
of wings on a cow. This absence only acquires the significance Weber attributes to it in
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relation to a context in which capital is a potential to be actualised and/or an immanent 
telos. This is where the real work of the scenario is done. It transforms a species of 
historical category error into a ‘rational’ contradiction. The real historical contradiction, 
the one between forms of life, is transfigured into an antagonism within Indian culture. 
This, in turn, opens up the possibility for the equally ‘rational’ resolution of the 
antagonism: the transformation of religion into the medium of psycho-cultural 
transmission required for the development of capital.
Ill: Humanism. Ideology and Utopia
Examples such as the one above disclose the way that the categories of imaginary 
dialectical universalisation provide the presuppositions of modern social and political 
theory, how they constitute the context within which a Eurocentric rationality takes 
shape. The categories examined so far, however, are by no means exhaustive, and 
before turning to the way in which the problematic determines the rationality of the term 
‘eurocentrism’ and invests it with meaning, it is necessary to look at how imaginary 
dialectical universalisation generates the categories of ideology and utopia.
In his account of utopianism, Fredrick Jameson points out its two forms: wish fulfilment 
and constructive fantasy.12 The utopian imaginings of wish fulfilment project desires 
from the present into the future wholly unconstrained by any strong sense of reality and 
its limitations. Constructive fantasies, on the other hand, take shape under the influence 
of a more efficacious irreality principle, with a sense that reality offers both resistance 
to desire and affords it creative possibilities. Now, there is a sense in which utopianism 
implies the very opposite of ethnocentrism, in that it articulates a visions of a form of 
life which transcends the present. The nowhere of utopia is no longer of the here and 
now. However, Jameson suggests, expressions of utopia are ideologically 
overdetermined, restraining the imagination within the confines of the given, blocking 
off the impulse to transcendence. More specifically, it draws utopianism and 
idealisation together, with idealisation sublimating utopian impulses. This amounts to a 
significant ideological success, as it means otherwise threatening moral impulses are 
contained within the imaginative horizons of the existing social order.
12 Fredrick Jameson, ‘The Politics of Utopia’, New Left Review 25, January and 
February 2004, pp. 35-54.
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Modem social and political discourse has its expressly utopian tradition of course, and 
Jameson points to the four genres ‘with which utopia seems closely related: the 
manifesto; the constitution; the “mirror for princes”; and great prophecy’.13 However, I 
am less interested in genre than in the necessary utopian dimension of all forms of 
humanism and universalism which seek to extend and develop modem social 
institutions and forms of social relations. These discourses are characteristically utopian 
in the sense that they are not simply idealisations of present actualities, but are oriented 
towards absenting the gap between the ideal and the actual. Jameson indicates as much 
when he describes utopianism as offering ‘the spectacle of one those rare phenomena 
whose concept is indistinguishable from its reality, whose ontology coincides with its 
representation’.14 I.e. the symbolic representation of that fomi of life which instantiates 
the universal.
Rather than pursue Jameson’s own discussion any further, I shall adopt his critical 
theoretical approach to ideology and utopia in order to show how a critique of 
Mannheim’s account of these categories illuminates the operation of imaginary 
dialectical universalisation. In Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim first makes a distinction 
between those ideas which are ‘congruent’ and ‘incongruenf with a given state of 
affairs.
Ideas which correspond to the concretely existing and de facto order are 
designated as ‘adequate’ and situationally congruous. These are relatively rare 
and only a state of mind that has been sociologically fully clarified operates 
with situationally congruous ideas and motives. Contrasted with situationally 
congruous and adequate ideas are the two main categories of ideas which 
transcend the situation - ideologies and utopias.15
Given the preponderance of the Europic problematic and irrealist humanism, however, 
even the ‘mind that has been sociologically fully clarified’ will be a rarity (unless 
Mannheim can be taken to be referring to critical-theoretical anti-Eurocentrism). In any 
case, epistemic incongruity, in itself, is no bar to functionality, and Mannheim’s work 
can be read as differentiating between two ways of relating ideas, practices and reality, 
with the two modes of transcendence primarily defined in terms of their relations to the
lj Jameson, p. 41
14 Jameson, p. 35.
15 Karl Mannheim, Ideology> and Utopia, Routledge and ICegan Paul Ltd., London,
1960. p. 175.
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limitations implied by the existing order: the ideological emphasises the need for 
symbolic work; the utopian emphasising the need to change the existing situation.
Mannheim understands an existing situation as “that which is ‘concretely effective’, i.e. 
a functioning social order, which does not exist only in the imagination of certain 
individuals but according to which people really act.”16 Some conceptions “... are to be 
designated as ‘transcendent’ or ‘unreal’ because their contents can never be realized in 
the societies in which they exist, and because one could not live and act according to 
them within the limits of the existing social order.”17 That is, transcendent ideas stand in 
irresolvable contradictions with the existing order. What distinguishes ideology from 
utopia is the locus in which pursuit of the conceptions is most keenly felt: ideologically 
motivated practice distorts meaning, whilst acting under a utopian impulse brings about 
deep change in social relations.
“Ideologies,” Mannheim writes, “are the situationally transcendent ideas which never 
succeed de facto in the realization of their projected contents”.18 While such ideas can 
be sustained within the structure of possibility of the existing order, they never develop 
a practical challenge to it. A price has to be paid, however. “Though [ideologies] often 
become the good-intentioned motives for the subjective conduct of the individual, when 
they are actually embodied in practice their meanings are most frequently distorted.”19 
This implies the need for ongoing ideological repair work: resolving imaginary 
antagonisms whilst reproducing real ones. By contrast, “... those orientations 
transcending reality will be referred to as utopian which, when they pass over into 
conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the 
time.”20 Unlike ideological unreality, the utopian unreal is a real possibility, but one 
whose condition of possibility is the transformation of the existing order. “Utopias ... 
are not ideologies, i.e. they are not ideologies in the measure and in so far as they 
succeed through counteractivity in transforming the existing historical reality into one 
more in accord with their own conceptions.”21
16 Mannheim, p. 174.
17 Mannheim, p. 175.
18 Mannheim, p. 175.
19 Mannheim, p. 175.
20 Mannheim, p. 173.
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Mannheim’s own account suggests, though, that the distinctions between ideology and 
utopia, and between existing situations and their transformations, can all be readily 
located with an account of imaginary dialectical universalisation. That is, the 
implications of sharp conceptual and historical breaks between ideology and utopia can 
be significantly mitigated, by recognising that the utopian impulse actually contains a 
self-negating tendency towards becoming ideology. As another world is brought into 
being, as the gap between existence and transcendence is narrowed, the utopian 
character of the conception increasingly shades over into the ideological. Mannheim’s 
own account of the fate of the utopian in the modem period, indeed, suggests an’ 
overarching narrative in which the two categories converge. “The historical process 
itself shows us a gradual descent and a closer approximation to real life of a utopia that 
at one time completely transcended history.”22 Utopias within the modern period have 
arisen as modes of ‘counteractivity’ which have fallen short of genuinely revolutionary 
transformation. Mannheim’s characterisation of socialism can be extended to cover 
other forms of utopian thought: This idea “... in its interaction with ‘actual’ events, 
operates not as a purely formal and transcendent principle which regulates the event 
from the outside, but rather as a ‘tendency’ within the matrix of this reality which 
continuously corrects itself with reference to this context.”23 Modernist utopianism 
informs historical tendencies which have been successfully contained within essentially 
modem constraints.
Mannheim reinforces this view with an account of liberal-humanist utopianism. Writing
on the Liberal Humanitarian Idea, Mannheim says: “In its characteristic form it also
establishes a ‘correct’ rational conception to be set against evil reality.”24 As such it is a
standard against which any existing social arrangements can be measured.
The utopia of the 1 iberal-humanitarian mentality is the ‘idea’. This, however, is 
not the static platonic idea of the Greek tradition, which was a concrete 
archetype, a primal model of tilings; but here the idea is rather conceived of as a 
formal goal projected into the infinite future whose function is to act as a 
regulative device in mundane affairs.25 
While the gap between the ideal and the mundane is never bridged, the two do come
together in practice. The ideal informs the ongoing reproduction and transformation of
21 Mannheim, p. 176.
22 Mannheim, p. 222.
23 Mannheim, p. 221.
24 Mannheim, p. 197.
25 Mannheim, p. 197.
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the mundane, as political and social practice are nothing other than ongoing attempts to 
subsmne the world under one or other instantiation of the Modem Imaginary. 
Utopianism is not ‘transcendent5 in the sense of an unreality beyond the horizons of the 
modern, after all. Rather, utopianism is the production of scenarios within imaginary 
dialectical universalisation which trigger the teleological potential of the ethical 
economic universal. It identifies antagonisms in the actual and informs their practical 
transformation with a view to the institution of a potential, non-antagonistic, state of 
affairs.
Aspects of imaginary dialectical universalisation can now be restated in terms of a 
‘dialectic5 of ideology and utopia. Ideology works to produce scenarios which trigger 
the actualisation of the universal and to resolve antagonisms within them. Utopianism, 
meanwhile, produces scenarios which trigger the absence of actualised universality, one 
effect of winch is to reveal the former scenarios as ideological. Utopianism also sets out 
to inform the practices which will practically resolve the antagonisms its own scenarios 
of the present have identified. Initially, at least, utopianism is untroubled by its own 
internal problems, but as its scenarios of the future are tested by political practice it has 
to become increasingly ideological as it is forced to come to terms with its own 
increasingly apparent unreality.
IV: Eurocentrism and Ideology. Utopia and Universalism
A common feature of accounts of Eurocentrism is that they remain confined within 
these horizons of Imaginary Dialectical Universalisation, reproducing the dialectic of 
ideology and utopia of ethical economy. Within the Europic problematic, 
‘Eurocentrism5 -is deployed as a critical term from a utopian perspective. A 
‘Eurocentric5 scenario is of some structural disequilibrium, usually combining both 
structural and discursive dysfunctions, but ‘ideologically5 represented as an actualised 
ethical economy. Of course, these dysfunctions are imagined in ways which also allow 
their resolutions to be imagined as well. The utopian scenario therefore implies a certain 
narrative in which the identification of the Eurocentric historical moment prefigures its 
subsequent transcendence. Emerging out of it, and motivated by its self-knowledge as 
Eurocentric, is the actualisation of the ethical economy. Its historical sensibility
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anticipates and looks back on the processes which resolve the antagonisms of the 
ideological scenario, as seen from the utopian perspective.
Two accounts of Eurocentrism, Ozay Mehmet’s Westernizing the Third World and 
James Blaut’s The Colonizer’s Model o f the World, will illustrate this.26 These writers 
exemplify the way that identifying Eurocentrism is the exposure of ideology, i.e. the 
pointing out of theory-practice inconsistencies within processes of universalisation. 
Meanwhile, from the standpoint of utopian anti-Eurocentrism, existing states of affairs 
are shown to be represented as either having achieved universality or progressing 
towards it, whilst its form of universalism in fact obscures and mediates the 
reproduction of Eurocentric social relations. They also show how utopian responses to 
their diagnoses are produced, responses which, more or less thinly, project the four 
negative moments of the emergence of ari ethical economy. Within the ethical- 
economic, humanist, problematic, the solution to these theory-practice inconsistencies is 
simply a temporal displacement of the actualisation of universality from the present into 
a different future.
Ozay Mehmet, in Westernizing the Third World: the Eurocentricity o f Economic 
Development, provides a typical example of ideology critique as it appeal's within 
Imaginary Dialectical Universalisation. His work on economics reveals a gap between 
the claims of orthodox economics that existing market relations are actualisations of 
ethical economy, on the one hand, and the centre-periphery relations which those claims 
inform and obscure, on the other. His utopian response to this problem is to argue for a 
form of developmental economics which would adequately guide the reform process 
needed for the actualisation of genuinely ethical economic relations. Mehmet discusses 
nearly two-hundred years of classical and neo-classical economic thought. His core 
argument is that the central tenet of this tradition, that trade is intrinsically mutually 
beneficial to those involved, renders that tradition Eurocentric. For Mehmet, the 
essential nonnative appeal of international trade, that it embodies the modem form of 
commutative justice, is a Eurocentric fraud.
26 Ozay Mehmet, Westernizing the Third World: the Eurocentricity o f  Economic 
Development Theories, Routledge, London, 1995.
112
Chapter 4: Dialectics ofUniversalism and Eurocentrism
The dominant tradition represents economic development as the processual 
universalisation of exchange relations. The latter are conceived in terms of inter-cultural 
neutrality -  i.e. the impersonal, mutually beneficial, exchange relations idealised by 
ethical economic imaginary. Mehmet, however, points to a number of problems 
translating the Imagined economy into reality. Firstly,
At [the] deeper level of analysis the fundamental flaws [of that tradition] are 
identified as the behavioural and subjective assumptions on which rests 
mainstream economics. In static terms, this ensures that the market forces of 
supply and demand clear. Market clearance is no more than a fleeting moment; 
it may be efficient at the point of equilibrium ensuring profit-maximizing 
output. But in the more normal state of disequilibrium, neither efficiency nor 
equity conditions hold in income distribution.27
Economic theory recognises the possibility of disequilibria, but instead of treating this 
as the ‘normal state’ develops its account of market relations on the basis of the 
‘fleeting moments’ of equilibria. The consequence of treating the exceptional as the 
normal is that economics is effectively oriented towards preserving, rather than 
rectifying, a state of disequilibrium. Also:
Eurocentric economics presents a further problem: it is necessary to question 
the assmnption of rational self-interested economic man, narrowly defined 
within an objective function as a utility maximiser subject only to his own taste 
and budget constraint. Such behaviour encourages selfishness and rejects tire 
ethics of altruism or reciprocity, i.e. interdependent utilities in a family or 
community.... The sole significant fact is that individualism clears the market.28
The doctrine of the equilibrium, i.e. of the actualised ethical economy, implies that the 
existence of the market is sufficient to meet the conditions of commutative justice. This 
is not so much apolitical as anti-political. It means that the role of the state is to preserve 
the existing conditions, ruling out the political construction of the conditions of just 
exchange. Finally,
Self-interested utility maximization looks like a fair competition; a game played 
on ‘a level playing field’, in which market forces objectively determine not only 
resource allocation, but distribution of reward according to productivity. 
However, distribution and productivity are in fact, subjectively determined by 
initial inequalities which the Pareto Optimality theorem ignores. In pragmatic 
policy terms, Western capitalism does not have an objective theory of 
distribution; it merely rewards the stronger.29
27 Mehmet, p. 136.
28 Mehmet, pp. 136-7.
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What Mehmet calls ‘the absence of a theory of distribution’ is the lack of a conception 
of how substantive inequalities need to be limited if formal exchange on the basis of 
equality are to meet the criterion of commutative justice. Mehmet can be read as 
addressing a problem that arises within narrowly economic thought as a consequence of 
the absence of any explicit considerations of the political and ethical issues which are at 
the heart of John Rawls’ account of justice as fairness.30 Unlike economic theory, 
Rawls’ version of contract theory directly confronts the possibility of antagonisms 
arising between formal equality and substantive inequality. In contrast to Rousseau, for 
instance, whose contractarian vision of a resolution to this problem was premised on a 
high degree of substantive equality, Rawls argues for establishing a functional 
equilibrium between the two. In the absence of such a theory of distribution, the ethical 
component of the economic is severed from its substantive conditions of possibilities. 
That is, Rawls effects a displacement of the problem of justice from the sphere of direct 
exchange onto a sociological scenario in which substantive inequalities become 
functionally beneficial to the worst off.
Mainstream economics, then, is especially vulnerable to becoming ideological in the 
sense that it is likely to represent a state of dysfunctional inequality as consistent with 
commutative justice. Mehmet follows this logic through by constructing an ideological 
scenario which relates this form of economic thought to the reproduction of structurally 
dysfunctional distribution. Within this scenario, trade relations are in fact characterised 
by the coerced institution of market distortions which systematically bias the flows of 
revenues so that accumulation occurs in the European core. Drawing on Pierro Sraffa, 
Mehmet effectively identifies Eurocentrism with ‘capitalisation’. He calls this the ‘inner 
logic of mercantilism old and new’.31 The term describes the process of transforming 
any and all resources into capital. All available resources are rendered as capital and 
then returns accrue to this form of property which can be traded on markets. This form 
of property, he argues, only survives through conformity to the law of compound rates 
of return. Under this compulsion:
Historically, capitalization has existed as long as capitalism itself because its
inner logic is mercantilism, the pursuit of trade balances by all means necessary.
Thus, in the age of colonialism, vacant lands in North America, Australia, New
29 Mehmet, p. 137.
30 John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, Cambridge, Mass. ; London : Belknap Press, 
1971.
31 Mehmet, p. 22.
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Zealand, mines in South Africa, plantations in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean 
were capitalized by colonial entrepreneurs as the indigenous inhabitants were 
pushed out or eliminated to make room for European interests operating as 
monopoly or oligopoly and extracting windfall profits.32
Eurocentrism, for Mehmet, must be understood as the terms of trade internal to 
capitalisation. He says: “Underpricing of Third World resources by Western interests 
has been the most systemic and widespread technique of capitalization”.33
While not discussed by Mehmet, the principal rival to what he calls ‘mainstream’ 
economics, i.e. the classical and neo-classical traditions, has been the overtly 
mercantilist or neo-mercantilist rival tradition of ‘national economics’, which has come 
down to us through such figures as Friedrich List. Unlike the market-centred Anglo- 
Saxon tradition, national economics has fore-grounded the role of the state as an agent 
of accumulation in its own right and its role in producing and sustaining the conditions 
of capital accumulation. Mehmet’s criticism of the mainstream can be summarised as its 
failure to acknowledge either its own mercantilism or to recognise that economic 
realities are, in part, a consequence of this mercantilism.
Having generated this ideological scenario, Mehmet turns to his utopian moment. He 
argues that ‘The Eurocentric Mindset’, the us-them structure of economic thought, took 
a blow with the rise of the NICs and the ‘end of the third world’.34 Mehmet treats this as 
an example of development “achieved independently and out of policy pragmatism. It 
was shaped by indigenous or national necessity reflecting internal cultural values and 
choices, despite, rather than because of, western mainstream theorizing”. He argues that 
this path “suggests a pro-labour, people-focused development that empowers local 
cultures and places the individual in a community”.35 Economic development in the 
periphery is represented as taking place with neither ‘Western theorizing’ nor its 
mercantile political economy. There is, instead, autonomous indigenous development 
which realises domestic conditions of commutative justice, and mutual self-realisation. 
This is accompanied by the institution of a sufficient degree of international substantive 
equality to ground commutative justice in this sphere as well. True forms of
32 Mehmet, p. 23.
33 Mehmet, p. 23.
34 The reference is to Nigel Harris, The end o f the Third World: newly 
industrializing countries and the decline o f an ideology, Tauris, London, 1986.
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development are those which realise the universal humanist promise of capitalist 
modernity.
Mehmet’s work conforms to the dialectics of ideology and utopia of ethical economy. 
Eurocentrism is fleshed out in terms of an ideological scenario which is then 
represented as being transcended by a scenario of utopian development. However, as 
Alice Amsden and others showed, the theory and practice of NIC development is 
squarely located in the tradition of national economics.36 What is more, the conditions of 
possibility of both the strategy and its degrees of success are a consequence of its 
historical background and geo-political context. Japanese and American occupations 
radically altered agrarian class structures to favour capitalist industrialisation, and there 
were strong linkages between U.S. trade and finance policies, designed to strengthen 
South Korea relative to its neighbours, especially North Korea, and its overarching 
security strategy for the region. Rather than representing this as a contradiction between 
development and mercantilism, as Mehmet does, it would be more consistent to move 
on to yet another dialectic of ideology and utopia. This would represent the articulation 
of global and local mercantilist-developmental strategies, each guided by their own 
ideologies and instituting their particular* forms of distortion, as the ideological scenario 
to be transcended by a further utopian one.37
James Blaut’s work on Eurocentrism in history also conforms to the dialectics of 
ideology and utopia. His ideological scenario combines an ideology of modern 
civilisation, i.e. European ‘ diffusion! sm \ with the structural dysfunctions implied by the 
global institution of colonialism. He also develops a utopian scenario which provides 
the ideals from which the ideological scenario is judged wanting. This provides the telos 
of an alternative historical narrative in which the ideology of illicit universalisation and 
its related dysfunctional structure, regarded as obstacles to the emergence of ethical 
economic relations, are absented as part of a global transformation.
35 Mehmet, p. 146.
36 Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and late industrialization, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
37 Of course, the real alternative would be to shift the entire discussion onto the 
terrain of theoretical anti-Eurocentrism.
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Blauf s ideological scenario has the usual two components. His form of illicit 
universalism is a general mythological framework of historiography, Eurocentric 
Diffusionism, in which Europeans lay claim to a monopoly of historical creativity. His 
structurally dysfunctional relations emerge from his discussion of colonialism, which he 
treats as the mechanism by which European powers were able to capture a globally 
emergent capitalism. This ideological scenario is in large measure a response to what 
Blaut sees as the problem of the non-emergence of non-European capitalism. As such it 
is a generalised version of Weber’s problem of the non-emergence of Indian capitalism. 
Consequently, the scenario encounters a similar set of difficulties to those encountered 
by Weber’s.
Blaut begins by surveying US textbooks on world history, at fifty year intervals
begimiing in the 1830s, all of which evince the same historical conception of cultural
development. Gradually shifting from a Christian influenced view to a more secular one,
and lagging, often considerably, behind academic historical work, and generally
ignoring controversies, these books have largely reproduced Eurocentric Diffusionism,
which he characterises as follows:
It is a theory about the way cultural processes tend to m ove over the surface o f  
the world as a whole. They tend to flow  out o f  the European sector and toward 
the non-European sector. This is the natural, normal, logical, and ethical flow  o f  
culture, o f innovation, o f  human causality. Europe is the source o f  most 
diffusions; non-Europe is the recipient.38
This world-view is by no means confined to the class room:
Eurocentrism is the colonizer’s model o f  the world in a very literal sense: it is 
not merely a set o f  beliefs, a bundle o f  beliefs. It has evolved, through time, into 
a very finely sculptured model, a structured whole; in fact a single theory; in 
fact a super theory, a general framework for many smaller theories, historical, 
geographical, psychological, sociological, and philosophical. This supertheory 
is diffusionism ,39
Blaut’s account shows diffusionist history representing a European core as the causal 
agent of Euromorphic transformation of the periphery. These two moments of Europism 
are to be found throughout the wide range of substantive, historical and sociological 
work. In addition, they all have in common ‘the most important tenets’ of diffusionism, 
i.e. ‘the autonomous rise of Europe’ and ‘the European Miracle’. That is, these tenets
38 Blaut, James, The Colonizer's Model o f the World: Geographical Diffusionism
and Eurocentric History, The Guilford Press, New York/London, 1993. p. 1.
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provide an account of the emergence of universality in Europe in terms of spontaneous
self-actualisation. Against this outlook, Blaut lays the ground for his utopian perspective
by arguing that history and sociology should be developed within an alternative
framework, what he calls ‘unifomiitarianism’.40 This approach is based on alternative
presuppositions concerning universality. This is intended to frame a rival mode of
representation in which a rather different world would appear:
This would be a world in which the processes at work in any one sector are also 
expected to be at work in the other sectors. In essence this m odel is driven by a 
concept o f  equal capability o f  human beings - psychological unity - in all 
cultures and regions, and from this argument it demands that any spatial 
inequalities in matters relating to cultural evolution, and more specifically 
econom ic development, be explained . Stated differently: equality is the normal 
condition and inequalities need to be explained. D iffusionism , in contrast, 
expects basic inequality between the Inner and Outer sectors o f  the world - and 
o f  humanity. The unifomiitarian principle is not one o f  uniformity; it is the 
principle o f  human equality.41
Blaut’s utopian perspective is premised on an ontological deployment of an ethical 
economic ideologeme. This state of normality and equilibrium provides the rationale for 
the ideological scenario and for his account of the emergence of a structurally 
dysfunctional distribution of political power. This anti-Eurocentric utopianism tackles 
the claim for Europe as the sole self-actualising culture by replacing the diffusionist 
scenario with one in which Europe’s rise to world domination is explained by its 
imposition of a systematically self-aggrandising appropriation of a common process of 
cultural evolution. In this way Blaut is able to tackle the emergence of capitalism within 
the world-system in a way which addresses the twin motifs of ‘autonomy’ and the need 
for ‘miracles’.42
Before 1492, most o f  the preconditions that would be critical for the eventual 
rise o f  industrial capitalism were present not merely in parts o f  Europe but also 
in parts o f  A sia and Africa. After 1492, in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Europe acquired three additional preconditions. One was the veiy  
considerable accumulation o f  wealth from the mines and plantations o f  America
39 Blaut, Colonizer’s Model, pp. 10-11.
40 See also the following articles by James Blaut: ‘Two views of diffusion’ in 
Annals o f the Association o f American Geographers 67: 343-349, 1977; 
‘Diffusionism: A uniformitarian critique.’ Annals o f the Association o f American 
Geographers 77: 30-47.
41 Blaut, p. 42. Emphasis in original.
42 Interestingly, Blaut identifies the common feature of liberal, Marxist and 
Weberian accounts o f the European ‘miracle’ as attempts to isolate the elusive 
‘factor’ which will explain Europe’s special destiny. They are all portrayed as 
mirror images of Weber’s examination o f India.
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and from foreign trade in A sia and Africa. The second, closely related to the 
first, was the huge enlargement o f  markets outside o f  western Europe for 
products either produced in western Europe or imported and then re-exported.
Third, and most important o f  all, the social sectors involved with capitalism  
took political power on a wide scale in western Europe, something that had not 
happened elsewhere except on very small terrains. This, the bourgeois 
revolution, allowed the emerging capitalist class-community to m obilize state 
power toward its further rise, such that the entire society contributed to the 
underwriting o f  colonial adventures and to the preparation o f  infrastructure such 
as cities and roads, w hile that state’s police and military power could now be 
mobilized to force people o ff  the land and into wage work, and to conscript 
people and resources for advantageous wars abroad. A ll three o f  these 
precursors, as I have argued, appeared because o f  - would not have appeared 
had it not been for - colonialism .43
In this scenario, the creative capacities, and ‘most of the preconditions’ necessaiy for 
capitalist development were not concentrated in any one part of the world. They were 
instead evolving throughout it and would, ceteris paribus, .have continued to do so. 
Within this context, however, the even process of cultural development was interrupted 
as European powers came to dominance. Three political-economic processes caused 
this: primitive accumulation centred on Europe; the expansion of trade networks centred 
on the core; political and social transformation within the core.44 Each of these was 
dependent on colonialism.
Colonialism, in this context, has to be understood as a mechanism for the appropriation 
of cultural resources, as a means of transferring control over the exercise of cultural 
capacities from the periphery to the core. Colonialism institutes cultural alienation. 
What Eurocentric diffusionism represents as a self-actualising universal, Blaut’s anti- 
Eurocentric representation portrays as universal cultural expropriation. The utopian 
implications of this ideological scenario, meanwhile, logically follow: the restoration of 
the natural, uniformitarian, state of affairs. This entails the dissolution of diffusionist 
ideology and colonial institutions, paving the way for the restitution of alienated cultural 
capacities to peripheral communities. The narrative is of the transformation of inter- 
cultural relations, with their reconstitution on an ethical-economic basis, such that 
culturally distinct groups become engaged in mutually beneficial contractualised 
transactions.
43 Blaut, p. 201.
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This historical revisionism raises many questions, not the least of which concern the 
distinctions and relations between European colonial dominance and emergent capital. 
In the construction of his scenario, Blaut runs together two very different kinds of 
argument. The first is the ‘Weberian’ presupposition that capital is a universal 
possibility whose absence in the non-European world needs to be explained no less than 
does its presence in Europe. The second is that colonialism was, historically, essential to 
the emergence of capitalism. It is, of course, entirely appropriate to investigate the 
significance of colonialism for the development of a capitalist world system, but this 
can be done without any recourse to claims that capitalism was an emergent possibility 
the world over. Blaut’s purpose, though, is to repudiate a narrow identification of 
Europe with capitalism, and to emphasise instead European domination of a world 
capitalist system. The proper historical questions about the more or less forced 
integration and transformation of non-European cultural powers and capacities into the 
emergence of capitalism are displaced by a scenario which regards non-European lands 
as sites of externally imposed distortions to immanent capitalist development.
V. Conclusions.
The critical theory of Eurocentrism being developed here, i.e. theoretical anti- 
Eurocentrism, has as its theoretical objects Europic theory, practice and social 
formation. This chapter has investigated the inner workings of theoretical Eurocentrism, 
and the place of ‘Eurocentrism’ within it. It has intimated the sheer scope of the former 
and the highly restricted nature of the latter.
The discussion, in Chapter 2, of Althusser’s account of theoretical humanism, was 
concerned with the overarching problematic of the modern tradition of political and 
social theory. That chapter drew attention to some of humanism’s fundamental features, 
including its theoretical reduction to concepts of human essence and the consequential 
human/inhuman dual. This chapter should be understood as having made a contribution 
to the development of Althusser’s account of humanism. It has specified some of the 
characteristics of the humanist tradition which constitute it as theoretical Eurocentrism.
44 See Blaut (ed.)5 The Debate on Colonialism, Verso, London, 1992, for an 
overview of these debates.
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Eurocentric discourse is a humanist mode of symbolic representation which revolves 
around theoretical reductions to conceptions of ethical economy and which generates 
the ethical/unethical dual as a consequence. This inner structure was brought out 
through a series of critical readings of commentaries on forms of theoretical-humanist 
thought.
The reading of Ricoeur5 s account of universalism took up his account of its 
differentiation between its ontological, deontological and teleological dimensions. 
Drawing attention to some of the presuppositions of universalism not included in his 
account, this critical elaboration showed how each of these dimensions is internally 
related to the others; how the basis of intelligibility in each dimension is the ethical- 
economic ideologeme; and how the form of universality of its categories is illicit, 
generating the systematic ambiguities characteristic of irrealism.
The ethical-economic ideologeme is the theoretical complement to humanist accounts of 
human essence, providing a conception of a mode of sociality. The critique of Ricoeur 
revealed how the projection of the ideologeme into the various dimensions of 
universalism is, at the same time, the projection of the ethical/unethical dual into them. 
The overall effect of these multiple duals is the complex of interlocking and mutually 
reinforcing discourses capable of symbolically representing the modem and processes 
of modernisation.
The subsequent critique of Mannheim built on these insights to reveal the operation of 
the ethical/unethical dual as the narrative form in which real contradictions are 
represented and resolved. This was shown to take the form of the dialectics of 
ideological and utopian scenarios. Drawing, more or less implicitly, on all three of 
Ricoeur5s dimensions, liberal humanist discourse is engaged in generating ethical 
economic utopias as political and social teleologies, and doing so in response to 
perceived dysfunctions and tensions created by processes of universalisation. Given the 
contradictions inherent in this form of universalism, theoretical Eurocentrism can be 
properly called Imaginary Dialectical Universalism.
Finally, the two critiques of ‘Eurocentrism5 showed how the term was deployed for the 
construction of ideological scenarios in the disciplines of economics and history.
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‘Eurocentrism ’ was shown to be not simply a limited or partial term of social criticism. 
While it is a term nsed to make negative evaluations, and it is used to represent 
Eurocentric states of affairs, its real use is to contribute to transitions from one 
Eurocentric configuration to another. Precisely because the term operates on the terrain 
of theoretical Eurocentrism, and it posits the emergence of an ethicised social formation, 
it is instrumental in the transformative reproduction of Real Eurocentrism. As such it is 
but one moment in the Dialectical Universalisation of Europic categories and relations.
In that interesting and fertile remark, Immanuel Wallerstein refers to a widespread 
position he calls eurocentric anti-eurocentrism: systems of values which are actually 
derived from the European experience, but are not conceived as belonging to it.45 In so 
saying he intimates the deontological dimension of universalism. This form of discourse 
valorises modem institutions, divorces them from their original historical context, and 
establishes them as the proper aspirations of all the nations of the world. The ubiquity of 
such Euromorphic universalism is itself an indication of the depth of social 
transformation brought about through dialectical universalisation, and of the 
organisation of the terrain on which hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggles are 
fought out. It is as a consequence of European dominance that many advocates for non- 
European cultural traditions are forced into the position of having to lay claim to forms 
of modernity which substantively diverge from the trajectories followed by Europeans, 
and to do so by maintaining the fiction of an organic continuity between the past and the 
present. The dialectics of ideology and utopia of the ethical economy provides the 
general narrative form in which the contradictions of these and other histories are 
represented, contained and resolved or anticipated.
In the absence of a theoretical anti-Eurocentrism, these kinds of intellectual constraints 
will remain in place. The possibility for the further development of critical theory, 
however, is embedded in the very processes of Dialectical Universalisation, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
45 Immanuel Wallerstein, "Eurocentrism and its Avatars: The Dilemmas o f Social 
Science", New Left Review, 226, November/December 1997, pp. 93-107.
122
Chapter 5 - The Dual Dialectics of the Ethical Economic Imaginary.
I, Introduction: Historicising modem categories
Questions concerning the Europic problematic are inseparable from those relating to the 
critical theoretical anti-Eurocentrism needed to understand it. The Europic problematic, 
in the expanded sense discussed in Chapter 2, encompasses the theory, practice and 
social relations of modem European universalisation. Theoretical anti “Euro centri sm is 
the critical theory of this problematic. There are a number of senses in which the latter 
is anti-Eurocentric, with this chapter examining the way that theoretical anti- 
Eurocentrism emerges out of and against theoretical Eurocentrism.
The relationship between the two modes of theory is a mutually constituting 
antagonism. Critical theoretical anti-Eurocentrism is in a continuous process of 
theoretical development. It is motivated by the ensemble of contradictions constituting 
the Europic problematic. These contradictions are internal to roles, functions and effects 
of the ethical economic ideologeme, and it is the intellectual reproduction of this 
ideologeme which generates the problem, raised in the opening chapter, of the historical 
reflexivity of the modern tradition. This is because, when it comes to the historical 
status of modem categories, the ideologenetic practices of the modern tradition generate 
a systematic ambiguity. The categories of this and other ideologemes are treated as both 
transhistorical universals, when they are deployed as essence, and they are treated as 
historically specific, when they appear as actualities. As a result of this ambiguity, the 
modern tradition of political and social theory runs into systemic difficulties when it 
comes to developing an adequate sense of its own historicity. Nevertheless, these very 
ambiguities also drive tendencies towards critical theoretical anti-Eurocentrism: they 
provoke fundamental questions about the nature of the tradition, and ground attempts to 
secure the properly historical status of the modern categories of the Europic 
problematic, both discursive and non-discursive.
The broad argument presented here elaborates some of the implications of this internally 
contradictory structure of theoretical Eurocentrism. The ethical economic ideologeme, 
with its structural ramifications, should be understood in terms of a complex mechanism 
which generates opposing tendencies towards both traditional and critical theory, with
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the former manifest as the defence and reproduction of the dialectics of ideology and 
utopia, and the latter engaged in its critical theoretical structural transformation. These 
conflicting tendencies can be illustrated with reference to debates over the universality 
of rationality and some of the arguments for relativism. For the sake of the argument, 
universalism will be primarily represented by Steven Lukes, with Charles Taylor as the 
main advocate of relativism.
The pursuit of relativism has two distinct, but related, orientations: the first and most 
clearly articulated one is a negative movement, away from the illicit universalism of the 
modem tradition; the more positive movement is towards a kind of social theory with a 
stronger sense of historicity. This latter direction tends to be more explicit at a more 
philosophical level, that of social forms in general, but is far less obvious when it comes 
to precisely how modem categories should be historicised. Anti-Euro centric tendencies 
are also evident in all of the major strands of relativism to the extent that they were 
informed by philosophical anthropologies developed in explicit hostility to some or 
other version of the ethical economic ideologeme and its elevation to the status of a 
universal anthropology. However, critiques of universalism have tended to 
underestimate the complexity of the problems involved in historicising modem 
categories and/or to pursue the issue beyond the bounds of philosophy.
II. The complex dynamics of the ethical economic problematic.
The previous chapter showed how critiques of Eurocentrism tended to reproduce the 
Europic, ethical-economic horizons, of their disciplinary problematics. Such critiques 
were shown to belong to traditional theory, whose primary tendency is to reproduce the 
dialectics of ideology and utopia. These dialectics are ‘bad’ ones, i.e. processes which 
reproduce their own structural absences and contradictions. The Europic problematic as 
a whole, however, is irreducible to this simple, negative, dialectic, and needs to be 
portrayed in a more complex light. As against that one-sided presentation, the Europic 
problematic is explored here in terms of the relations between two dialectics, each 
internally related to one another. To be sure, the dominant tendency is that of the 
dialectics of ideology and utopia, but this co-exists with the subordinate tendency to 
realist, critical theory. This tendency contrasts with the first in that it is oriented towards 
a ‘good5 dialectic, one which generates the production of theoretical anti-Eurocentrism
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through the disclosure and transformation of the categorial structures of the ethical 
economic problematic.
Modern intellectual production is deeply marked by the effects of both tendencies. For a 
variety of reasons, including the sheer weight of traditional theory, the political and 
institutional contexts of theoretical production, the ideational effects of lived relations 
and the historical limitations on structures of possibility of intellectual creativity, the 
tendencies towards the reproduction of traditional theory are the most obvious, whilst 
those towards the realisation of critical theory are considerably constrained. This is as a 
consequence of both the discursive and non-discursive dimensions of the expanded 
problematic exercising powerful regulatory forces on the development of the discursive 
dimension. So, while a great deal of debate and controversy is symptomatic of both 
dialectics, it also reveals the subordination of critical to traditional tendencies.
Indeed, a great deal of traditional intellectual theoretical energy is absorbed by attempts 
to contain the implications of its internally generated problems, while critical, realist, 
efforts are channelled into the elaboration of these problems, using them as points of 
departure for the production of an alternative, historically reflexive, mode of intellectual 
production. The good dialectics of critical theory are those of the immanent disclosure 
of the real social and historical context of traditional, Europic theory.1 The necessary 
theoretical perspective is produced through a multi-dimensional critique which can be 
formalised in terms of a number of distinct, internally related, issues: philosophical 
ontology -  dealing with general questions of form; philosophical anthropology -  
relating to the most general questions of forms of life; philosophical epistemology -  
concerned with theory-reality relations; sociological questions to do with specifically 
modern forms and their emergence.
The interdisciplinarity of critical theory is a fimction of the interdependence of these 
four dimensions. Any sociology of modem forms, for instance, presupposes 
epistemological, anthropological and ontological concerns, such that any problems 
posed by these latter dimensions must be addressed, if only implicitly, if that sociology 
is not to reproduce the forms of traditional theoiy. Equally, there can be no account of
1 The further development of good dialectics spills over into the disclosure of real 
possibilities for ruptures in historical process and for real social transformations.
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philosophical categories that does not relate them back to their social and historical 
conditions of emergence.
The ‘rationality debates’ raised all of these issues, if somewhat unevenly and 
incompletely. Epistemologically, they addressed the relations between abstract theories 
of rationality and different forms of life while wrestling with the status of the natural 
sciences; anthropologically, relativism both draws on and feeds back into critiques of 
the coherence and universality of ethical-economic visions of social life. Sociological 
concerns revolved primarily around the institution of science and technology. The most 
significant absence, though, was any real engagement with ontology, which meant that 
the case for relativism, and along with that the possibility for developing critical 
theoretical anti-Eurocentrism, could not be sustained.
Relativist projects, at base, are motivated by the problematic historicity of modem 
categories, which is generated by the antinomies of the ethical-economic ideologeme, 
i.e. its essence/actuality ambiguity, and by its various disciplinary projections. As was 
seen in the previous chapter, Jameson’s contention that ideologemes are figures which 
can be projected into various disciplines and at various levels of generality can be 
readily illustrated, with the rationality debates providing a highly significant example. 
Debates over the universality of analytic conceptions of rationality also show how the 
essence/actuality dual translates into a more complex set of problems, as the universalist 
problematic establishes categories as transhistorically necessary aspects of all forms of 
life, allowing these categories to appeal' either as constitutive determinants of those 
forms or as potentialities embedded within them. So, for instance, rationality can either 
be a real capacity, whose exercise may be prevented in some way, or else it can be a 
potential capacity whose realisation is blocked for some reason. In the first of these, 
reason can be represented as a universal reality, but one whose efficacy and scope may 
be distorted by circumstantial realities. Such distortions then need to be accounted for 
and may be dealt with in practice. The alternative is for reason to be treated as a 
universal potential which is only realised under certain conditions. This establishes 
reason as necessarily immanent within any form of life, regardless of socio-historical 
space-time. It appears as something that can be realised once the right conditions have 
been established.
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These, of course, are the formal possibilities of the universalist problematic, around 
which the dialectics of ideology and utopia revolve. However, this very structure of 
possibilities engenders the problem of the historicity of these categories. These 
universals cany the potential to be read as transhistorical and/or historically specific. 
They possess an internal sense of historicity, derived from the structure of the 
universalist problematic, which simultaneously dehistoricises universals at the same 
time as it asserts their historical character. This ambiguity and ambivalence of universal 
categories generate pressures within the problematic to sustain a distinction between 
theories at different levels of generality, and/or to present these problems as having been 
resolved.
One of the ways this pressure manifests itself is in philosophical epistemology, for 
instance, in various criticisms of theoretical reification. While relativist arguments are 
varied, a common response to claims for the universality of rationality is to insist on the 
reality and efficacy of cultural and historical difference. Cultural context, the particular' 
foim of life, and historically specific conditions, are regarded as essential determinants 
of meaning and linguistic practices. Two broad lines of argument follow from this: If 
the rationality of any social practice is relative to its broader context there is either no 
universal theory of rationality, or if there is it must be so foimal as to have no 
meaningful purchase on concrete practice. One of the primary moves by proponents of 
different strands of relativism is indeed to reject the idea that the concrete world can be 
represented by abstract theory. Wittgenstein’s repudiation of ‘philosophical pictures’ 
must be considered to be one of the most important examples of this.2
The non-representational capacity of abstract theory, the failure of theoretical 
modelling, is often taken to imply the rejection of any inquiry into universal categories 
and their foimal configurations. Interestingly, however, this position is very rarely 
maintained in practice. Indeed, advocacy of relativism is closely associated with a de 
facto advocacy of philosophical-anthropological alternatives to those which dominate 
traditional theory. This is no mere accident, as arguments for relativism must 
encompass, or at the very least must imply, some alternative conception of the formal 
universalities of human existence.
2 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1967.
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The other issues raised by the relativist critique arise when the general argument that 
rationality needs to be understood in context is turned back on universalism and, indeed, 
on arguments for relativism. That is, the modem dialogic field constituted by its form of 
universalism needs to be understood in relation to its own context. What is striking, 
however, about debates over rationality is their intellectualism, their tendency to reduce 
the idea of context to the sphere of meaning, rather than seeking to relate Europic 
universalism to its broader, non-discursive context. Unless universalist discourse is to 
be completely identified with and collapsed into itself as its own context, some account 
of the specificity of modem ‘universal5 social relations is needed. This places a 
significant demand 011 advocates of relativism, one which has been responded to in 
terms of the strong programme of the sociology of knowledge. However, the success of 
such a programme requires a non-miiversalist sociology of modern social relations 
which can sustain a conception of those relations as historically specific. It also needs a 
conception of the relations between these discursive and non-discursive dimensions of 
the modem form of life and its modes of universalisation.
Unfortunately, the development of arguments for relativism has not resulted in the 
production of a critical-theoretical anti-Eurocentrism. These intellectual trends have 
been unable to realise the realist potential of the discursive field. What happened instead 
was that the antinomies between universalism and relativism were established as two 
poles around which the discursive field was organised. Outcomes to date represent 
compromises between the rival tendencies animating this field, demonstrating the 
effective force of traditional theory in containing the immanent potential for its own 
radical transformation.
To illustrate this more complex conception of the Europic problematic at work, the rest 
of this chapter stages a confrontation between two positions. The universalist position 
here is organised around the defence of the universal actualisation of rationality. The 
concept of rationality it uses will be shown to presuppose ethical economic forms, while 
related conceptions of social change are instances of the core-periphery dynamic. 
Modernity is distinguished from other forms of life in that the common core rationality 
is here both systematised and extended into various areas of life, most notably in the 
shape of science and technology, but also more generally. The relativist alternative
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discussed here reproduces the essence/actual dual. Instead of reproducing the core­
periphery model of universalis ation, however, this model treats scientific and technical 
rationality as a universal potential, realised under modem conditions, thereby 
reproducing the illicit universality of the Europic problematic.
III. On the Universality and Universalisation of rationality.
Naturalism has provided one of the major defences of the universality of culturally 
specific forms and conceptions of rationality. From this perspective, rationality has been 
characterised as an element common to all social life, as indeed it must be at some level 
of generality. But while this idea does allow for a culturally non-specific account of 
reason naturalism tends not to make abstract, general claims, but treats the universality 
of rationality as an empirical, concrete, fact. The result is that theories of rationality tend 
to simply become an elaboration of (the rules) of certain, privileged, existing social 
practices.
The most prominent of the naturalist positions supports the idea of an intercultural 
bridgehead.3 This position sets out the contents of the common rational core possessed 
by all cultures. Amongst the arguments for such a core is the fact of successful 
intercultural translation, or at least the absence of total failure. The argument holds that 
at least some of the activities of people on opposing sides of any cultural boundaries can 
readily be made intelligible to those on the other side. Such trans-ethnic communication 
is taken to imply a universal mode of interaction, with others and with the world around 
them, which any functioning member of any culture can and does successfully engage 
in as a matter of course. It is this mode of interaction that defines the extent of the 
bridgehead, and where people are operating in this way, they are acting in accordance 
with a common, universal, rationality.
For instance, Steven Lukes argued
[...] that some criteria o f  rationality are universal, i.e. relevantly applicable to all 
beliefs, in any context, w hile others are context dependent, i.e. are to be 
discovered by investigating the context and are only relevantly applicable to 
beliefs in that context. [... and that] beliefs are not only to be evaluated by the 
criteria that are to be discovered in the context in which they are held; they must
3 See, for instance, Richard Hollis, ‘The Limits of Irrationality’ in Rationality, pp.
214-220.
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also be evaluated by criteria o f  rationality that simply are criteria o f rationality, 
as opposed to criteria o f rationality in context. In what follow s universal criteria 
will called ‘rational (1) criteria’ and context-dependent criteria ‘rational (2) 
criteria’.4
However, this could not simply be a matter of formal criteria. Intercultural
communication presupposes that people on either side of a cultural boundaiy are able to
make their substantive beliefs about the world understood. So, argued Lukes:
[...] in the very identification o f  beliefs and a fortio ri o f  b elief systems w e must 
presuppose commonly shared standards o f  truth and o f  inference, and ... we 
must further presuppose a commonly shared core o f  beliefs whose content or 
meaning is fixed by application o f  the standards.5
The bridgehead, then, is a universal sphere of culture involving both criteria of 
judgement and a set of beliefs which are held in place through the use of those criteria. 
Lukes’ argument is naturalistic in that it locates these criteria within the very nature of 
social practices. They are non-contextually specific criteria, which should not be 
considered as existing externally to any context to which they are applicable. Rather, 
they are internal to the very idea of a social context: “[any society’s] language must 
have operable logical rules and not all of these can be pure matters of convention.”
Given this kind of naturalism, it might be thought that arguments of this kind would be 
subject to empirical testing of some kind. However, Martin Hollis argues that what has 
just been outlined cannot be a testable hypothesis: “Mr Lukes’ ‘rational (1) criteria’ are 
not so much universal as necessary and that his ‘rational (2) criteria’ are not so much 
context-dependent as optional. [...] If anthropology is to be possible [...] the natives 
must share our concepts of truth, coherence and rational interdependence of beliefs.’6
The bridgehead argument is, in effect, an extension of familiar conceptions of language. 
Firstly, language use is taken to imply distinctions between signifier, signified and 
referent, i.e. between the words used, the meaning the words have, and the things or 
states of affairs which the words are about.7 Secondly, successful language use depends
4 Steven Lukes, ‘Some Problems about Rationality’, in Rationality, pp. 194-213, p. 
208.
5 Lukes, ‘Relativism in its Place’, in Rationality and Relativism pp. 261-305, p. 
262.
6 Hollis, ‘The Limits o f Irrationality’.
7 The following points are made in the two pieces by Lukes and Hollis cited in the 
previous two footnotes.
130
Chapter 5: Dual Dialectics o f the Ethical Economic Imaginaiy
on a necessary set of grammatical and logical rules. The existence of a zone of ready 
communicative possibility presupposes that all of these elements are identical on either 
side of any linguistic boundary, with the sole exception of the signifiers, the stock of 
actual words used. Otherwise there must be a common referent: a unitary environment 
within which all cultures operate, and whose character is independent of any particular 
culture. There must also be common human relations to that environment, relations 
grounded in common natural capacities such as the ability to see and to experience the 
colour' spectrum and acquire language etc. There must, in addition, be a common set of 
grammatical and logical rules by which language users abide when speaking about that 
world and that experience. These rules must facilitate the accurate descriptions of 
things, their empirical features and their spatial, temporal and (some) causal relations to 
allow for prediction of and control over the natural world. Finally, the efficacy of 
language as a means of guiding practices which regulate the natural environment 
depends on its meeting criteria of correspondence between signifiers and referents and 
consistency or coherence within and between discrete accounts of the. experienced 
world.8
Turning briefly now to modernity and the universalisation of rationality. In order to 
account for the peculiarity of the modem relation between rationality and culture, some 
sense of the historical is required. The development of the natural sciences is clearly a 
historical phenomenon: a process of cultural transformation with global reach. It is, 
equally, a process indissociable from modem science and technology. “[Some 
communities] possess enormous and indeed growing cognitive wealth, which is so to 
speak validated by works as well as faith: its implementation leads to a very powerful 
technology. There is a near-universal consensus about this, in deeds rather than in 
words: those who do not possess this knowledge and technology endeavour to emulate 
and acquire it.” 9 Ahistorical universality has a special link with historical 
universalisation. The core is constituted by that “massive central core of human thinking
8 These criteria are, in effect, the philosophical presuppositions of empiricism and 
positivism, a tradition whose naturalism must be read as an illicit desocialisation 
of modem epistemic conditions. Written into this account of universality, then, 
are the philosophical presuppositions of the dominant tradition in the philosophy 
of science. For more on this see Section IV below.
9 Ernest Gellner, 'Relativism and Universals’ in Rationality and Relativism, pp. 
181-200 .
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that has no history”10. Modern science, on the other hand, is predicated on methods that 
successfully expand the domain of true beliefs far beyond this core. It is, therefore 
culturally particular in one sense, but is premised on the prior existence of
transhistorical conditions of reason and truth. The threshold to modernity can therefore 
be characterised as the permanent institution of the means by which the rationality 
embodied in the core is transmitted into the periphery. This takes the form of the
“decisive emergence and systematic refinement and application of what has been
variously described as the absolute Cartesian conception of knowledge, and the Galilean 
mode of reasoning, embodying the pursuit of objectivity (understood as perspective- 
neutrality).”11
This core-periphery model of universalism and universalisation needs to be expanded 
one step further with the inclusion of universalisability: the potential for
universalisation. From the perspective of universal rationality, the process of 
universalisation is regarded as the process of extending the necessary mode of 
objectivity residing in the core into its wider cultural milieu. This process entails the 
transformation of the periphery, the realm of the ‘optional’ into the form of the 
‘necessary’. Universalisation is predicated on the universalisability of universals, i.e. on 
the possibility that ‘accidental’ forms of culture can be subsumed under the forms 
belonging to the realm of cultural necessity. Any sustained realisation of this principle 
in practice must be mediated by the discursive, theoretical, articulation of universals, 
hence the importance of the role played by the Galilean-Cartesian principles. This 
philosophical articulation of universals has itself to feed into the process of 
universalisation by defining, or at least refining and defending, the forms that 
universalisable knowledge must take. “Unconvertible currencies are not suitable for 
trade, and ungeneralizable explanations are useless for a practical and cumulative body 
of knowledge. [...] Material not amenable to treatment within this assumption is
19worthless, and must either be reinterpreted or discarded.”
In practice, however, extending this form of universality into peripheral social realities 
has remained problematic. Modern political history, for instance, is replete with
10 Strawson, P.F. Individuals: An essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Methuen,
London, 1959. p. 10.
11 Lukes, ‘Relativism in its Place5, p. 298.
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attempts from Hobbes to Rawls to rationally ground state institutions by means of a
political algebra which moves off from naturalised first principles concerning human
nature and logic. Lukes, though, acknowledges that disclosing ‘the fact of the matter5
about social life continues to run up against a seemingly insuperable set of issues in
philosophical anthropology. Where the natural sciences appear to develop on the basis
of either having settled or dispensed with their major ontological issues, the social
sciences remain enmeshed in controversies: the real character of actors; the construction
of narrative and explanatory accounts and their relation to empirical material; the
influence of moral and political questions, such as the relation of institutional functions
to real needs.13 Lukes suggests that the principles of objectivity can be brought to bear
here, but only in so far as they act as a restraining influence.
Such constraints are powerful. Their application yields perhaps the only 
‘objectivity’ that is possible in much o f  social inquiry: not ‘perspective- 
neutrality’, but rather accomits that are not merely theory- but also perspective- 
relative, yet constrained by evidence that is as systematic and reliable as 
possible and relatable to other perspective-relative accounts. In applying them, 
one may explain from some perspective what could not be explained from no 
perspective.14
In the light of such difficulties, the core-periphery model has to be developed a little 
further. The natural/social science distinction can be mapped on to a distinction within 
the peripheral cultural zone itself. Universalist forms can be extended into a natural 
scientific zone, opening up the possibility of technically rational mediation of social 
practices with the technological products of the sciences. Other aspects of social life are, 
though, less readily universalised. They retain a degree of relative autonomy from 
processes of universalisation, though within ‘powerful constraints’. Political life 
remains mediated by theory and perspective. It is necessarily a zone of irresolvable 
intellectual conflict, regulated rather than constituted by universal rationality.
The unfinished character of this social zone suggested by this model open up the space, 
indeed the need, for the dialectics of ideology and utopia. The periphery becomes a 
sphere of culture in which and over which the struggle to adapt to and regulate rational 
universalisation takes place. This model of the world which emerges from the 
naturalisation of rationality identifies the expansion, to universality, of rationality,
12 Gellner, ‘Relativism and Universals’ p. 189.
13 Lukes, ‘Relativism in its Place’, p. 303-4.
14 Lukes, ‘Relativism in its Place’, p. 305.
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science and technology as the defining features of the modem. The peripheral zones can 
then be best understood in terms of the processes of subsumption and the struggles that 
take place over them. What regulates those struggles, or at least should in principle, is 
the institution of some general sense as to what counts as a rational social order. 
Interestingly, the most significant work on disclosing such standards has been done by 
critics of universalism, critics who identify the presuppositions of social and political 
theory and who also extend that work into the critique of universalism.
IV. On the presuppositions of universalism.
The universalist position asserts a qualitative identity between different cultures or
forms of life. However, Peter Winch argues, judgements about qualitative identity must
be related back to the theoretical perspective from which they are made:
“A  regularity or uniformity is the constant recurrence o f  the same kind o f  event
011 the same kind o f  occasion; hence statements o f  uniformities presuppose
judgements o f  identity. But this takes us to an argument, according to which
criteria o f identity are necessarily relative to some rule: with the corollary that
two events which count as qualitatively similar' from the point o f  view  o f one
rule would comit as different from the point o f  v iew  o f  another. So to
investigate the type o f  regularity studied in a given kind o f  inquiry is to examine
the nature o f  the rule according to which judgements o f  identity are made in that
inquiry. Such judgements are intelligible only relatively to a given mode o f
15human behaviour, governed by its own rules.”
Barry Bames and David Bloor argued that the universalist perspective entails a set of 
commitments to some well-known problems of the modem philosophical tradition. 
They point out that it is a narrow concentration on three aspects of social life: the 
sensual, which is largely elaborated in terms of the empirical; the technical, which is 
largely elaborated in terms of practical techniques of survival; the rational, identified 
with the logical. These are the same terms which define parameters of the dominant 
tradition of philosophy of science. Barnes and Bloor declare that “It is not difficult, 
however, to perceive the [the bridgehead argument’s] origins in the received culture of 
the epistemologists. It is an old dualism dressed in a new garb.” 16 To the extent that the 
bridgehead argument is really little more than a thinly veiled and considerably abridged 
version of Kanfs arguments for the necessary preconditions of experience, its
15 Winch, ‘The Idea of a Social Science’, Rationality, p. 1.
16 Barry Barnes and David Bloor, ‘Relativism, Rationalism, Sociology of 
Knowledge’, in Rationality and Relativism, pp. 21-47. p. 39.
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formulations are susceptible to all of the critiisms that could be levelled at the 
empiricist-rationalist tradition.
That dualism, along with the antinomies and contradictions it generates, is itself
grounded in a deeper problem, that of the philosophical presuppositions of the
epistemological tradition. Charles Taylor, in his remarkable essay ‘Overcoming
Epistemology’, identifies ‘three anthropological beliefs’ underpinning that tradition.17
The first is the picture o f  the subject as ideally disengaged, that is free and 
rational to the extent that he has fully distinguished him self from his natural and 
social worlds, so that his identity is no longer to be defined in terms o f  what lies 
outside him in these worlds.18
This account has to be amended slightly if it is to be applied directly to Lukes’ account, 
but not to the extent that it loses its purchase. Some account needs to be taken of the fact 
that this version of naturalism seeks to shift the locus of rationality from the entirely 
desocialised individual person to encompass some aspects of social practice. 
Nevertheless, if the ideal of disengagement is taken to mean an absence of identifying 
entanglements in the specificities of culture, then disengagement in the naturalist 
context simply means participation in the core region of culture -  which is itself 
disengaged from its surroundings. This core, after all, is only related to a non-specific 
identity as a language user as such, with no significance for the meaning of identity 
beyond that. The particularity of an individual’s identity, on this score, is entirely a 
function of their entanglements and participation in the peripheral spheres of culture. 
This means that personal, individual, identity becomes entirely a matter of contingency. 
Given its dualism, which translates into the core-periphery distinction when the social 
or cultural is invoked, then, the ideal of rationality and disengagement is preserved with 
the shift to naturalism.
The second, which flows from [the first], is a punctual v iew  o f  the self, ideally 
ready qua free and rational to treat these worlds -  and even some features o f his 
own character -  instnunentally, as subject to change and re-ordering in the 
effort to secure the welfare o f  h im self and other like subjects.19
17 Charles Taylor, ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ in After Philosophy: End or 
Transformation, Kenneth Baynes et al. (eds.), MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1987.
18 Ibid. p. 471.
19 Ibid. p. 471.
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The idea of a core zone of rationality, with its introduction of cultural elements into a 
partially socialised conception of universal rationality, in the form of its theory of 
language and meaning, seeks to break from isolated individuals, and so it does not 
reduce to the punctual individual. However, it does provide for a secure base from 
which to approach the peripheral, contingent, zones in precisely the way Taylor 
describes. Selves can, as it were, withdraw into the core in order to subject peripheral 
contingencies to what ever changes they are able to bring about. Once again, by positing 
the idea of a rational core within culture, the naturalist reworking of the epistemological 
tradition preserves its fundamental features.
The third is the social consequences o f  the first two: an atomistic construal o f  
society as constituted by, or ultimately to be explained in terms o f  individual 
purpose [ ... which] takes shape in seventeenth century contract theories, but 
continues not only in their contemporary successors but also in many o f  the 
assumptions o f  contemporary liberalism and mainstream social science,20
As we have seen, Lukes’ conception of core rationality is not straightforwardly 
individualist in the sense that Taylor has in mind here. However, the affinities with 
contract theory remain. Take Rawls’ use of the veil of ignorance, for instance.21 Behind 
the veil, Rawls’ subjects are to all intents and purposes the same as Lukes’. They are 
stripped of all the peculiarities of their identities, and are only able to imagine 
themselves as occupying entirely indeterminate locations within the social structure. 
Rawls’ subjects are ideally disengaged and instrumental and they are involved in a 
project to regulate the peripheral zone of culture through contractually devised 
regulation.
The attempt to naturalise the universals of the epistemological tradition by projecting 
them into universal social relations such as language, then, is revealed as an attempt to 
naturalise the self-image of the age -  the ethical economic ideologeme. The qualitative 
identity of cultures now appeal's as the projection of that self-image, and related 
ideologemes. From a certain kind of relativistic perspective, this in itself would not pose 
any problem. Indeed, an implication of Winch’s view, and one affirmed by Lukes in the 
sphere of social theory, would appeal* to be that there is no alternative to doing this. 
However, while observations and qualitative assessments such as these are necessarily
20 Ibid. p. 471-2.
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mediated by theoretical perspectives, those perspectives are themselves subject to 
critique and to change. The real strengths of the relativist challenge to universalism are 
precisely due to its being engaged in such a process of perspectival transformation. At 
the forefront of these considerations is the anthropological vision of the ethical 
economy and its reification.
V. Critique of ideologeme and reification
Charles Taylor suggests that major streams of critical thinking are all concerned with 
dismantling the anthropological beliefs outlined above.22 What distinguishes the work of 
Hegel, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein and Nietzsche from the mainstream of traditional 
theory is their responses to the three anthropological beliefs in which traditional theory 
is grounded. All of these responses can be seen as critical and realist moves. None, 
however, are entirely successful, and the rival accounts of the modem which have been 
built on them continue to be drawn back into the problematics of traditional theory.
Critical theory responds to the first of Taylor’s anthropological beliefs by refusing the 
ideal of disengagement. Rival anthropologies stress the concrete, physio-biological and 
social determinations of personhood and identity. Foims of knowledge are seen as being 
grounded in definite relations with the social and natural environment in which persons 
are enmeshed or entangled. The second kind of response follows on from this. A 
technical-rational orientation cannot be adopted towards the world as a whole because 
of this conception of the embodiment of the knowing person. In the absence of a purely 
rational core, there is no secure base from which to approach the ‘outside’ world wholly 
instrumentally. Rather, the embodiment of rationality provides the necessary conditions 
under which an instrumental attitude can be adopted in relation to some limited aspects 
of the world. In addition, a strong sense of the intemality of knowledge to foims of life 
means that even modes of technical rationality can only be properly understood in their 
wider context, and in terms of their ongoing contribution to the reproduction and 
transformation of that form of life. It is the broader context which confers on any form 
of practical or technical rationality its real social significance and which imparts an 
encompassing sense of rationality, or indeed irrationality, to it. The third kind of
21 Rawls, John, A Theoiy o f Justice, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971
22 Taylor, ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ p. 473.
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response addresses the atomistic conception of the subject. Here, the theme of 
intersubjectivity comes to the fore, along with theories of language and communication. 
Not only have these aspects of the social been given greater prominence, linguistic 
theories have even been suggested as paradigms for social theory in general.
For the sake of the argument, only selected aspects of these critiques will be pursued 
here. What these arguments illustrate is the way that the relativist project is effectively 
an attempt to pursue a revised version of the naturalist project, but one which seeks to 
abandon the epistemological tradition so heavily implicated in the reproduction of 
ethical economic ideologemes. This has meant tackling the idea, central to the vision of 
reason dominated by the disengaged, or the effectively desocialised, individual, that the 
core is constituted by a more or less explicit form of proceduralism: that the social 
imaginary is grounded in the institutionalisation of given sets of rules and/or laws. It is 
precisely this idea that informs the model of language use in the core advanced by 
naturalism. It is also the primary object of critique for the later Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein’s general complaint about philosophy was that it produced what he called 
‘philosophical pictures’.23 Such pictures produce a curious form of misrepresentation, in 
which certain descriptive categories are transformed into explanatory ones. The 
transformation involves the abstraction of descriptive categories from their concrete 
milieu and their relocation in a fictitious social order (a scenario) which is then held up 
as an explanation for what has been described. The key to Wittgenstein’s account of this 
process is the distinction between two idioms. The first is the explanatory one in which 
people’s behaviour can be accounted for in terms of their following a rule, while the 
other is a descriptive one in which behaviour can be said to be in conformity with some 
rule.
The first idiom, that of rule following, presupposes that some actor knows about some 
rule or law and that they know how and when to follow it. This entails that the actor 
recognises some explicit requirement, and is able to put it into practice under the 
appropriate conditions. Take the example of riding a bicycle. One might say that there is 
a rule which goes as follows: Stop at a red light. The cyclist in question would have to
23 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1967.
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know that this rule applies under certain conditions, i.e. when riding along the road, and 
that the traffic lights at red imposes a requirement to come to a halt before the 
continuous white line drawn across the road immediately before the traffic lights. 
Whenever we see this happening we can say with some certainty that the rule has been 
followed. Now, this rule might be observed more often in the breach, nevertheless when 
it is followed it serves as a fairly self-contained explanation - the cyclist understood and 
acted so as to follow the rule.
No such implications can be inferred from any activity which only conforms to a rule. 
The most that can be said for it is that the activities in question embody some regularity, 
of which those involved may or may not be aware. In practice, there is no necessary 
relation between the two idioms. Following a rule does not necessarily result in 
behaviour which conforms to it, while conformity to some rule does not necessarily 
imply any intent to follow the rule. Take another example from cycling. One might say 
there is a rule which holds that if a cyclist leans over too far to one side they will fall off 
the bike altogether. This is a rule, in the familiar sense that one kind of event is 
preceded by another with sufficient regularity for there to be some kind of connection 
between the two. What is more, this rule is well known to anyone who has ridden a 
bike. However, when someone does fall off their bike it is only under the most unusual 
circumstances that they might do so as a result of following the rule. Their behaviour 
will conform to the rule but, by and large, the rule will not serve as an explanation for it.
In this instance, conformity to the rule explains nothing: it is simply a description of 
some empirical regularity. Of course, an explanation can be given, but that would be in 
an entirely different idiom, and it would be concerned with the conditions of possibility 
of such a regularity.24 An adequate, explanatory, account would be couched in terms of 
the distribution of weight and the balance of the cyclist, the consequences of forward 
momentum, the effects of gravity on mass, etc. Crucially, the apparent rule would be 
explained with reference to the causally efficacious mechanisms at work in this 
context.25 Wittgenstein, following Hume, was right to say that for this class of rules, the 
rule does not imply an explanation. As it happens, the same is true of all the laws
24 What follows here is not taken from Wittgenstein, but is the realist implication of 
his argument.
25 Bhaskar, Roy, A Realist Theory o f  Science.
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produced by the experimental sciences. It is only through the creation of the conditions 
under which empirical regularities are made to occur that scientists generate ‘rules’ to 
which the world can be made to conform.26 This requires so controlling conditions as to 
shut down the existing range of possibilities and allow for only a single outcome. To 
speak of the rule or law as possessing any autonomous validity in the absence of this 
context is to abstract from all the social and natural conditions of its occurrence.
Equally, similar* comments have to be made concerning the example of following a rule. 
While rule following can at times be a sufficient explanation for individual acts, its 
invocation cannot be the end of the matter. This is because accounting for an individual 
event in this way does not shed any light on the institution of the rule itself. That is, the 
rule which is followed needs to be explained in a way which is analogous to the rule 
which is conformed to. In order for the idea of rule following to be meaningful, the 
social practice must be a generalised social phenomenon. The example given above of 
the cyclist and the red lights involves the promulgation of the rule through the medium 
of the law. This in turn requires some account of the development of the modem state 
and of the wider social conditions under which such a rule can become a social reality.27 
Explaining this kind of rule following, then, involves historical and sociological 
accounts of the law-abiding citizen and their conditions of existence.
There are two important consequences that can be drawn from this. Firstly, invoking 
either kind of rule carries with it a considerable burden of implications concerning their 
conditions of existence. Rules, if they exist at all, have to be accounted for in terms of 
the social (and natural) mechanisms which generate them. Secondly, if the social world 
is historical all the way down, it is not rules all the way down. This qualifies Winch’s 
contention that different forms of social activity can be adequately explained with 
reference to different sets of rules. Rather, the idea of different forms of life has to be 
taken with absolute seriousness. What is needed is a language of form in which social 
forms can be invoked as real and efficacious.28
26 See the next chapter for a full discussion of the implications of this for a realist 
critique of universals.
27 Similar comments were made in the previous chapter with respect to claims of the 
universality of human rights.
28 This intimates an alternative form of naturalism to that pursued by Lukes, one 
more in keeping with Durkheim and pursued by Bhaskar. The next chapter will 
take this up more thoroughly.
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All of this is clearly intimated by Winch’s critique of the universalist conception of 
logic:
“One is inclined to think of the laws of logic as forming a given rigid structure
to which men try, with greater or less (but never complete) success, to make
what they say in their actual linguistic and social intercourse conform. One
thinks of propositions as something ethereal, which just because of their
ethereal, non-physical nature, can fit together more tightly than can be
conceived in the case of anything so grossly material as flesh and blood men
and their actions. In a sense one is right in this; for to treat of logical relations in
a formal systematic way is to think at a very high level of abstraction, in which
all the anomalies, imperfections and crudities which characterize men’s actual
intercourse which each other in society have been removed. But, like any
abstraction not recognized as such, this can be misleading. It may make one
forget that it is only from their roots in the actual flesh and blood intercourse
that those formal systems draw such life as they have; for the whole idea of a
logical relation is only possible by virtue of the sort of agreement between men
in their actions which is discussed by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical 
29Investigations.
Spelling out the implications of our ‘pictures’ of logic strongly reinforces Taylor’s 
account of the way in which modem universalism embodies a series of errors. Even 
explicit rules, genuinely followed in the course of social activity, ought not to be 
abstracted from their conditions of existence. Where this has happened, where 
philosophical pictures and reification have taken hold, our understanding of such 
abstract categories and of their relations to flesh and blood existence requires a 
thorough-going explanation of how this has occurred, as well as the ontological
• • 30restitution needed to make that explanation possible.
Now, it was noted earlier that the relativist project has been conceived in terms of the
construction of a conceptual bridge, a theoretical architecture which could span the gaps
between distinct cultures without the implications of the bridgehead argument. The
demands made of such a bridge are clearly considerable. In the first place, an abstract
and generalisable language is needed. Pursuing precisely this line of argument Bames
and Bloor argued that social relations can be referred to at some level in terms of
general categories that do not presuppose any specific relation between them:
hi all cases [the sociologist] will ask, for instance, if a belief is part of the 
routine cognitive and technical competences handed down horn generation to 
generation. Is it enjoined by the authorities of the society? Is it transmitted by
29 Winch, ‘The Idea of a Social Science’, Rationality, p. 11.
30 The phrase is Fredric Jameson’s Marxism and Form Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1972
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established institutions of socialization or supported by accepted agencies of
31social control? Is it bound up with patterns of vested interests?
This list of questions could be added to ad infinitum, with all of them couched in 
similarly general terms. They all use categories which, despite the specificity of their 
cultural origins, are held to have some kind of applicability to other societies regardless 
of the categorial distinctions used by members of that society. Considerations such as 
these are advanced as possible elements of the necessary conditions of given systems of 
beliefs and patterns of change. A similar position is implied in Robin Horton’s
32generalisations concerning diverse modes of thought . Horton argues that theoretical 
forms play largely similar roles in both African thought and Western Science, despite 
their very different contents. Both traditions have what he calls ‘theoretical’ aspects, i.e. 
conceptions of non-empirical reality: both use these entities to bring about a sense of 
order: both also develop on the basis of metaphorical translations of meanings from the 
familiar to the unfamiliar. Horton notes many other such similarities, all the while 
insisting on the real differences between the practices they entail. Horton explicitly uses 
general categories to disclose abstract similarities, implying that at this level of 
abstraction, a general language of human culture, thought, language and practice can be 
legitimately deployed without those abstractions doing violence to real cultural alterity.
The relativist case, then, can only be advanced on the basis of a general and abstract 
language of universals, which relates to all forms of human society. The real difficulty 
here is that modern social and anthropological theory is replete with highly abstract 
categories, e.g. ‘language’, ‘beliefs’, ‘system’ etc., which are applied generally but 
whose contents have largely been elaborated from theoretical reflection on modem 
foims. The relativist project, or a version of the strong sociological programme, can 
only be successful to the extent its general categories are, negatively, emptied of 
concrete contents and, positively, developed to allow a genuine openness to the 
diversity of forms of life. A sociology predicated on this presupposition would have to 
be concerned with the relations between general categories and the specificity of 
configurations of localised categories and relations and with investigating them as social 
mechanisms with their own dynamics. Where the illicit universalism of the modern
31 ‘Relativism, Rationalism, Sociology o f Knowledge’, Rationality and Relativism, 
p. 23
32 Horton, ‘African Traditional Thought and Western Science’, in Rationality
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tradition has insisted on tire necessity of certain forms and relations, relativism has to,
and despite itself often does, propound the general categorial elements of a
philosophical anthropology. Where it falls short, often deliberately so in a mistaken
rejection of philosophy, is in failing to take a systematic approach to the presuppositions
of the form of social life. In this spirit, Barnes and Bloor argued that
... relativism is essential to all those disciplines such as anthropology,
sociology, the history o f  institutions and ideas, and even cognitive psychology,
which account for the diversity o f  systems o f knowledge, their distribution and
the manner o f  their change. It is those who oppose relativism, and who grant
certain forms o f  knowledge a privileged status, who pose the real threat to a
33scientific understanding o f  knowledge and cognition.
Winch’s work is best understood as making a contribution to the philosophical
framework within which this project might be pursued by establishing a revised
philosophical anthropology. At the heart of his work was an attempt to conceptualise
what was specific to cultural forms, and what was so distinctive about his answer to this
was the particular inflection he gave to the linguistic turn. While he recognised that
there is an important distinction to be maintained between the discursive and non-
discursive dimensions of any form of life, he argued that both dimensions must be
brought under the categories of linguistic or quasi-linguistic activity.
“[...] there is 110 sharp break between behaviour which expresses discursive
ideas and that which does not; and that which does is sufficiently like that
which does to make it necessary to regard it as analogous to the other. So, even
where it would be unnatural to say that a given kind o f  social relation expresses
any ideas o f  a discursive nature, still it is closer to that general categoiy than it
34
is to that o f the interaction o f  physical forces.
Whilst making the distinction between these two dimensions, Winch retains a 
commitment to their being internally related aspects of a more or less unified social 
formation. That is to say, the realm of the cultural as a whole could be understood in its 
own terms, terms that derived from the sphere of meaning but were not reducible to it. 
In other words, Winch’s work can be read as an anticipation of the development of the 
relativist critique. The positive side of this critique would address the ethical economic, 
illicitly universalist, ‘pictures’ and their anthropological presuppositions currently 
dominating social theory, and it would be developed through a theoretical elaboration of
33 Barnes and Bloor, ‘Relativism, Rationalism, Sociology of Knowledge’, in 
Rationality and Relativism, pp. 21-22.
34 Winch, ‘The Idea of a Social Science, Rationality, p. 12.
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linguistic forms which would be able serve as a general ontology of broader social 
forms.
The full implications of these remarks will be taken up in the remaining chapters, which 
will attempt to show that Winch’s hopes for social science can be borne out. 
Meanwhile, it remains only to say that such hopes are evidence of a strong critical 
realist tendency in his work but that this linguistically-based anthropology of internal 
relations needs to be supplemented by further ontological considerations which disclose 
both necessary general categories and their formally possible configurations.
Winch’s assertion of the distinction between ‘behaviour which expresses discursive 
ideas’ and The interaction of physical forces’ is part of the hermeneutic attack on the 
claims for a social science modelled on the nomological natural sciences to have any 
reabpurchase on the social. At this point his work completely coincides with the idea of 
science as developed within critical realism, which shares this repudiation of such 
approaches. Where critical realism really advances the relativist project is in its explicit 
concern with ontology. Its approach generates a sufficiently broad framework which can 
encompass both social and natural forms, which is sufficiently open to formal diversity, 
and which provides a secure intellectual space in which both the historical emergence of 
new forms and the interpenetration of social and natural forms can be comprehended. 
However, the true significance of later developments in realism here, especially 
Bhaskar’s account of ir/realism, is that they provide precisely the hoped for general 
theory of linguistic and non-linguistic social forms.35 This in turn opens up the
intellectual space for the disclosure of specific categories and mechanisms and the
determination of the character of any given term, quality, facet, etc. as it is actually 
woven into the fabric of a given form of being.36
VI. Historicity in Taylor’s account of Instrumental Rationality.
The above section sought to illustrate how modern social theory is constituted by a dual 
dialectics. On the one hand there is the dialectics of ideology and utopia belonging to
35 See the next two chapters.
36 See also Bertell Oilman on internal relations Dialectical Investigations,
Routledge, London, 1993.
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theoretical Europism, represented here by the universalist and naturalist account of 
rationality. On the other hand there are the persistent tendencies towards realist critique 
and theoretical anti-Europism generated by the essential contradictions of Europic 
forms, represented here by attempts to consolidate ‘relativism’. What has been left out 
of this account, however, is any consideration of the non-discursive social forms in 
which this dual dialectic is embedded. This chapter will therefore be rounded off with 
an examination of the account of the relation between historically specific foims and 
transhistorical categories in Charles Taylor’s discussion of technical rationality. This 
will serve to demonstrate the need for a philosophical ontology of form to inform 
philosophical anthropology, showing how the relativist project has so far stopped 
considerably short of its stated aims as far as reflecting on modern foims is concerned.
At issue here has been the attempt to establishing a narrow and abstract concept of 
rationality as an objective and universal standard, against which stand conceptions of 
rationality as judgmental, practical, deliberative etc., all of which are skills acquired in 
social context and whose successful exercise is also context relative. Taylor puts it as 
follows:
Rationality involves more than avoiding inconsistency. What more is involved
comes out in the different judgements we make when we compare
incommensurable cultures and activities. These judgements take us beyond
merely formal criteria of rationality, and point us toward the human activities of
37articulation which give the value of rationality its sense.
The implications of this were noted above. Even the rationality of science and
technology, of the pursuit of a certain notion of objective knowledge, of the peculiar
abstract forms of such knowledge and the ways in which it is translated into social
practice, cannot be divorced from the wider context of the form of life in which science
flourishes. An understanding of its broader setting, and of the relation between it and
science, has to be much more firmly established before validity claims can be assessed.
This is in sharp contrast to the position adopted by Lukes.
Lukes argued that modern science is the result of the pursuit of objectivity. For Lukes 
this meant that “[...] judgements of cognitive superiority of later over earlier phases of 
science and of scientific over pre-scientific modes of thought are not and cannot be
37 Taylor,‘Rationality’, p. 105.
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relative to a particular conceptual or explanatory scheme.”38 That is to say, Lukes 
cannot imagine the possibility of a particular conceptual or explanatory scheme within 
which the cognitive superiority of each successive phase of science would not be 
recognised. He could not envisage the possibility of a worldview which could even 
sustain the space for a concerted debate on this matter. Indeed, the status of science is 
such that its cognitive claims, at least when they are taken independently of its social 
consequences and of the translation of what pass for scientific methods into the wider 
social world, are rarely subject to sustained criticism. Taylor’s views on the matter 
would appear' to lend credence to Lukes’ case, for despite his critique of epistemology, 
Taylor concedes the point. However, what distinguishes Taylor from Lukes is the way 
in which the latter grounds the claims for the superiority of science. Whereas Lukes 
regards science as the systematic extension of core rationality into social relations with 
nature, Taylor gives us an account of universalisation which does without the need for 
the core.
For Taylor, the emergence of science is a process of universalisation which generates 
the basis for its own claim to cognitive superiority. This, he insists, is because the 
technical payoff from modem science establishes it as a rival, and as a superior one at
on
that, to all other social activities that encompass a technical orientation. In a sense, 
Taylor side-steps the question of abstract cognitive superiority, shifting the ground of 
judgement to its technical operationalisation. This is both despite and because modem 
science has developed out of pre-modem practices through the characteristically modem 
processes through which institutions acquire functional specialisation. Modernisation 
theoiy, drawing on Durkheim’s account of modern social change, regarded pre-modern 
institutions as combining a multiplicity of given functions. The emergence of the 
political state and the market economy from the institutions of Feudalism, the parcelling 
out of the many functions of the family and household to these and other modern 
institutions, such as the school as site of education and the workplace as the location of 
production, is represented as the crystallisation of pre-existing functions and the 
shedding of other purposes. Modern science, on this view is not so much the emergence 
of a novel orientation to the world as a reduction to the narrow, technical-orientation 
function previously embodied in prior, poly-functional institutions.
38 Lukes, ‘Relativism in its Place’, p. 298. Lukes associates this view with Gellner.
39 Taylor, Charles, ‘Rationality’.
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Ordinarily, the functional dissimilarities between distinct activities means that they are, 
in Taylor’s use, ‘incommensurable’, i.e. subject to judgement by different standards. 
While no overall judgement of superiority is possible between say, different modem 
institutions, or between them and pre-modern ones, there is a sufficient functional 
overlap which means that, in a narrower respect, some judgement about relative efficacy 
can be made. By virtue of its highly developed technical capacity, modem science must 
be judged superior. Taylor reaches this conclusion by investigating something of a 
paradox. On the one hand, to speak of pre-scientific practices as melding the practical 
and the symbolic “might not be flatly untrue, but it is putting the point in ethnocentric 
language”: the distinction might have no meaning for different societies. However, 
“What we have here is not an antecedently accepted common criterion, but a facet of 
our activity [...] which remains implicit or unrecognized in earlier views, but which 
cannot be ignored once realized in practice”.40
What we have here is a distinctive account of universalisation, of the concrete 
institutionalisation of transhistorical, universal categories. The theoretical universalism 
suggested by proponents of relativism involved the defence of strictly abstract 
categories which could be applied to many, if not all societies. As the discussions of 
rationality suggested, such categories could be instantiated in actual concrete forms of 
life, but their configuration was a strictly historical and social matter. Abstract theory 
could not determine in advance what these forms might be. Taylor’s account of the 
emergence of science adds the idea of practical universalisation to that of theoretical 
universalism. This process is one through which the abstract categories of theoretical 
universalism become disentangled from the complex forms in which they would 
normally exist, a process which sees them newly instituted as simplified forms. The 
simple universal category is abstracted, as it were, from other categories, in a process of 
its concretisation, or what Taylor dubbed ‘realisation’. As a result of such a process, the 
historically specific institution becomes the embodiment of a universal facet, immanent 
within all forms of life.
40 Taylor, Charles, ‘Rationality’, p. 97 and 103.
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There is an interesting problem with all this, namely that Taylor appears to treat the 
development of science and technology as if it occurred in a realm wholly detached 
from the rest of the society. That is, he treats the evolution of ‘purely’ practical foims of 
knowledge as if they could have been abstracted from pre-existing institutions but not 
subsequently re-inscribed into new ones, or indeed into wider configurations of new 
institutions, relations, processes, etc. This produces a curiously one-sided vision of 
historical process, and an appropriate response to this would need to develop a stronger 
sense of the relations between science and technology and its broader social milieu. 
What is more, all this follows directly from Taylor’s own account of the development of 
critical theory. There are two ‘sides’ to this, both of which draw on that dimension of 
critical theory which flows from responses to the second anthropological belief of 
traditional epistemology. The thrust of that response was to deny the possibility of a 
purely technical orientation to the world. Such an orientation was deemed possible, but 
in a strictly limited way, and it was held to be made possible by the organisation of the 
concrete social formation in which rational capacities are embodied. The evolution of a 
scientific and technical orientation to the world, then, cannot be properly evaluated 
without reference back to its wider enabling conditions.
The second side to this question, however, has far reaching implications. Having 
acknowledged that the superiority of modern science and technology is a function of its 
practical consequences, some account needs to be taken of these, for the technical 
mediation of modem social formations is a social fact of enormous significance: 
modern modes of practical rationality are increasingly constitutive of the culture as a 
whole. There is ever greater social mediation by technological, and technically 
regulated, means, such that modernity has long been defined by its capacity to 
incorporate one invention after another on a mass scale. The implications of this are 
profound. Technical rationality, it was argued, was dependent 011 a background of 
concrete and complex social relations. However, that very background is undergoing a 
constant process of transformation as a consequence of the institution of this particular 
form of ‘purely’ technical rationality. Emerging from that process is a social world 
which increasingly resembles, or at least appears as, that underpinning traditional
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epistemology -  the reified and regulated world of atomised and desocialised 
individuals.41
As a novel social institution, then, modern practical rationality cannot be viewed simply 
in terms of its having been abstracted from pre-existing institutions such that it now 
stands on its own as the realisation, the concrete embodiment, of a pre-existing principle 
or facet of social life. It is instead a general feature of the institutional nexus of 
modernity, permeating the whole of the society, i.e. it is a contemporary universal. 
Referring to this as the realisation of something implicit in other forms of life is simply 
to confuse the transhistorical and historical.
Deploying the language of the ‘realisation’ of immanent categories reproduces precisely 
the ambiguous historicity of universal categories which typifies the Europic 
problematic. It does so in the context of a particular conception of historical process. 
While the relativist insistence on the historical specificity of cultural forms is an 
important step forward towards realist and critical theory, the sense of the historical 
seen here is rather peculiar: historical processes become manifestations of difference, 
but lack a sense of real change. History appeal’s here as the process whereby the abstract 
universals of a general anthropology assume various concrete configurations and 
reconfigurations. Historically specific categories appeal’ merely as the concrete forms in 
which those universals are embodied. Crucially, history adds nothing to anthropology, 
being reduced to the constellations of anthropological categories. It can be likened to a 
kaleidoscope in which the categories are tumbled about, falling into different patterns 
. with each turn.
Strikingly similar problems confronted Marx, who raises them in the introduction to the 
Grundrisse. Criticising the unreflective use of abstract universals in political economy, 
Marx makes two kinds of observation. The first questions the use of categories in 
isolation from one another by recognising that the categories of production, exchange, 
distribution and consumption are each moments of the other: the production of one
41 Adorno, Minina Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, Verso, London, 1981. 
Lulcacs ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’ in History and 
Class Consciousness \ Merlin, London, 1971.
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tiling always involves the consumption of another, and so on.42 This kind of discussion, 
however, is not simply an affirmation of the internal relations between general 
categories. Rather, it establishes such generalities as distinct perspectives on the whole 
under consideration, and it allows for the specificity of their configuration to be 
examined.43
Secondly, in a discussion of ‘labour5, Marx deploys almost exactly the same language 
as does Taylor:
for the first time, the point of departure of modem economics, namely the 
abstraction of the category labour, ‘labour as such’, labour pure and simple, 
becomes true in practice. The simplest abstraction, then, which modern 
economics places at the head of its discussions, and which expresses an 
immeasurably ancient relation valid in all forms of society, nevertheless 
achieves practical truth as an abstraction only as a category of the most modern 
society.44
The simple category of abstract labour, here, appeal's to have emerged out of the 
complex, organic and irrational forms of pre-capitalism. However, as Marx develops his 
theoiy of capital the ‘practical truth5 of transhistorical abstractions is securely grounded 
in a theory of appearances and ideology and historically emergence social relations, and 
which can be clearly distinguished from the kind of theory intimated by Taylor. In 
Capital, the capital relation, a defining relation of modernity for Marx, is indeed the 
institution of abstract labour, but it is in no sense at all the ‘realisation5 of a 
transhistorical category. It is, rather, a historically specific, emergent, abstract relation.45 
It is a strictly modern universal category. What is more, a proper understanding of this 
is needed in order to help account for the fact that such modem relations appear in 
transhistorical guise.
42 Karl Marx, Grnndrisse, Penguin, Harmondsworth and New Left Books, London, 
 ^ 1973. p. 99.
43 In other words, there is no a priori form, or rational conception, of how these 
categories are or should be organised. Categories acquire form and substance in 
the world, a world which may more or less rational and more or less complete.
44 Ibid. p. 105.
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VI. Conclusions.
The movement towards relativism is clearly one motivated by the illicit universalism of 
the Europic tradition. At the very centre of such debates are the anthropological 
presuppositions of theoretical Eurocentrism and the reification of its analytic 
abstractions. What we have, in effect, is a sustained critique of (aspects of) the ethical- 
economic ideologeme. However, the re-emergence of an illicit universalism in Taylor’s 
account of the ‘historical’ emergence of practical or scientific rationality demonstrates 
the depth and complexity of the problems involved in pulling away from the Europic 
problematic. That problematic remains as the highly efficacious context within which a 
sustainable sense of historicity has to be pursued. It also remains as the background 
whose implications have to be more adequately disclosed if there is to be any likelihood 
of tackling theoretical Eurocentrism. In the end, relativist projects have been unable to 
acquire adequate critical momentum, largely as a result of their persistent entanglement 
in Europic presuppositions. The two dialectics are at work in the rationality debates, and 
far* beyond. Yet the dialectics of traditional theory continually assert themselves as the 
more dominant force at work.
The least developed elements of the relativist project are the sociological and 
ontological. This leaves the pursuit of the positive dialectic of critical theory in need of 
both a theory of illicit universalism as a theory of the form of traditional, Europic 
discourse, and a theory of the form of modern social relations in which those discursive 
forms are embedded. These are the issues taken up in the final chapters. Bhaskar’s 
dialectical critical realism will be explored for just such a theory of illicit universalism, 
while Marx’s account of modern social forms, and his implicit ontology, can be 
understood as attempts to establish a sustainable sense of the socio-historical and a 
theory of illicit universals closely related to Bhaskar’s.
45 The full discussion of the nature of this relation has been put off until Chapter 8. 
This is because the full discussion of the nature of this universal relation requires 
significant theoretical preparation. See Chapters 6 and 7.
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I. Critical Realist development of theoretical anti-Eurocentrism.
The demands of historical reflexivity push critical-theoretical work in the direction of 
relativism. Equally, as discussed in the previous chapter, the impulse towards relativism 
is motivated by the problems of theoretical Eurocentrism, and this takes theory in a 
critical, realist, direction. However, these tendencies towards critical-theoretical anti- 
Eurocentrism are constrained by countervailing forces. The symptomatic consequences 
of this include the failure to connect the critiques of philosophical anthropology to the 
development of philosophical ontology, and the failure to locate a strong programme of 
the sociology of knowledge within the sociology of modernity. The relativist 
programme is notoriously ill-disposed to both and, as such, is itself an obstacle to 
further development. In order to see how these problems can be addressed, the critical 
theory of Eurocentrism being developed here now turns to the emergence of 
philosophical realism and its capacity to disclose the real forms of the theoretical 
categories and social relations of modernity.
Roy Bhaskar’s Critical Realism contains rich resources for critical-theoretical anti- 
Eurocentrism to draw on. The first, and the most obvious, is the philosophical ontology 
of realism, and its contrasting theory of ‘irrealism’. Bhaskar develops the latter in terms 
of ‘anthroporealism’, which is taken here to provide the core elements of a theory of 
illicit universalism. It will be recalled that Europism was previously discussed in terms 
of the illicit character of European universalisation.1 The two forms of Europic 
universalisation were given as Eurocentrism, i.e. illicit concrete universalisation, and 
Euromorphism, i.e. illicit abstract universalisation. Europic thought, as a whole, 
engenders a set of profound equivocations about the existence, identity, activity and 
change of other forms of society. Bhaskar’s ‘anthroporealism’ elaborates and clarifies 
the full complexity of these contradictions, equivocations, ambiguities etc.
In contrast to advocates of relativism, Bhaskar affirms the need to combine epistemic 
relativism with ontological realism. That is to say, social relations are practical as well
1 See Chapter Three.
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as meaningful, and that all forms of culture entail engagement with, and transformation 
of, natural forms of being. This is registered in Bhaskar’s work in terms of a distinction 
between the intransitive and transitive dimensions of philosophy which relate to those 
aspects of the world which are umnediated by culture, and those which are, respectively. 
In addition to providing a metaphysical basis for thinking about reality and its 
differentiation, Bhaskar’s ontology also grounds conceptions of real change, both 
natural and cultural, necessary for a genuine historical reflexivity and for a sense, of the 
socio-historical.
In sum, critical realism provides a framework within which the insights and intimations 
of relativism can be sustained and taken forward as part of the project of critical- 
theoretical anti-Eurocentrism.
In the following account of critical realism, and critical realist dialectics, Roy Bhaskar’s 
work will be presented as if it were a response to the problems of Eurocentric discourse 
and social formation. This is not to say that it was intended as such. Rather, Bhaskar’s 
critique is directed at the Western Tradition of philosophy, including that of the 
classical Greeks, and has its own universalist implications for human culture. While 
Bhaskar’s work is primarily concerned with philosophical ontology and emphasises the 
transhistorical dimensions of human existence, the present work places greater emphasis 
on the social and historical dimensions of critique, dealing with the philosophical 
implications of a more narrowly circumscribed modem tradition of political and social 
theory.
II. Bhaskar’s Critical Realism.
Summarising Bhaskar’s work is no easy matter. His work is often dense and 
complicated. The works on dialectic, Dialectic the Pulse o f Freedom and Plato Etc. can 
make particularly heavy demands on readers not familial' with philosophical jargon or 
with debates on key figures in the philosophical tradition such as Hegel or Marx. On the 
other hand, Bhaskar is attempting a demanding task. He is developing a kind of therapy 
for our troubled intellectual condition. In this he is building on the work of many before 
him, figures as diverse as Marx and Wittgenstein. Such therapy, if it is taken seriously, 
requires us to engage in the hard work of changing ourselves. It means having to
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jettison a great deal of our common sense and transforming our sense of being in the 
world from the inside. At the very least, if we take Bhaskar seriously we will recognise 
that there are fundamental problems with the ways in which we ordinarily understand 
our world, and that our theoretical and philosophical traditions tend to reproduce, rather 
than resolve, those problems.
There are two points to be made here. Firstly, in relation to the present work, Bhaskar’s 
main contribution to critical philosophy is his disclosure of the systematic anthropism, 
or anthroporealism, of the modern tradition of theory and philosophy. These terms are 
crucial for they refer to the constitutive contradictions embodied in this tradition. 
Bhaskar’s conception of anthroporealism, therefore, provides an account of the 
essential forms constituting the modem problematic. Secondly, as far as this tradition is 
concerned, this critique of anthropism can be readily interpreted as a critique of its 
Europism: Bhaskar’s concept of anthropic contradictions provides essential ingredients 
for a theory of Europic contradictions. There have been previous criticisms of the 
anthropocentrism of the Western tradition, such as Heidegger’s, and Bhaskar has 
developed this line of thinking so that it is now possible to generalise about the modem 
tradition as having systematically thought of both causes and things in anthropocentric 
and anthropomorphic ways.
The earlier discussion of ethnocentrism, just mentioned above, drew attention to its 
implicit, and illicit, universalism. Similarly, in the modem context, anthropealist 
contradictions are the contradictions of illicit universalism. That is to say, modernist 
anthropism is the root of its form of mis-representation. Its anthropic forms mean that it 
has illicitly represented itself in universalistic terms, and these forms have mediated the 
production of both Eurocentric concrete universals and Euromorphic abstract ones. The 
dialectics of critical realism provides a way of disclosing our place in the world, of 
decentring ourselves, and of thinking through these philosophical and theoretical 
problems so that we can come to a critical understanding of Eurocentrism.
The following critical realist account of Eurocentric and Euromorphic universalism will 
take in all three dimensions of critique: the immanent moment, which identifies the 
internal problems of some account of the world, usually in the form of contradictions; 
the omissive moment (metacritiquei), in which those problems are related back to what
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is lacking from that account; the explanatory moment (also called metacritique2), in 
which these absences are grounded in their broader social context, itself constituted by 
other contradictions and absences. These latter moments are called metacritiques 
because they look back on the original accounts of the world from a new metaphysical 
perspective, one with the resources needed to disclose the contradictions and absences 
of the older perspectives and the world they inhabit.2
The first moment, as presented here, has two main thrusts: one is an account of 
Bhaskar’s critique of the notions of causality implied by the idea of causal laws; the 
other is his somewhat broader critique of the analytic character of the modern 
problematic, which presents relations between things and/or between things and their 
qualities, in fixed, static terms. Many others, during the twentieth century, contributed 
to critiques of law and analytics. Much criticism focused on positions closely associated 
with positivism, with its naturalisation of knowledge and its negle.ct of the social and 
creative aspects of knowledge production. The converse problem, however, which 
received much less attention, was that this concern with the social character of 
knowledge of objects of knowledge was developed at the expense of the general nature 
of reality, i.e. ontology. While most theory acknowledged a distinction between the 
natural and the social, it proved impossible to sustain it. Either the social would end up 
being naturalised, i.e. illicitly reduced to the natural, or the natural would end up being 
socialised, i.e. illicitly reduced to the social. Bhaskar’s work shows that neither the 
social nor natural dimensions of knowledge can be adequately theorised unless both the 
distinctions and connections between the two dimensions can be sustained.
Whereas Bhaskar’s work in the area of immanent critique draws on much work done 
during the last century, it is with the move to metacritique that his positive contribution 
is to be found. His work offers a comprehensive philosophical view of the kinds of 
problems confronted in trying to understand the world using the categories we need to 
negotiate it. He argues, in effect, that our lived categories, and the ideas about the world 
they are used to communicate, are lacking in something essential. The world, as we
2 Metacritique, by disclosing absences within the world, also has normative 
implications. To the extent that it can not only disclose absences in the world, and 
also identify possible ways of overcoming them, it passes a negative judgement 
on that world.
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understand it, is troublingly incomplete. World views, as it were, are constituted by 
determinate absences.
Two ways of thinking about absences in knowledge can be distinguished. On the first, 
linear, view, absences can be recognised without having any serious implications for 
existing knowledge. This view treats the development of all kinds of knowledge as if it 
were like learning mathematics. To learn maths is to become skilled in a system by 
building up from its most basic units, such as ordinary numbers, and functions, such as 
addition and multiplication. These elements have to be mastered before more 
complicated functions, such as differential calculus, can be understood. Still yet more 
complicated functions, those of theoretical physics for instance, can be built on these, 
and so on. Ignorance, of developments at the outer fringes of mathematical inquiry, 
however, does not impinge on our abilities to use core elements. We can know that 
there are potentially enormous holes in our knowledge without having to question the 
things that we do know. This kind of absence is ‘external’, and it means that the growth 
of knowledge is linear and accumulative.
The second, dialectical, view of absences regards them as ‘internal’. Internal absences 
are constitutive of the knowledge we already have. Where this is the case, knowledge 
may still develop outwardly, but it will also have to develop inwardly. New knowledge 
will be about our existing knowledge, while acquiring new knowledge entails the 
transformation of what went before. Where there are internal absences, our existing 
language is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not necessary because it can and does 
change, because it has been different and will be so again. It is not sufficient because it 
does not contain all that we need. For all the richness of our existing understanding, 
there is a debilitating poverty about it.
Bhaskar’s work in philosophy, especially in ontology, transforms our language by 
enriching it. It seeks to do away with internal absences, to absent them through the 
disclosure, critique and transcendence of anthropism. For instance, it was pointed out 
before how Eurocentrism and Euromorphism systematically lead to equivocations and 
contradictions. Bhaskar discusses these problems in respect of the anthropocentrism and 
anthropomorphism of the modem tradition. On the one hand, there are anthropocentric, 
causal or functional, reductions of nature to human culture, along with their antinomy,
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i.e. the causal separation of the two realms. On the other hand, there are 
anthropomorphic identifications of nature in terms of human being, along with its 
antinomious position, the quasi- or non-being of alterity. Expressions of these positions 
would appear as rival, directly opposing, positions in philosophical debates, but their 
opposition is dialectical, arising from the common internal problems of ‘irrealism’, 
being constituted by errors and contradictions. The root source of such contradictions is 
the absence of any sustainable conception of the internal, and dynamic, relations 
between nature and culture.3
Anthropic contradictions, then, are grounded in the absence of, or in a failure to sustain, 
necessary categories and relations. The problems of philosophy, Bhaskar argues, are due 
to an inability to maintain the categories of ontological depth and ontological absence. 
By contrast, ‘realism* is the philosophical development of the full implications of these 
categories. The ontological status of these categories means that they relate to the most 
general features of our world and that they are needed so that we might speak 
adequately about it. They are the most general of abstract universals. In much the same 
way as we would say that if something exists then we must apply the categories of time 
and space to it, so we also have to say that if something exists we have to apply the 
categories of depth and absence to it. The implications of this for illicit universalism are 
this: illicit universals are generalities, categories and concepts constituted by the internal 
absence of necessary universals.
Briefly, the category of depth is used in recognition that our world extends beyond our 
senses. The foregoing has already been an illustration of the idea of depth. Meanings are 
constituted by structures, and internal absences, which are not immediately visible, but 
which make their effects felt as symptoms, e.g. whenever we encounter contradictions. 
Philosophy, however, is a form of depth inquiry, seeking to disclose what is to be found 
beneath the surface.
3 An analogy might be drawn between the ephemeral world of meaning and the 
more solid one of, say, bridges. A bridge can be built with a sufficiently strong 
structure for it to be viable under normal conditions. However, when tested by a 
high volume of traffic or unusual weather conditions underlying inadequacies 
might be revealed: some essential part of its structure is missing. Anthropism 
refers to the inner structures of meaning from which essential categories are
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Now meaning is not the only reality to be like this. Rather, all realities have depth and 
are therefore stratified, For example, we know of the macroscopic and the microscopic, 
of realms of being quite beyond our naked eyes to see. The colours of light we see are 
related to different wavelengths we cannot; there are more ‘colours’ than we can see. 
We inhabit a stratified world, and scientific investigation takes us through one layer 
after another, ever more deeply, into the hidden depths of the natural world. Depth 
investigations can disclose the inner structures of things, revealing what makes them 
what they are, and showing how their internal organisation accounts for their powers 
and liabilities.
Such ontological awareness has not always made itself felt in theories of knowledge, 
with serious consequences. A failure to appreciate the significance of ontological depth, 
for instance, has sustained the framing of the dominant conception of causal laws in 
terms of what we can experience, i.e. the empirical. Lacking depth realism, laws have 
embodied a form of irrealism, i.e. empirical realism. This is a classic example of 
modern anthropism, as we shall see in greater detail below.
Similar implications attend the category of absence. Bhaskar’s philosophical critique is 
relatively unusual in being self-consciously concerned with the internal absences of 
language and meaning.4 The processes of critique, for instance, work through the 
contradictions of a given way of understanding some part of the world, and then 
develop with explanations of those contradictions in terms of the absences they embody. 
For instance: when some account of the world is criticised for being ‘reductive’ it 
means that some categorial or causal collapse has been identified: categorially, the 
account is unable to sustain some distinction and relation; causally it lacks some 
structure or process. These absences are epistemic, and on their own would be sufficient 
grounds for recognising the importance of the category of absence. Epistemic change 
comes about by remedying such absences and reconfiguring categories and relations
missing. Anthropic conceptions can, like the bridge, be shown to have real limits 
beyond which they begin to fail.
4 Althusser’s, and Etienne Balibar’s, influence over the present work was 
mentioned in chapter two. Their account of Marx’s struggle with political 
economy makes it quite explicit that it entailed a process of conceptual 
transformation predicated on both immanent and omissive critiques. The latter 
presupposes tire disclosure of internal absences. Althusser and Balibar, Reading 
Capital, New Left Books, London, 1971.
158
Chapter 6: Anthropic Form o f Europic Universalism
accordingly. That is, real epistemic change means the transformation of categorial 
structures at the appropriate levels of depth.
Absences, however, are by no means confined to language; they are ontological in the 
sense of being internal to all forms of being. Where epistemic absences are an important 
condition of epistemic change, the significance of absence as an ontological category is 
that it is a precondition of all real change. Bhaskar contends that the modern tradition 
has defended, more or less explicitly, an ontology which denies the reality of absence. 
Traditionally, reality can or must be reduced to what is present, at the price of excluding 
any potential for the emergence of new forms of reality. This implies that reality has 
only one mode of being, one value or valence: this is ontological monovalence, e.g. 
empirical realism. Reductionism of this kind generates antinomies, e.g. those of 
idealism, so that the consequences of monovalence for the broader discursive field are 
forms of dualism. By contrast, Bhaskar defends the ubiquity of absence on the grounds 
that everything necessarily embodies some absence or other: both absences and 
presences are necessary. What is more, they are internally related features of any reality: 
there is no presence without absence.5 Given that reality has more than one mode of 
being, more than one value or valence, we have to speak of ontological polyvalence.
As ontological categories, absences are properties of concrete spatio-temporal 
processes. This means that there are two related inflections of the term needing to be 
kept in mind. Both abstract from ongoing change, with the first relating to some more or 
less hypostatised concrete state of affairs, and the other to the possibilities immanent 
within it.6 One might say the first abstracts synchronically, while the second does so 
diachronically. A synchronic perspective on absence is descriptive, revealing those 
elements which are missing from some state of affairs: anything from a lost key to 
mental illness to a form of life. Such absences could be at any level or strata of reality.
5 Bhaskar does make an argument for the ontological priority of absence, and the 
possibility that there could be absolute absence, nothingness. Dialectic, section I. 
So while presences depend on absences, in some absolute limit case, absence 
does not depend on presence. This land of philosophical argument is not relevant 
to the current work, except to the extent it informs aspects of Bhaskar’s work 
with which it takes exception.
6 The development of Bhaskar’s later work does not always sustain the 
implications of this. He uses his theory of real absences, at times, in ways which 
seem to presuppose meaningfulness of discussing concrete absences without any 
reference to the structure of possibilities in which they are embedded.
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The diachronic perspective on an absence tends to be more explanatory. It deals with 
non-occurrences, with failures to exercise some power, highlights the non-emergence of 
generative mechanisms, and so on. In all of these cases real absences are unrealised, 
blocked, possibilities. Accounting for synchronic absences entails a reference back to 
some diachronic, causal, absence. This will invoke either a real possibility that went 
unrealised, or it may invoke a deeper absence, that of the possibility itself, where a 
given absence will be explained in terms of the absence of its conditions of possibility.
The importance of ontological stratification and polyvalence to Bhaskar’s critique of 
anthropism is that they establish the perspectives from which metacritiquei can be 
developed. However, these valuable contributions to philosophy, cannot, as such, 
account for what is distinctive about Europism. These abstract categories lack any 
historical content, so tackling questions of Eurocentrism means asking more specific 
questions about the problems of modem theory and philosophy: why they take the 
forms they do; why contemporary anthropism, primarily, takes on the forms of 
abstractions which appear- in the guise of universalism. To do this means turning to 
explanatory critique or metacritique2 . This involves clarifying the distinction between a 
critical theoretical perspective on the world and traditional theory by casting the latter as 
‘praxiology’, i.e. uncovering the way that its cognitive concerns are fundamentally 
shaped by, more or less explicit, concerns with reproducing existing social relations.7
The idea of a critical theory, as it is pursued here, rests on an important distinction 
between categories which have a primarily practical significance and those which have 
a primarily epistemic function. Traditional theory, as opposed to critical theory, tends to 
preserve and develop the terms used in everyday practice.8 In building on these 
categories, and treating them as the essential givens of theoretical work, traditional 
theory produces results whose practical significance tends to be at least as great as its 
cognitive significance. Traditional theory therefore tends to be ‘praxiologicaT, i.e. to be 
theory for a given social practice, rather than being a theory o f that practice and possibly 
for a quite different practice. Critical theory reveals the ways that traditional theory is
7 Once again, Althusser and Balibar are relevant here. Althusser discusses critique 
in terms of the transformation of generalities belonging to the realm of ideology, 
or theoretical humanism, into those of Marxian science, or theoretical anti­
humanism.
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entangled in the problematic categories, practices and relations of modern life. It 
develops through the attempt to achieve theoretical distance from the problematic forms 
of contemporary life by resituating them in a broader theoretical, and metaphysical, 
framework, i.e. ‘theoretical anti-Eurocentrism;.
III. Critical Realism and Ontology.
To begin with a problem of metaphysics: Philosophical self-consistency requires a 
theory of philosophy.9 That is, a philosophy must both strive for a theory of itself, and 
to be consistent with that theory.10 It was suggested above that our ideas about the world 
are stratified, i.e. that they have hidden depths, that our concepts have both ostensive 
meaning and inner structures. It was also suggested that these hermeneutic depths are 
one of the real objects of philosophy. On this account, realist philosophical practice 
entails the disclosure and transformation of the inner structure of existing forms of 
meaning. Also, the results of any philosophy constitute a metaphysics: a provisional 
metatheoretical framework for inquiry, dealing with the most general categories, 
relations and forms; giving shape to inquiry and providing some of the criteria by which 
it should be judged,11
In common with other philosophies, realism aspires to provide a metaphysics, i.e. the 
metaphysics for realist inquiry. To those for whom metaphysics has only negative 
connotations, this might seem a surprising aspiration. All the more so because realism 
would claim to be a philosophy developed, initially at least, on the basis of the natural 
sciences. After all, the dominant portrayal of the relations between modern science and 
metaphysics has been as an opposition. There are, though, two different reasons for 
hostility towards the idea of metaphysics, each of which is related to a different 
conception of what metaphysics is: it either makes “claims concerning the nature of 
being” or claims for “the adequation of its categories to being”.12
8 See Horkheimer, Max, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ in Critical Theory,
Herder and Herder, New York, 1972.
9 ‘Philosophies as Ideologies of Science’ in Reclaiming Reality, Verso, London,
1989, p. 50.
10 This is a necessary, though insufficient, condition of philosophical rationality.
11 Ibid.
12 Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens, ‘An introduction to Badiou’s Thought’ in 
Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy, Continuum, London and 
New York, 2003, p. 18.
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The first meaning of metaphysics is of transcendental inquiry into what lies beyond 
either the realm of nature, or the bounds of possible experience.13 This might also be 
thought as inquiry into ultimata or the absolute nature of being. Outside theology, where 
religious experience remains, for some, a basis for speculation about the nature of god, 
secular thought has, by and large, readily abandoned this terrain.14 Kant, for instance, 
distinguished between the phenomenal realm, to which we have access via our senses, 
and the noumenal, to which we are denied any such access.15 In the absence of any 
connection to the empirical, arguments about any transcendental realm necessarily run 
into irresolvable problems.16 The phenomenal realm of experience, by contrast, was 
amenable to rational understanding, in forms such as logic, maths and science.
The second meaning of metaphysics is the somewhat more mundane notion of an 
inquiry into what we mean by being or existence. It is concerned with the categories and 
forms we need to understand the world. ‘Its subject matter is ... the most fundamental 
features of reality as it presents itself to us”.17 Kant’s transcendental idealism is just one 
form of inquiry into the presuppositions of empirical and theoretical knowledge, but for 
many, especially for the positivist tradition, the rise of the sciences was thought to do 
away with the need for any such inquiry. Science came to be understood as, in some 
sense, self-sufficient, even self-justifying, such that the rise of science meant the 
displacement, if not suppression, of metaphysics. The problem with this, though, is that 
abstaining from metaphysical inquiry only shields the presuppositions of the existing 
forms in which knowledge appears, including scientific knowledge, from critical 
scrutiny.
Bhaskar’s realism reasserts the need for a critical metaphysics. In that sense it returns to 
the kinds of problems Kant addressed. However, it also diverges from Kant in that it 
shifts the focus of inquiry in one vital respect. Kant’s conception of metaphysics was
13 See also Thomas Mautner, ‘Metaphysics’, The Penguin Dictionary o f  Philosophy,
Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1997. p. 351. Mautner’s distinction is useful but is 
slightly different to the one I am using here.
14 See, for instance, Archer et al, Transcendence: Realism and God, Routledge,
London, 2004.
15 Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, MacMillan, London, 1964.
16 Kant uses a form of dialectics to show up the fallacious character of such 
reasoning.
17 Brian Carr, Metaphysics: An introduction, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1987, p. 2.
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not ontological but epistemological, and was conceived as inquiry into the properties 
and nature of cognition. He rejected inquiry into the nature of being, where being is the 
condition of possibility of mind and knowledge. Taking up the Aristotelian form of 
metaphysics, Bhaskar’s philosophy of reality is ontological and is concerned with 
laying out the most general features of being. It is “an elaboration of what the world 
must be like prior to any scientific investigation of it and for any scientific attitude of
i o
behaviour to be possible.”
This expanded sense of metaphysics, away from one reduced to epistemology and 
towards an ontology which encompasses epistemology, has significant consequences 
for how the idea of a prior framework of presuppositions can be understood. Indeed, it 
drives inquiry towards the expanded conception of problematic discussed in earlier 
chapters. This is due, in part, to the different senses of the term ‘presuppositions’. The 
first, and most common, is that of logical entailment: the search for the rational 
presuppositions of a line of reasoning. However, it is also rational to say that activity 
has non-rational, i.e. practical and real, preconditions, e.g. knowing presupposes socio- 
historical culture, which presupposes the natural world, which presupposes being. 
Presuppositions, understood as preconditions, have many different locations and have to 
be understood in more than one way. Crucially, the realist concern with ontology does 
not imply any rejection of the realm of ideas as the location of presuppositions, though 
it does mean that the idea of ‘mind’ possessing fixed qualities and projecting fixed 
categories onto an external world has to be dispensed with. Instead, realism demands 
engaging in the essentially social and historical task of categorial inquiry into prior 
categories in at least three distinct locations: the historically generated categories of a 
given mode of thought; the equally historical categories of the social conditions of that 
thought; the general categories of the natural conditions of existence of that society. 
This, in turn, means that a metaphysics must have three meta-critical dimensions: a 
philosophical epistemology (an account of the general categories of thought); a 
philosophical anthropology (an account of the general categories of human social
18 Bhaskar, ‘Realism in the Natural Sciences’ in Reclaiming Reality, p. 12. It 
should, though, be pointed out that ontological realism is only one of three terms 
which characterise critical realism. The other two are epistemological relativism 
and judgemental rationality. The implications of relativism in this context are to 
ensure that the development of all knowledge, including ontology is understood 
in its historical context.
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existence); as well as a philosophical ontology (the account of the general categories of 
being).
From the perspective afforded by this expanded and differentiated sense of metaphysics, 
the characteristic mistake of the epistemological tradition was to collapse these three 
dimensions into a single one. This is a typically anthroporealist error. To the extent that 
knowledge is either informed by or implies such anthropism it will be constituted by the 
absence of a series of necessary distinctions: that between social and the natural forms 
of existence; between the transhistorical and the historical; between things and ideas. 
The result of failing to sustain either proper differentiation or a proper sense of 
historical dynamics is the naturalisation of ‘mind’, This, in turn, means that historically 
particular forms of thought are, first, misrepresented and then, secondly, identified as a 
universal form of thought. The metaphysical neglect of ontology within the European 
tradition illicitly universalises it. Such is the essentially philosophical dimension of the 
problems of Eurocentrism.
The realist response to this problem of metaphysics is the critical development of the 
major responses to the disintegration of the dominant philosophical tradition, including 
strands of relativism. These other developments all involved metaphysical 
developments, but the concentration 011 philosophical anthropology was too one-sided, a 
failing Bhaskar’s work is an attempt to redress.
The following account of Bhaskar’s work will not be straightforward exposition, for the 
aim here is to approach Bhaskar’s disclosure and critique of anthropism from the 
perspective of the critique of the illicit universalism of the modem tradition. For his 
part, Bhaskar makes scattered references to problems of illicit universality, but does not 
explicitly develop his account of anthroporealism in terms of illicit abstract and concrete 
universality. From the present perspective, the two moments of Bhaskar’s realist 
response to the problem of metaphysics within the modern European tradition are the 
initial elaboration of a realist theory of science and its subsequent dialecticisation. The 
following account of Bhaskar’s work, then, will be an elaboration of its implications 
from the perspective of Eurocentrism. As such, it will not proceed strictly 
chronologically, as it will treat the various moments of Bhaskar’s work as distinct, but 
consistent, perspectives on the same set of issues. A somewhat anachronistic reading of
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the earlier work, one which presupposes the later perspective, will be given here. In 
particular, the category of absence will be given a somewhat greater significance than it 
actually had in the earlier work.
Also, the take on the development of realism advanced here emphasises the twin 
critiques of positivism and analytics. Both positivism and analytics are limit positions of 
modem philosophy, and as such might be considered to be unrepresentative. What is 
more, both have come in for considerable criticism over the course of the last century or 
so, such that they might be thought to be no longer central to the contemporary 
problems of philosophy and social theory. However, they remain significant to the 
extent that large areas of contemporary thought have been developed against them, 
establishing them amongst the most significant points of reference and departure. More 
importantly, they also typify contemporary thought in that subsequent strands of 
thought have neither fully disclosed nor resolved the problems bequeathed to them by 
positivism and analytics. The modem tradition remains in thrall to these problems. 
From the perspective afforded by dialecticised critical realism, these problems are 
disclosed as irrealism, anthroporealism and illicit universalism, i.e. the defining 
structural features of theoretical Eurocentrism.
Turning first to the realist critique of positivism. Positivism developed as an 
epistemology throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Its influence was 
such that in the 1930s “few philosophers would have dissented from the view that 
science develops in a linear' or monistic fashion, so as to leave meaning and truth value 
unchanged, on the basis provided by common experience”.19 Both of these qualities of 
knowledge, its stability and its basis in experience, have since been the focus of distinct 
lines of attack on the positivist inheritance.
The unchanging character of knowledge is known as monism. In general, to speak of a 
monism is to infer a given unity. Monism in the theory of knowledge holds that 
knowledge has given and fixed characteristics. Pieces of knowledge are discovered in 
their fully developed form, while the concept of epistemic change is reduced to the 
accumulation of hitherto undiscovered pieces. For present purposes, this conception of
19 Bhaskar, ‘Feyerabend and Bachelard: Two Philosophies of Science’ in 
Reclaiming Reality\ p. 26.
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epistemic monism can be understood in terms of its treatment of absence, i.e. it has an 
external conception of absence. Externalising absences means that they cannot be 
understood as constituent of knowledge. Knowledge with no internal absences cannot 
be partial. Equally, it shuts the door on critical transformation.
The twentieth century saw the development of a concerted anti-monist strand of 
epistemology, with the most prominent contributors being Gaston Bachelard, Alexandre 
Koyre, Kail Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend. These writers 
drew attention to the historical phenomenon of theoretical change. They showed that, 
far from conforming to the positivist ideal of the gradual accumulation of knowledge, 
scientific theories were regularly challenged and superseded. The real pattern of 
scientific development involved protracted clashes between rival, often 
incommensurable, descriptions of reality. Under pressures such as these, knowledge 
came to be understood less in terms of its discovery and more in terms of its having 
been constructed through social, historical, processes.
Anti-monism fed into the development of relativism for various reasons. For instance, 
the core-periphery model of rational expansion, a central element of universalism, was 
displaced by a radically different conception of the dynamics of epistemic change.20 
This can be understood in terms of the changing status of the absences belonging to the 
field of knowledge, which could no longer be considered external. They had become 
internal, giving rise to complex and changing field of internally related meanings.
The other pillar of positivism is related to another aspect of universalism: the idea of a 
fixed standard of rationality: positivism holds that common, empirical, experience 
provides the only secure foundation on which to develop knowledge. This is a form of 
deductivism: knowledge developing through valid inferences from necessary premises. 
Thus we have a) certain knowledge and b) valid inferences. Modern deductivism has a 
long history, reaching back at least as far as Descartes’ early work, ‘Rules for the 
direction of the mind,’ written in the 1620s. Unlike Descartes, whose subjective Cogito 
was meant to provide foundational certainty, the positivist project involved the attempt 
to secure sense experiences as the unquestionable basis of all knowledge. It therefore
20 See chapter 4.
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developed as a brand of empiricism: the view that all knowledge is based on or derived 
from sense experience. What has been known as phenomenalism was developed to 
secure the link between experience and knowledge by identifying the sense experiences 
of blowing subjects with the known qualities of real objects. From Berkeley in the 
eighteenth century to Hempel in the twentieth, phenomenalists have either argued that 
things just are sense experiences, or that statements about sense experiences can be 
simply translated into statements about tilings. The former is an idealist form of 
empiricism, while the latter implies material object empiricism.21
The second influential strand of twentieth century thought, including work by N. R. 
Hanson, Steven Toulmin, Mary Hesse and Rom Harre, much of it strongly influenced 
by Wittgenstein, showed how scientific practice could not be understood in this way. 
Their investigations of theoretical practice revealed scientists to be engaged in 
developing theoretical objects which could not be reduced to empirical statements. 
Explanations of the world depended on the scientific imagination having a strictly non- 
empirical, non-deductive, dimension, without which scientific explanations would not 
get off the ground.22
While these developments undermined the pillars of positivism and universalism, both 
strands of thought gave rise to serious problems of their own. Theories of cognitive 
change have a tendency to theoreticism, a form of scientistic relativism. Where 
phenomenalism identifies senses with the world, theoreticism identifies theory with it, 
prompting the suggestion that the world must change as theories do. The world appeal's 
to be readily subsumed under the theories of the investigators, rather than theories 
emerging out of the resistance encountered by investigators in their dealings with the 
world. Without explicitly countering this tendency, by developing a philosophical 
defence of the autonomy, relative endurance and stability of real objects from scientific 
inquiry, there could be no rational grounds for deciding against a given theory or 
between different ones: what, if anything, were theoretical disputes really about? “More 
generally, the theorists of scientific change have found it difficult to reconcile the
21 Bhaskar, ‘Philosophies as ideologies of Science’, in Reclaiming Reality, p. 55.
22 Bhaskar, ‘Realism in the Natural Sciences’, in Reclaiming Reality, p. 12.
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phenomena of discontinuity with the seemingly progressive, cumulative character of 
scientific development, in which there is growth as well as change.”
Meanwhile, accounts of theoretical objects were beset by parallel difficulties concerning 
the status of non-empirical theoretical items. The problem here was that the abiding 
influence of empiricism meant that it could not be accepted that such items could both 
have cognitive validity and at the same time make some reference to some dimension of 
reality.24
These kinds of problems, internal contradictions, belong to the first moment of critique. 
To take matters further, however, is to move on to metacritique. Bhaskar’s initial move 
here was to argue that scientific discontinuity and change had seriously disturbing 
consequences for philosophy on the grounds that “their recognition snaps the privileged 
relations between subject and object which, in classical philosophy, uniquely ties 
thought to things.” 25 Once the phenomenalist tie is broken none of the forms of 
empiricism are able to survive.
Thought cannot now be viewed as a mechanical function of given objects (as in
empiricism); nor can the activity of creating subjects be regarded as endowing
the world with tilings (as in idealism); nor is any combination of the two
possible, hi short, it becomes necessary to distinguish clearly between the
unchanging real objects that exist outside the scientific process and changing
cognitive objects that are produced within science as a function of scientific
practice. Let me call the former intransitive and the latter transitive objects: the
theoretical space in which to talk about them will accordingly become the
intransitive and transitive dimensions respectively of the philosophy of 
Q 26 science.
By way of clarification it is worth noting how Bhaskar’s non-standard use of these 
terms relates to their more familiar grammatical use. Transitive verbs are those which 
take objects, which establish some relation between a subject and an object. For 
instance, "I write a letter’, or ‘She loves him’. Intransitive verbs take no such object, e.g. 
‘The bird flies,’ or ‘She suffers5. This distinction between the presence and absence of 
an active relation to another object can be used to distinguish between knowledge of 
things and their existence. The intransitive dimension of the philosophy of science
23 Bhaskar, ‘Realism in the Natural Sciences’, in Reclaiming Reality, p. 11.
24 Ibid. p. 12.
25 Bhaskar, ‘Feyerabend and Bachelard’, p. 26.
26 Ibid. pp. 26-27.
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refers to the sphere of objects referred to with the intransitive verbs ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’: 
‘there is a magnetic field. The objects of natural science must, in the first instance, be 
understood to exist independently of the scientist who seeks to know them. Objects in 
the transitive dimension, on the other hand, emerge from active relations between 
knowing human subjects and their objects of knowledge: ‘She has worked on the theory 
of gravity’. To speak about knowledge, then, often invokes a relation between the two 
dimensions: Knowledge (in the transitive dimension) is about something (in the 
intransitive dimension).
This distinction can be extended from philosophy of science to the more general 
philosophical anthropology. Thus, two dimensions are referred to when speaking of 
acting on the world: The intransitive dimension expresses the presupposition that there 
is a realm of nature which is both the condition of possibility of human action and 
which is subject to possible transformation by various kinds of work. As things become 
the objects of social activity (in the transitive dimension), so natural beings, natural 
processes and their outcomes (in the intransitive dimension) are altered and 
transformed.
Relations between the intransitive and transitive dimensions are asymmetrical: the 
existence of an intransitive dimension to being does not presuppose a transitive one, but 
the transitive dimension does presuppose the intransitive. The latter encompasses all 
those areas of existence which are unmediated by social existence: all those aspects of 
being which, in any given time or place, fall beyond the sphere of human culture. The 
transitive, by contrast, encompasses anything brought into being through social activity 
taking objects. It takes in all those things no longer wholly independent of human 
activity. It is the sum of the consequences of social mediation. The transitive dimension 
is, from the most general of perspectives, coextensive with the whole of human culture. 
Although Bhaskar does not use the term, one can speak of ‘transitivisation’ as the 
necessary consequence of human activity: the mediation of things, or their activities, or 
their effects by social activity, such that their pre-existing independence from social 
relations is lost. A general account of culture is ‘iterative transitivisation’, i.e. the
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successive ti'aiisformative mediation of previously intransitive things, activities and
•  * 9 7effects - including human individuals.
This philosophical anthropological concept of transitivisation always needs to be given 
socio-historical content and elaborated in terms of the cultural specificities of the forms 
it engenders. In the present context this means substantiating it in terms of the illicit 
universalisations and totalisations of Eurocentrism. The extent to which different 
cultures are independent of one another is always an open, historical, question. 
However, Europic universalisation expands and intensifies the extent to which pre- or 
non-modern cultural forms become dependent upon and mediated by European forms. 
Europic expansion is a process of intercultural transitivisation. What is more, there is 
considerable scope for translating Bhaskar- development of the transitive/intransitive 
distinction in respect of the natural sciences into a more general account of modem 
forms of universalisation.
Bhaskar fleshes out this distinction in his account of experimental activity and 
theoretical creativity, in the transitive dimension, and his elaboration of the ontology of
• 9 0transcendental or depth realism, in the intransitive dimension. In so doing he generates 
a theoretical account of a specifically modern mode of universalisation, and its 
accompanying form of universalism. While other modern social relations differ from 
those of science and technology, they nevertheless share significant formal 
characteristic. A realist theory of science, unintentionally, provides fundamental 
elements of a broader theory of modern social formation.
27 Iterative transitivisation can have serious consequences for how we understand 
science. On Bhaskar’s account, the real objects of science are intransitive, but 
iterative transitivisation raises the possibility of an increasing distance between a 
pure science concerned with intransitive objects and techniques concerned with 
increasingly mediated objects. Over time the distinction between discovery and 
invention can become blurred. Genetic modification, for instance, is at least as 
much a technology for mediating structures with a view to invention than it is a 
science of discovery.
Alternatively, the historical mediation of human evolution by the activity of the 
species, such that our social being has long been a condition of our biological 
development, indicates the irreducibility of human being to biology. Social 
existence is essentially polyvalent with respect to this distinction.
How that distinction develops within forms of social life, or what forms are 
generated by historically specific modes of transitivisation, are questions of the 
utmost significance.
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The development of this account of modem transitivisation can be approached from 
many directions, including the critique of empiricism. While empiricism is explicit in its 
reduction of knowledge to sense experience, it also implicitly reduces being to the level 
of the senses as well. The success of non-empirical explanations in the sciences, 
however, justifies depth ontology. Not only does reality extend beyond the senses, as 
Kant’s distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal suggests, but scientific 
and experimental inquiry create the conditions under which it is possible to develop 
theoretical knowledge of the non-empirical. The object realm of modern science is 
irreducible to the empirical. Rather, it encompasses non-empirical causal mechanisms 
embodied in enduring natural kinds. On this account, science presupposes that reality 
has a number of features: it is stratified, in more or less complex ways; it is structured, 
i.e. is not chaotic but organised; it is also differentiated, i.e. each mechanism, at each of 
its layers has its own specific structure.29 Now, once the concept of reality is elaborated 
in this way, through the generation of new ontological categories, it enriches the 
metaphysical framework within which the history of science can be reformulated. For 
instance, cognitive change no longer has to struggle with the idea that reality changes as 
theories do. Instead, cognitive change can be understood as coming about when 
scientists acquire knowledge of successively deep strata of each region of this non- 
empirical realm.30 While theoretical objects are developed or displaced (in the transitive 
dimension), their real objects endure (in the intransitive dimension).31
The most significant consequences of this is that neither the role ascribed to the 
scientific experiment by positivism in the production of knowledge, nor the form it 
ascribes to that knowledge, are any longer tenable. Science is not the ‘discovery’ of 
knowledge, nor does knowledge take the form of laws. Now, the positivist conception 
of knowledge has two aspects to it. Its theory of particular knowledge is of individual 
events sensed in experience. Our reception of these experiences is held to be entirely 
passive. The category of experience excludes any and all culturally mediated capacities, 
such as interpretation, theoretical creativity, or prior knowledge of any kind. 
Scientifically relevant experience is a strictly desocialised relation to the world. The
28 It should be noted that all general ontological categories, such as depth and 
structure, must be applicable to both cultural and non-cultural spheres.
29 Bhaskar, ‘Realism in the Natural Sciences’, in Reclaiming Reality, pp. 15-18.
30 Bhaskar, ‘Realism in the Natural Sciences’, in Reclaiming Reality, pp. 18-22.
31 Of course, real changes are profoundly interesting to science.
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positivist theory of general knowledge, on the other hand, is of empirical regularities, 
i.e. constant conjunctions of sensed events: Event A is followed by event B. This takes 
the form of ‘laws’: if A then B. Human relations to these conjunctions is merely to 
record their occurrence. Science, on this account, is the passive identification of 
naturally occurring empirical regularities.
The realist critique of law-like empirical regularities begins with the critique that 
constant conjunctions, in general, do not occur spontaneously. Rather they are co­
produced by scientists intervening in the activity of natural mechanisms. This 
intervention comes in the shape of the experiment, which produces constant 
conjunctions by imposing closed systems onto the operation of natural powers. Closure, 
in this context, means that the range of possible effects that the natural power can 
produce is reduced to just one. When the same mechanism operates naturally it will 
usually do so in systems whose range of possibilities is open, and where constant 
conjunctions will not occur. In open systems the results of natural tendencies are 
transfactually efficacious, i.e. their activity produces different empirical effects 
depending on the conditions under which they operate. Constant conjunctions, 
therefore, cannot provide sufficient grounds on which to make general knowledge 
claims, because they only indicate that a given mechanism is in operation. The realist 
conception of general knowledge is not of empirical regularity, but is instead of the 
causal structures which co-produce events.
One of the most significant problems with promulgating general knowledge in the form 
of empirical laws is that it cannot be legitimately universalised.34 In order for a 
regularity to be universal, the conditions of possibility it presupposes, including the 
closed system in which it occurs, must themselves be universal. This means that a claim 
for the universality of a law involves the universal projection of experimental closure 
into the world. The experiment is transfigured, such that it becomes the natural grounds 
of scientifically discovered laws. This is a striking form of anthropomorphism: the 
projection of culture into nature. It is a denial of transitivisation, and the consequent 
collapse of the distinction between transitive and intransitive dimensions. So while there
32 Bhaskar, ‘Philosophies as ideologies of Science’, in Reclaiming Realityt, p. 51.1
33 Bhaskar, Realist Theory> of Science, Verso, London, 1997. See chapter 1.
34 Realist Theory o f  Science, chapter 3.
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is an implicit conception of nature being distinct from culture, the idea of a natural law 
fails to sustain it.
This collapse between transitive and intransitive realms, between nature and culture is 
the most general form of anthropism. The additional value of a realist theory of science 
though is that it discloses the specific internal structure, i.e. the contradictory categorial 
form, of positivism’s illicit universalism.' Realist metacritique reveals positivism as a 
specific form of ‘irrealism’.
Irrealism is the realist theory of its opposites, i.e. the realist theory of structures of non­
realist meaning: forms of thought whose constitutive categories are characterised by 
internal absences, splits and collapses. From the realist perspective, the structural 
absences which constitute irrealist discourse are category errors, errors which come 
primarily in the forms of categorial fusions and fissions. Fusions arise when necessary 
distinctions are absent, where categorial distinctions are elided and categories are 
collapsed into one another. Examples include any form of reductionism, e.g. the 
reduction of social life to the activity of individuals at the expense of social relations 
and structures. Also, empirical realism, as we have seen, involves a reduction of the real 
to the empirical, at the expense of deeper causal structures. Each of these reductions 
gives rise to a discourse organised around a set of irrealist categories which, in turn, 
generate a set of intellectual problems. No attempts to solve the problems of that 
discourse will succeed unless that reduction is addressed.
Categorial fissions, on the other hand, involve splitting aspects of the world apart so that 
necessary connections or relations are absent. Examples here include the illicit granting 
of autonomy to some aspect of being. For instance, much individualistic social theory 
also presupposes individual autonomy.35 As previously discussed, the vision of ethical 
economic society, which encompasses the notion of essentially desocialised sovereign, 
autonomous, rational individuals, informs great swathes of modern political, legal,
35 As this example suggest, categorial fissions and fusions tend to reciprocate one 
another. See below for a more detailed discussion of the general structure of 
irrealisms.
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economic and social thought.36 It is on this basis that the modem imaginary appeal's as a 
complex of irrealist figures, or ideologemes.
IV. Illicit universalism and anthroporealism.
Illicit universalism, then, is a mode of irrealism, and its internal structures can be 
theorised in terms of its most basic fissions and fusions, i.e. those related to the 
contradictions of its implicit metaphysics. Every theory secretes philosophies with 
ontological, anthropological and epistemological dimensions. However, irrealisms do so 
in contradictory ways, collapsing these dimensions into one another, thereby failing to 
sustain the necessary distinctions, and/or failing to make the necessary connections 
between them. These fissions and fusions generate the dichotomies and ambiguities of 
anthroporealism, accounting for the antinomies of the modem tradition. The critique of 
anthroporealism “involves a Copemican Revolution in the strict sense of an anti- 
anthropocentric shift in our philosophical conception of the place of humanity in 
nature”.37
The disclosure of positivism’s anthropism is important because it minutely details many 
of the general characteristics of the broader modern tradition. This is because, as we 
have already seen, the vision of the world which positivism defends shares significant 
features with other, more explicitly sociological, visions. This final section will show 
how specifically modem anthropism, i.e. theoretical Europism, generates reification and 
fetishism, categories long associated with the ideology and praxiology of capital. It will 
show how the categories and forms of the realist critique of positivism and empiricism 
need to be generalised to the wider modem tradition. The wider implications of these 
issues will be taken up again in Chapter 8, when the general structures of modem 
universals are related to Marx’s account of capital.
36 See the previous chapter for a discussion of the Modern Imaginary. Also, see
Rajiv Bhargava’s Individualism for a thorough discussion of the different forms 
of individualism. Bhargava, Rajeev, Individualism in Social Science: forms and 
limits o f a methodology, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.
37 Bhaskar, ‘Realism in the Natural Sciences’, in Reclaiming Reality, p. 12.
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For now it remains to follow up the implications of positivism’s explicit denial of its 
own ontological presuppositions. Once it is accepted that any theoretical idiom has an 
internal categorial structure which constitutes its philosophical ‘presuppositions’, any 
theoretical claims to the contrary amount to a performative contradiction. The absence 
of any explicit conception of internal structure opens up the possibility, at the very least, 
of contradictions between this level of reality and that of the actuality of the idiom in 
which it is expressed. The realist critique of the modern tradition develops an account of 
the ramifications of such contradictions by disclosing their implicit ontological 
commitments, their implications for the structure of the tradition as a whole, and their 
wider effects.
Positivism’s theory of particular' knowledge held that it was restricted to events or states 
of affairs sensed in experience. The implicit ontology on which this view of knowledge 
depends on treating “what is apprehended in immediate sense experience as a fact 
constituting an atomistic event or state of affairs, existing independently of the human
t o  t
activity necessary for it, and hence a reification of facts”. To speak of reification in 
this context is not to say that facts should not be treated as things, for facts are indeed 
things. They are, however, ones produced by human activity, and they belong to the 
transitive world of scientific activity. This reification of facts occurs with the projection 
of their specifically social qualities onto the things and events of which they are 
accounts, i.e. the transitive-intransitive distinction collapses as transitive qualities are 
displaced into the intransitive dimension. Positivism achieves this by combining two 
reductive collapses. Firstly, sense experiences are run together with facts, and then facts 
are fused with empirical material objects. The first collapse occurs when the objects of 
science are reduced to facts stated in terms of sense of experience. The second takes 
place when such accounts are treated as, or as identical to, the objects to which they 
refer.39
The theory of general knowledge, meanwhile, is a form of fetishism, due to a parallel 
collapse of the transitive-intransitive distinction: the transfiguring of social causes as
38 Bhaskar, ‘Philosophies as ideologies of science’, in Reclaiming Reality, p. 52.
39 Ibid. p. 52.
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natural ones.40 In ordinary parlance, a fetish is a medium of human interaction, the 
efficacy of which depends on the fetish having been invested with intrinsic powers of its 
own. The human interaction is effective because the powers generated by social 
relations are displaced onto the fetish so that the interaction itself appears only as the 
context in which those powers are mobilised. The positivist form of general knowledge 
is that of constant conjmictions of events. Such conjimctions are represented as naturally 
occurring, but as has already been seen, they are the results of human intervention in 
natural processes: A follows B as a consequence of the social mediation of natural 
activity and/or its conditions. Positivism, regarding them as occurring quite 
independently of such mediation, fetishises the closed systems produced by scientists by 
projecting the social mediation and causal powers involved in experiments onto the 
sequence of ‘natural* events. So it is that fetishism parallels reification, but at a deeper 
level, that of the non-actual, where causal powers are displaced from the transitive to 
intransitive dimension, effectively eliminating transitive mediation and causality from 
view.
With the category errors of illicit naturalisation and illicit de-socialisation embodied in
reification and fetishism we have arrived at the ‘anthroporealism’ implicit in positivism.
This anthroporealist view of the world is generated by a series of exchanges through
which social and natural qualities, powers and effects are conflated and/or hidden. The
consequences of this anthroporealism are forms of symbolic representations of society
and nature. Not yet using the terminology of anthropism, Bhaskar asserted:
Now positivism can sustain neither the idea of an independent reality nor the 
idea of a socially produced science. Rather what happens is in a way quite 
extraordinary - for, as in the interests of a particular conception of philosophy, it 
allows a particular conception of knowledge of reality to inform and implicitly 
define the concept of reality known by science. These ideas become crossed, so 
that we have a naturalized science purchased at the expense of a humanized 
nature. And it is in this exchange (or transference), or rather in the 
philosophical crucible in which it occurs, that the most fateful ideological 
consequences of positivism are found.41
Anthroporealism, due to its forms of illicit universalisation, deploys reification and 
fetishism as the vehicles for humanising nature, for projecting the qualities and powers 
of social entities into nature. Social properties are desocialised, separated off from 
society, externalised. Meanwhile science is ‘naturalised’, but some care needs to be
40 Bhaskar, ‘Philosophies as ideologies of Science’, in Reclaiming Reality, p. 52-3.
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taken here. Naturalisation here should be understood negatively, as indicating that 
things are held to be independent of social activity and existence, i.e. as intransitive in 
Bhaskar’s terminology. Naturalisation should not be taken to mean that things are 
positively attributed with specifically natural qualities and powers. It is more consistent 
to speak in terms of the illicit transfers of things between the transitive and the 
intransitive dimensions, where the distinction between the two rests on the presence or 
absence of human mediation.
The reification of facts as things, for instance, strips them of their social and historical 
character, simply by asserting that they are passively received in ordinary experience. 
However, facts are not, as positivism holds, passively apprehended in sense experience, 
but instead depend on theories which organise our apprehension: they are potentialities 
of conceptual schemes which are actualised in discovery, sustained in practice and 
objectified in sense experience.42 They are possibilities inherent in cognitive structures, 
structures which are reproduced and transformed by social activity. They belong to the 
transitive dimension, being dependent on structured social mediation. Equally, their co­
production depends on the actualisation of unmediated, i.e. intransitive, natural powers.
Reification, then, is an effect of the failure to sustain the category of transftivisation, 
collapsing the distinction between transitivity and intransitivity. This generates a 
systematic ambivalence or equivocation over the distinctiveness of the real objects of 
social activity, for they are held to have a distinctive mode of existence, on the one 
hand, whilst they are imbued with social qualities, on the other.43 This produces the first 
of the two forms of anthroporealist exchange characteristic of irrealism: 
anthropomorphism. Reification projects social qualities into nature, illicitly naturalising 
and universalising them as it does so. This means that the sphere of philosophical 
anthropology is illicitly extended into the rest of nature becoming, in effect, an ontology 
or general form of being. Anthropomorphic reification illicitly universalises the 
anthropological conception it presupposes, and it does so at the expense of the
41 Bhaskar, ‘Philosophies as ideologies of Science’, in Reclaiming Reality, p. 51.
42 Bhaskar, ‘Philosophies as ideologies of Science’, in Reclaiming Reality, p. 60.
43 Bhaskar’s argument here is to say that reification engenders an equivocation over 
the independent existence of the objects of science. This is so only as a 
consequence of bringing something within the transitive dimension, which is to 
make a general attribution of social mediation.
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distinctiveness of philosophical ontology. It entails a double error, both misconceiving 
the sphere of social existence and conflating it with a misconceived non-social sphere.
It is, then, as the consequence of an extraordinary combination of exchanges and 
absences that social facts come to appear as if they belonged to an unchanging natural 
order. The absence of change brings us back to monism and the idea of knowledge as 
unchanging, to a conception of knowledge which externalises absence. This is strongly 
reinforced by atomism.44 In addition to concealing the structural depths of the social 
relations which engender them, the atomistic conception of facts conceals epistemic 
change, whether it .occurs at the level of what a given set of social relations produces or 
at the level of those relations themselves. On this basis, positivism treats knowledge as 
both desocialised and deprocessualised, while the effects of projecting this view of 
knowledge onto nature means that natural things are also abstracted from their temporal 
processes and rendered changeless.45
The anthropomorphic dimension of irrealism, then, is disclosed through this elaboration 
of the categorial structures of reification. Its most significant features are, firstly, a 
failure to sustain a distinction between the cultural and non-cultural and, secondly, to 
present that ambiguous world in terms of a generalised ontological destratification and 
deprocessualisation, i.e. within a metaphysics of ontological monovalence.46
The fetishism of closed systems is a manifestation of the second set of irrealist, 
anthroporealist, exchanges, i.e. those of anthropocentrism. The naturalisation of 
constant conjunctions is the moment of the naturalisation of science, while the fetishism 
of closed systems is the socialisation of nature. Once again, the intransitive-transitive 
distinction is mooted, only to be immediately negated. The two dimensions are run 
together, producing a new, anthropocentric, reality, by insinuating social causes into 
nature. Like reification, this involves a double collapse: the first is the collapse of the
44 Atomism means the absence of internal spaces, or absences. The exlernalisation 
of absence which accompanies atomism is vividly illustrated by the dualism of  
classical atomistic ontologies which reduce the world to indivisible atoms and tire 
void in which they move.
45 These implications of the absence of absence are not explicitly addressed in the 
early phase o f Bhaskar’s work.
46 Philosophies as ideologies of science, pp. 60-62.
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distinction between the exercise of causal powers and their realisation.47 The second is 
the fusion of natural and social causal powers.
The significance of all this for an understanding of theoretical Europism is that the illicit 
character of modem universalism can be understood in terms of anthroporealism. In this 
specific case, it attaches to the claims for the universality of scientific laws disclosed by 
experimental science. Any such laws have to be underpinned by the implicit ontology of 
closed systems. If constant conjunctions are natural and universal, then their conditions 
of possibility - closed systems - have also to be natural and universal. Equally, for laws 
to have applicability beyond the laboratory they have to be assumed to occur 
independently of scientific activity. This requires the desocialisation of socially closed 
systems and their implicit projection into nature as the hidden cause of its constant 
conjunctions, engendering equivocation over the independent exercise of causal powers. 
What is more, these claims for the universality of law-like regularities imply the 
concrete universalisation of socially generated closure. Social causes, in this case those 
of experimental science, are transformed into the reasons for the existence of natural 
laws and the reasons for how and why they operate. The anthropomorphism of the 
expressly universalistic idiom of the sciences and its philosophy illicitly generates a 
worldview in which its own social presuppositions are simultaneously desocialised and 
universalised and in which the natural world is represented as anticipating its own 
universal mediation by these same presuppositions.
It is only a short step from this account of the anthroporealist representation of the 
technical mediation of nature by science to an appreciation of the common sense 
underlying the ‘promethean’ attitude to the natural world characteristic of modernism.48
V. Conclusions.
The introductory remarks to this chapter drew attention to the place that critical realism 
has in addressing the problems evident in the development of conceptions of relativism. 
Critical realism is offered here as making a vital contribution to dealing with problems 
of historical reflexivity and as providing a theoretical conception of the forms of
47 Philosophies as ideologies of science, p. 62.
48 For a brief discussion of Marx and prometheanism see chapter 8.
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modern European social formation. The presentation of Bhaskar’s work was organised 
around the categories of anthroporealism and transitivisation, both of which are 
fundamental to an adequate understanding of the illicit universalism of the modem 
intellectual tradition.
The chapter has served a number of purposes. The idea of transitivisation, taking up 
Bhaskar’s distinction between the intransitive and transitive dimensions of philosophy, 
was developed here as a category of philosophical anthropology. It treats cultural 
activity as the human mediation of the effects and/or activities and/or structural 
transformation of that activity’s own conditions of possibility. The effect of such 
mediation is the transformation of those conditions and the production of cultural forms 
-  forms of life -  and their reproduction and transformation.
One effect of modem cultural activity is the production of anthroporealist universals, 
the dominant forms of meaning through which that activity is understood. Such 
universals are ‘chaotic’ conceptions and symbolic representations of transitivisation, 
whose reality they obscure through their structural forms. Specifically, transitivisation is 
systematically hidden from view, acting as a structural constraint on historical 
theoretical reflexivity.
As a philosophical term, pitched at a transhistorical level of generality, anthroporealism 
refers to any categorial error embodied in the treatment of nature and culture and which 
fails to sustain the intransitive/transitive distinction. These errors can be found in works 
belonging to very different traditions, e.g. Aristotle’s naturalisation of the Polis and 
Hobbes’ account of the state of nature. While it is appropriate to ask questions about 
how these writers imagined the extent of their potential audiences and their 
universalistic intent, they are certainly both read as universalists. From a critical 
perspective, they both produce anthropic universals. The cultural specificity of their 
work, however, renders them ethnocentric. Illicit universalism, i.e. anthroporealism, is 
always-already ethnocentric.
As the example of Hobbes suggests, then, the anthroporealism of the modern tradition 
has to be understood as a form of ethnocentrism. It is of its cultural time and place and 
bears all the marks of being so. Whether it is the naturalisation of modem science,
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experimental activity or its technological results, or whether it is the establishment of 
ethical economic visions of society as the human essence, these anthropic forms are 
embodied in the many and diverse disciplines of the modem tradition of European 
political and social thought. By drawing on Bhaskar*s work in this way, critical 
theoretical anti-Eurocentrism is able to disclose the structural form and implications of 
Europic thought and to point to its ubiquity as a constitutive feature of that tradition.
There is also a third reason for drawing on Bhaskar’s work. It has been noted how the 
realist category of transitivisation understands the production of cultural forms in terms 
of its mediation of (some of) its own preconditions. Having examined the forms of 
Europic thought it therefore remains to do the same for Europic social relations, i.e. to 
turn to the ‘practical5 dimension of Europic Dialectical Universalisation. This task 
involves a kind of ‘translation’ of anthropic illicit universals into a theoretical account 
of the non-discursive dimension of social relations. There are two steps to be taken here. 
The first fleshes out a further aspect of irrealist universalism in terms of analytics, and 
locates this within an overarching conception of dialectical process (Chapter 7). The 
second shows how the full account of anthropic contradictions is made concrete, as it 
were, in the capital relation, i.e. a necessary, if insufficient, universal of Europic social 
formation (Chapter 8).
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I. Introduction.
The critical-theoretical anti-Eurocentrism being elaborated here can be understood as a 
development of the critique of political economy from the perspective of its anthropic 
universalism. As discussed previously, realist critique is many faceted, involving the 
transformation of both theoretical form and the disclosure of the real forms of social 
relations. This chapter brings the latter to the fore, with its most significant step being 
the translation of the concept of anthropic universalism from the metacritique of irrealist 
theory into the philosophy and sociology of modernity. This entails utilising this 
specific concept of irrealist form, with its characteristic absences and contradictions and 
its systematically ambiguous relations between universality and particularity, to theorise 
social relations.
This theoretical translation establishes a formal homology between the two dimensions 
of social life. For his part, Bhaskar insists on an irreducibly hermeneutic dimension of 
social life, such that social relations are dependent on meaning. This chapter develops 
this internal relation by taking up Winch’s assertion that there is a fruitful analogy to be 
made between the spheres of meaning and social relations:1 social relations are not only 
dependent on meaning but are also meaning-like in their categorial structures. 
Addressing questions relating to the possible forms of social relations and 
contradictions in this way means that the chapter establishes ir/realism as a general 
conception of all social forms and thereby provides a framework for theorising modem 
social relations in terms of irrealist universals.
Approaching both Althusser’s and Marx’s work as a critique of the illicit universalism 
of modern forms of thought, the first section of this chapter returns to the theme of a 
problematic. The aim now is to show how Althusser, and Marx, relate the forms of 
modem universals to those of modem social relations. The second section provides a 
further elaboration of realist conceptions of form, with an examination of Bhaskar’s 
distinction between dialectics and analytics, approaching it on this occasion from the
1 See chapter 4.
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perspective of how it deals with alterity by establishing illicit modes of identity. The 
category errors of what Bhaskar calls the ‘analytic problematic’ are then treated as a 
dimension of the universalist problematic.2 Its principle feature is the illicit fixing of 
meanings at and between levels of generality, reinforcing anthroporealism. The 
‘analytic’ character of modem social relations is then established by drawing these ideas 
together. This establishes analytic relations as structural aspects of the dialectical 
processes of universalisation.
II. The Expanded Europic Problematic
Under the heading of a thoroughly problematic universalism, in the introductory 
chapter, I sketched out an initial, brief, conception of Eurocentrism as a process 
involving the theoretical and practical illicit universalisation of European categories. 
That process was said to be dialectical, in the double sense that it was both motivated by 
and constituted by contradictions. At that point, the primary locations of contradictions 
were said to be (i) in theory, the location of anthropic universal categories of thought 
and (ii) in social relations, the site of really abstract universals. Bringing these ideas 
together gives the following account of Eurocentrism: the dialectical universalisation of 
theoretical and real Europic abstractions under the sign of their universality.3
It is now possible to develop the account of this dialectic by relating the processes of 
Europic universalisation to the expanded conception of ‘problematic’ encompassing
2 This discussion of the concept of a Europic problematic takes up the earlier, more 
general account in previous chapters. That discussion established its theoretical 
expansion, moving it beyond its limited theoretical scope to encompass an 
ensemble of theory, practice and social relations. This chapter narrows its use, by 
focussing on the Europic problematic.
J This last aspect is informed by Bhaskar’s account of ‘dialectical universalisation’. 
Despite the existence o f some important problems associated with Bhaskar’s use 
of this concept, it is essential for an adequate understanding of Eurocentrism. 
Bhaskar’s use of the term is a global one, denoting the processes through which 
contradictions are absented as eudaimonia, the good life, is realised for the whole 
of humanity. The idea of a global process, however, is reserved here for the 
Europic dialectics of universalisation, those in which the internal contradictions 
specific to this from of life are preserved as they are extended ever more deeply 
into the social and natural worlds. One of the implications of Bhaskar’s use of 
dialectical universalism is that a contradiction-free mode of human existence, one 
he equates with the realisation of true social being, is an ever-present possibility. 
This ahistorical approach to historical possibility is discussed in an article by 
Alan Nom e and myself: Hostettler, Nick and Alan Nome, ‘Are Critical Realist 
Ethics Foundational’, Critical Realism: The Difference it Makes’, Justin 
Cruickshank (ed.), Routledge, London, 2003.
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theory, practice, relations and process as a whole. In addition, the theory of the Europic 
problematic has to be sufficiently open to allow for its complexity and development in 
space and time. This means that it must encompass the combined and uneven 
multiplicity of the modes of Europic universalisation and their articulations with one 
another.4
The concept of problematic, as developed by Althusser, is an important aspect of the 
critique of political economy and civil society. The critical theory of Eurocentrism, for 
its part, takes that critique in a particular direction, motivated largely by the problem of 
the forms of illicit universalism. That is to say, by approaching the critiques of political 
economy and civil society as critiques of their universalism, in the way that Bhaskar’s 
work was approached in the previous chapter, they can be understood as contributions 
to critical-theoretical anti-Eurocentrism. The concept of problematic, then, while not 
intended as such, can be readily appropriated to this end.
The disciplines, for whose theorisation the term problematic was originally intended, 
such as economics and politics, not to mention philosophy, have already been discussed 
as Eurocentric. Here they are treated as examples of Eurocentric praxiologies par 
excellence.5 These traditions are essential to the developing institutional capacities for 
the transformative mediation of the world in terms of ‘universal relations’. That is, they 
contribute to establishing, developing and universalising the really abstract relations of 
the Eurocentric social formation. Such forms of intellectual inquiry inform the activities 
through which the process of Europic universalisation are established and maintained: 
they are the dominant theoretical medium through which the modem world is shaped. 
Universalist praxiologies are the primary bearers of the Eurocentric visions of 
modernity and they mediate the imposition of Europic forms onto the world. They are a 
vital cognitive aspect of Europic transitivisation. In light of all this, Althusser’s work on 
the problematic can be treated as if it were dealing with Eurocentrism.
In its established use, problematic refers to the causes and effects of structured inquiries, 
and tends to refer to strictly theoretical or cognitive concerns. However, while its use
4 The overall effect of this is to push the concept of problematic in the direction of 
the concept of hegemony.
5 See immediately below for a discussion of ‘praxiology’.
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draws attention to the institution of, say, the intellectual boundaries of a given 
discipline, the full extent of the structures to which a rounded account of intellectual 
limits needs to refer are broader than a narrowly hermeneutic use suggests. In his study 
of Capital, Althusser disclosed the way political economy established ‘exchange value5 
as the dominant categoiy around which its inquiries revolved. Political economy also 
instituted limitations on that inquiry, providing an effective way of protecting the 
category. This meant that ‘exchange value5 could be preserved in its particular form, a 
form whose hidden qualities were disclosed by Marx’s critique. Political economy was 
revealed by Marx’s critique as the problematic of an illicitly naturalised ‘value5. From 
the vantage-point of a dialecticised critical realism, the category of ‘value5 is an 
anthropic universal, having been displaced from its proper, historically specific context 
and elevated onto the level of the transhistoric. This move illicitly universalises the 
socially specific category, such that ‘value5 appeal's to belong to the order of categories 
which are natural to the species. As a result, the range of questions and answers 
produced within the confines of political economy are delimited by the internal structure 
of the conception of its ‘master category.56
This account, as we have seen, provides only the first take on the concept of 
problematic: a theoretical discipline whose defining qualities are the internal absences 
embodied by its primary categorial register. The discipline is constituted as a 
problematic by virtue of its deep internal, structural, absences, and the categorial and 
conceptual effects it generates, effects which serve to protect the established master 
category. So, while the discipline is ostensibly an inquiry into the category, it actually 
functions to produce a series of defences for it, even defending the category against the 
practice of inquiry itself by blocking off the potential for critique.
We can see, then, how the first of Althusser’s contributions to the concept of 
problematic draws on the ontological categories of depth and absence, and how it is 
concerned with them in as much as they constitute internal limitations to ways of 
thinking. The second contribution pushes the concept of a problematic in the direction 
of social relations and social practice, a direction already indicated by Marx. The 
category ‘value5 is not simply produced by specifically intellectual work. Rather, it
6 The phrase is Quentin Skinner’s, commenting on politics as a discipline.
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arises with the institution of ‘economic’ social relations. What is more, its form of 
appearance is not generated by theoretical means, but can be accounted for in terms of 
social practices. ‘Value’ appeal’s in the form it does to those whom it mediates. It 
appeal’s to those engaged in commodity exchange as a natural quality of those 
commodities. The categories of political economy, then, have to be understood as being 
grounded in and sustained by social activities and relations.
As discussed earlier, it is by drawing these two dimensions of the problematic together 
that it becomes possible to speak of a concrete problematic which encompasses theory, 
practice and social relations. In effect, Althusser read Marx’s critique of political 
economic as the disclosure of the problematic in which the categorial form of the 
theoretical category of value is conjoined to the form of ‘economic’ social relations. 
Given what has already been said about political economy, it is clear that the concept of 
the problematic refers to the theory-practice ensemble of theoretical universals and 
universal social relations.
It remains now to take this expanded conception of problematic and to make it explicit 
how the processes of Europic dialectical universalisation constitute such a problematic. 
It has already been seen, in the previous chapter, how Bhaskar’s work on anthropism, 
monovalence and the absence of absence provide us with aspects of an account of the 
contradictions of Eurocentric and Euromorphic theory. This conception of anthropism 
provides a general theory of the internal theoretical structure of the universalist 
problematic. Now, two further contributions by Bhaskar can be drawn on to develop 
this conceptual expansion of ‘problematic’. The first is the conception of ‘praxiology’, 
which has been developed by Alan Norrie in respect of the law and legal practice.7 The 
second area is the translation of Bhaskar’s conception of the anthropic irrealist form of 
theory into a conception of the forms of social relations.
Praxiology, in general, refers to the kinds of knowledge which inform social practices 
and institutions and the reproduction of social relations. It also implies a relation 
between knowledge and practice where the former is shaped and distorted by its 
subordination to the latter. In respect of Eurocentrism, the purpose of social theory is,
7 Alan Norrie, ‘The Praxiology of Legal Judgement’, in Critical Realism: Essential 
Readings, Routledge, London, 1998, pp. 544-558.
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first and foremost, the reproduction and expansion of the ‘universals’ which are its 
dominant categories. The most developed example of a discipline as a praxiology is 
given in Marx’s critique of political economy. Marx showed how the central categories 
of political economy were either mystifying or false.8 The category of economic value 
appeal's as a universal when it is in fact the particular form taken by commodified 
wealth, or capital. All of the forms of value are forms of capital, and cannot be 
identified with wealth as such, because the form that wealth takes depends on the 
broader form of the society in question. Political economy is a praxiology because it is 
both functional to the expansion of a given social relation and because its theoretical 
form is ‘irrealist’. That is, in order to fulfil its practical function it is internally 
constituted by determinate contradictions: its theoretical anthropism is for  its social 
universalisation.
Also, due to this internal structure, praxiologies have a great deal of ideological 
flexibility. Their internal contradictions mean that they cannot provide any stable 
rational basis for any resolutions they advance for their own intellectual problems. 
Instead, solutions to problems are motivated and explained by external, namely practical 
matters related to the process in which they are embedded. The praxiologies of political 
economy, then, provide rationales and motivations to actors and they are the idiom in 
which practical measures are advanced.
The practical effects of praxiology, its consequences for shaping the world, bring us to 
the second use of Bhaskar’s work in theorising Eurocentrism.9 His conception of the 
anthropic contradictions of theory can be adapted to the concrete forms of the world 
structured by ‘universals’. That is, the social formation dominated by real abstractions 
can also be understood in terms of anthropic contradictions. Not only are the dominant 
theoretical categories of modem praxiologies anthropic, the social relations they 
mediate also embody this form of contradiction. The Europic problematic encompasses 
a double set of anthropic contradictions: one in the realm of theory, the other in the 
sphere of social relations.
8 Norman Geras, ‘Marx and the Critique of Political Economy’, in Ideology in 
Social Science: Readings in critical social theory, Robin Blackburn (ed.),
Fontana, 1972.
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Once again, Marx’s work provides the most valuable resources for developing this 
conception of modem universal social relations. For current purposes, I shall be 
drawing heavily on the account of Capital developed by Moishe Postone in Time, Labor 
and Social Domination,10 In that work, Postone argues that Marx provides us with an 
account of capital in terms of impersonal domination, which he, Postone, describes as 
‘social domination’. Social domination is the form of alienation peculiar to modern 
societies. It does not imply any absence of personal domination, far from it. But it 
means that as a result of this mode of Europic universalisation the relations of 
domination between, say, dominant and subaltern, develop in ways which are 
increasingly subject to the operation of impersonal, social, imperatives.
Read as an accoimt of Europic universalisation, this account of capital significantly 
enriches our understanding. Universalisation, firstly, is the expansion of originally 
European political and economic relations of social domination. It is a Eurocentric 
process of concrete universalisation, the production of a social ‘totality’ mediated by the 
homogeneous social relation of capital.11 Secondly, the development of this totality 
entails increasingly intense social demands. Both give rise to political struggles over the 
concrete foims of universalisation. Such struggles can be concerned with the speed and 
scale of the process itself, i.e. enforcing and resisting the extension of the capital- 
relation into areas of social and natural life, and with the distribution the various 
demands generated by the process, e.g. distributing levels of exploitation between 
classes, groups, centres and peripheries, regions, etc. These efforts to advance and 
respond to concrete universalisation shape the political terrain to which the more 
substantive connotations of Eurocentrism can be applied. Struggles over colonialism, 
for instance, being only one of the most obvious examples.
Social domination is abstract in more than one sense. It is abstract in that it is not 
personalised but is rather a general, social, force, i.e. it makes itself felt through the
9 Bhaskar has a well developed sense of the possible contradictions of social 
relations. He does not, however, use ‘anthropism’ in the same practical sense as it 
is being used here.
10 Postone, Moishe, Time, Labor and Social Domination, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1996.
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efficacy of the nature of social relations themselves, through their related practices. It is 
also abstract in the sense that economic value, the primary form of social domination, is 
a real abstraction. Capital gives rise to a world of commodities, objects which appeal* to 
possess the property of exchange value. Value, indeed, appeal’s as the universal property 
of human and natural products: all things appear as potential sources of profit. Marx, of 
course, discloses how things are not at all what they appeal* to be: this form of value is, 
in fact, neither a human universal, nor a property of things. Value appears as a universal 
as a function and/or effect of the social relations within which commodities are 
produced: it is a property of the social relations between commodity producers. 
Commodities only appear to have properties of their own because the properties of these 
particular social relations are displaced on to them. It is for this reason that value cannot 
be a universal property of human products. Rather, it is the displaced property of a 
specific social relation.
Crucially, this property of the social relation is an effect of its universalisation. It is the 
universalisation of commodity production which imposes an abstract identity on every 
concrete form of commodity producing labour; it is this socially produced universality 
that is displaced onto commodities and which appears as their intrinsic identity. It is 
therefore this form of universalisation which leads to the labour of all producers 
acquiring its dual character. On the one hand labour assumes a concrete form: a 
furniture porter moves sofas; a teacher teaches; a bricklayer lays bricks; an economist 
theorises, and so on. Each of these kinds of labour is intrinsically different from the 
others, so none can be put in the balance and weighed against another as they have 
nothing in common. In the absence of a common quality, a universal, there can be no 
common standard against which they can all be measured: they are incommensurable. 
This is so for any and every form of labour, regardless of which kind of society it 
belongs to. In a capitalist society, however, as well as being concrete, commodity 
producing labour becomes an instance of labour in the abstract, and as every instance of 
commodity producing labour is similarly abstract it is also identical to every other one. 
It is this abstract labour which appears as the value of commodities.
11 Postone argues that he follows Marx’s use of ‘totality’. The term is borrowed 
from idealist philosophy to refer to ‘a general whole that is substantially 
homogeneous’. Time, Labor and Social Domination p. 72.
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It is the mutual relation of commodity production which establishes the relation of 
identity between producers, as each kind of labour can be exchanged for every other 
land. As they cannot be identical in their concrete forms, their identity has nothing at all 
to do with concrete differences. Rather, concrete individuality is stripped away in a 
relation of purely abstract, universal, identity. Commodity producing labours are all 
identical simply because they produce commodities in the form of goods or services, 
which then stand in as proxies for those forms of labour. It is as proxies for the labour 
which produced them that commodities are, in their turn, treated as identical, i.e. can be 
exchanged for one another. Now that all forms of labour are identical they can, after all, 
be measured by a common standard, and the standard measure of this abstract form of 
labour is time. Qualitatively identical, labour varies only according to how long it takes 
to produce something.
This abstract form of labour is not a property of forms of concrete labour in isolation 
from one another, but only arises with the ongoing reproduction and expansion of 
relations of identity between concrete forms. This relation is mediated by commodity 
production and exchange, which means that commodities are also its ‘bearers’ or 
‘supports.’ The universal identity of labour is therefore embodied in all its proxies, i.e. 
in all forms of value, and in every aspect of capital. This means that social, impersonal, 
domination by capital is nothing other than domination by forms of value, or as we can 
now say, domination by abstract labour. Social domination comes about as this abstract 
character of labour develops a life of its own, as it were, through the imposition of 
impersonal imperatives. Not only is abstract labour' instantiated in all its concrete forms, 
it is also split off from and comes to dominate them. Social domination is the 
generalised domination of the concrete by a generalised abstract social relation.
The duality of abstract and concrete is a primary effect of Europic universalisation, and 
is continually reproduced by the social activities of its bearers. As such it is an intrinsic 
aspect of Europic universalisation and the Europic problematic. The universalisation of 
capital is one mode of Europic universalisation: it is a mode of transitivisation and 
engenders a form of life which is mediated, constituted and dominated by real 
abstraction. This can be understood, firstly, in terms of its analytic moments of identity. 
These can then be understood as being overarched by the, second, dialectical moment in 
which the absences and contradictions of analytics are universalised.
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III. The Analytics and Dialectics of Eurocentrism
Analytics is frequently contrasted with dialectics. Whereas the former is ostensibly 
concerned with the preservation of meanings attached to terms and with logical relations 
between them, dialectics deal with non-logical relations, change and contradiction. 
However, the problems associated with analytics do not arise so much from its narrowly 
epistemic character as from the displacement of what is properly only a moment in the 
process of knowing things onto those things themselves. Analytics becomes a problem 
when it overreaches itself, especially so when this highly circumscribed epistemic 
moment stands in for epistemology as a whole, and where the epistemology stands in 
for ontology.
Analytical principles, in and of themselves, need not imply any particular metaphysical 
commitments.12 However, it is easier said than done to maintain the strictly abstract 
character of principles, not least because principles only acquire their full meaning 
through their application. Once an ‘abstract’ principle is understood in relation to some 
part of the world, i.e. once it is applied to statements about the world, it becomes a 
moment of theoretical practice and is necessarily implicated in any philosophical 
questions such statements raise. While abstractions themselves might be neutral, they 
cannot be deployed neutrally.13 All of which, of course, demands the need for clarity 
about the metaphysical context in which they are used.
Bhaskar situates analytics by arguing that that all forms of reasoning must have their 
analytic moments, in which given meanings are preserved, but that all such moments 
have to be situated within an overarching dialectic of cognitive change. Reasoning is 
irreducible to the exercise of analytical logic, being ca dialectic of its analytical and 
dialectical moments’:
12 Collier, ‘Dialectic in Marxism and critical realism5, in Marxism and Critical 
Realism, Brown et al (eds.), Routledge, London, 2001.
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Dialectic can only achieve its full purchase in relation to its analytical antipode.
[...] From this standpoint [of dialectics], analytics expresses the ontology of 
stasis, and an implicit ideology of repression: that is to say, it assumes the shape 
of an unselfconscious legitimator normalizing past (and local) changes and 
unfreedoms, and denegating present and future (and general) ones.14
Failing to recognise the overarching dialectic, and extending analytical principles 
beyond their legitimate scope generates what Bhaskar calls the analytic problematic, 
whose consequences are manifest in a range of illicit statements of identities. The three 
principal forms this takes are type-type identity, token-token identity, type-token 
identity.15
A type is a general term, while a token is an instantiation of a type, a particular. For 
instance, the term Monarch is a type term, while a particular monarch, e.g. Elizabeth II, 
is a token. Type-type identity occurs when the use of a general term, such as monarchy, 
preserves its meaning. Individual instances of monarchy are treated as identical, with 
the implication of semantic consistency between uses of terms being some kind of ontic 
identity. The main effect of preserving a general definition of identity is to obscure the 
realities of difference. Token-token identities have the effect of obscuring real change. 
For instance, to identify the monarchy of Elizabeth II today with the monarchy of 
Elizabeth II fifty years ago is to negate any of the real changes that have occurred 
during that time: she both is and is not the same. Finally, the type-token identification of 
monarchy with Elizabeth II elevates the token to the very definition of the type. This 
presupposes that the generality has only one real mode of concrete existence, i.e. the 
one actualised by this monarch.
Take the terms ‘culture’, as a type, and ‘European’, as a token. The first type-type 
identification arises with the fixing of meaning for different uses of general terms, 
attributing essential meaning to the term and implying common and necessary qualities. 
This establishes a given meaning of culture as universal. Establishing a token-token 
identity, by speaking of European culture in the present and at some moment in the past 
or future as the same thing, does away with any possibility of real change. So doing 
confirms European culture as possessing a given essence. Type-token identification
13 For a detailed discussion of how this relates to the debates on universalism and 
relativism see chapter five.
14 Plato Etc., p. 135.
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elevates a given instance of European culture to the real definition of culture in general, 
establishing Europe as the very essence of what culture means.16
One further example can be usefully given here. Modern economic theory, as noted 
above, has identified wealth in terms of exchange value. However, exchange value, as 
Marx observes, is only one possible cultural manifestation of wealth. Yet the tradition 
of economics has systematically conflated the particular form of exchange value with 
the general category of wealth, making it possible to speak of all wealth as forms of 
exchange value.17 The illicit universalism of economics is sustained by all three modes 
of illicit identity: type-type identifications disregard the different cultural forms that 
wealth has taken historically; token-token identifications disregard changes to the forms 
assumed by capital; and of course it is the type-token identification that elevated capital 
to the transhistorically real form of wealth in the first place.
The analytics of the Europic problematic, then, can draw in a wide range of categories, 
dealing with the foim of society as a whole or with the form of one of its constituent 
relations. The systematic utilisation of these modes of identification generates a mode of 
thought with multiple moments of monovalence, i.e. it imposes stasis at the level of 
particulars, between the general and the particular and at the level of the general.
Given that it has to cope with these internal contradictions, and to develop a series of 
defences against the possibility of critiques, the analytic problematic is what Bhaskar 
calls a TINA compromise formation,18 As discussed below, both ideologies and 
praxiologies are TINA compromise formations. Where they take a European subject,
15 Dialectic, p. 191; Plato Etc., p. 138.
16 The strategy can be taken further, as the following quotation from Victor Hugo in 
anticipation of the Prussian siege of Paris shows. Paris = Europe = Civilisation.
“It is in Paris that the beating of Europe’s hear is felt. Paris is the city of 
cities. Paris is the city of men. There has been an Athens, there has been a Rome, 
and there is a Paris.... Is the nineteenth century to witness this frightful 
phenomenon? A nation fallen horn polity to barbarism, abolishing the city of 
nations; German extinguishing Paris.... Can you give this spectacle to tire world? 
Can you, Germans, become Vandals again; personify barbarism decapitating 
civilisation?... Paris, pushed to extremities; Paris supported by all France 
aroused, can conquer and will conquer; and you will have tried in vain this course 
of action which already revolts the world.”
The Fall o f  Paris: The Siege and the Commune 1870-71 by Alistair Horne, 
MacMillan, 1965, p. 73.
17 See the next chapter for a thorough examination of the Europic character of value.
18 TINA: There Is No Alternative.
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and conform to the general structures of the analytic problematic, their anthroporealism 
acquires a specific and distinctive character: such analytics, and their related dynamics, 
become those of the Europic problematic and of Imaginary Dialectical Universalisation, 
and they can be accounted for in terms of theoretical projections of visions of Europe 
onto the different moments of the problematic. The necessary response to the problems 
of the analytic problematic is dialectics, ontologically, epistemically and socio- 
historically.
Within ontology, the dialectical alternative is to establish the opposite principle, that of 
non-identity, between these various moments, allowing for both real differences and 
real change. It also has consequences for how type terms, such as the transhistorical 
generalities of philosophical anthropology are understood. They should be understood 
to be dealing with formal possibilities, in the way that the theory of irrealist category 
errors does. This gives them the flexibility and opemiess to encompass known 
differences and changes in concrete realities, and also to be able to adapt to future ones.
This can be illustrated, for instance, with reference to the nature of epistemic change. 
The attempt to reduce knowledge to analytic statements falsely abstracts from the social 
conditions under which statements of any land are produced, reproduced, and 
transformed.19
From the most elementary to the most recondite, analytical reasoning is entirely
dependent upon the process of transformative negation necessary to ascertain, in
an open-ended hermeneutic, ‘what x means’ or when two instances of A are to
20count as the same. Such hermeneutics is a constant.
The transformative negation referred to here is the making of necessary changes to 
things to establish the existence of the non-identities, i.e. the real difference, needed to 
contrast with the relevant identity. Also, given the internality of absence to knowledge 
discussed earlier, epistemic processes involve real cognitive changes, often produced 
through dialectical processes in which existing contradictions are removed. These 
dialectical processes overarch analytic moments in the sense that meanings are 
preserved for as long as necessary, but once a new meaning is established the old ones
19 See the discussion in chapter five on relativism.
20 Dialectic, p. 190.
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are discarded. Analytic moments of this kind are akin to the rungs of a ladder which are 
dropped away once they have been used.
Of course, the theoretical problematic of a political or social science discipline does not 
conform to the good dialectics of cognitive progress. Rather, it conforms to the bad 
dialectics of the analytical problematic as it preserves its master categoiy. This was 
clearly seen in the discussion of Imaginary Dialectical Universalisation, What is most 
interesting though, is that the theory of the theoretical dimension of the problematic can 
be translated into an account of its practical and relational moment.
The capital relation comes into being as a peculiar social form, whose peculiarity rests 
on the fact that an abstract category has become a social reality. The institution, i.e. 
production and reproduction, of a really abstract relation is the institution of a set of 
analytic identities. Under any other conditions such identifications would not exist. 
Ordinarily, to speak of labour in the abstract would be to speak theoretically at one of 
two levels of generality: the general cultural one at which the social activities are related 
to the production and reproduction of wealth; the culturally specific forms of activity 
this might take.
In either case, the abstraction is strictly theoretical, not real. Also, the category of social 
labour would be a complex one, involving a host of relations to other categories of 
social being. There would be no ‘labour in itself, only labour as an aspect of the rich 
sensual quality of concrete social activity. To speak of labour' under these conditions 
would not involve reification. However, this is not the case with the capital relation. 
Here, an abstract categoiy of labour has become a social relation. The complexity of 
other forms of labour, deeply embedded in concrete forms, is left behind and this 
abstract category is instituted in all its simplicity as labour as such.
Now, being a simple category it is both the general form of labour as well as its 
individual instances: there is no longer any distinction to be made between these levels 
of generality. It is, therefore, the abstract and simple character of this relation that 
accounts for the analytic moments of capital: those in which commodity producing 
labour establishes social relations in the form of identity-relations. Crucially, these 
identity-relations are not semantic. Rather, they are the (socially and historically) real
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identities between instances and forms.21 It was seen above how the analytic 
problematic involved the collapses of three kinds of distinction, i.e. those between token 
and token, token and type, type and type. Here, however, to avoid any confusion with 
the semantic references of ‘token’ and ‘type’ the point can be made clearer by speaking 
of ‘instances’ rather than ‘tokens’ and of the ‘form’ rather than the ‘type’. In this case 
the generality is commodity producing labour, while its instances are each of individual 
occurrences. This makes it possible to speak of the following moments of identity:
1. Instance-instance (token-token) identity.
At the level of relations between instances, each instance of abstract labour is identical 
to every other one, as the capital relation confers this identity on all concrete forms of 
labour. It should be noted, however, that the duality of commodity producing labour as 
both abstract and concrete means that there is also instance-instance non-identity as, 
concretely, each instance of labour is differentiated from every other. The duality of 
commodity producing labour is therefore a duality of instance-instance identity and 
non-identity, or alterity.
2. Instance-form (token-type) identity.
As far as the relations between individual instances and general form are concerned the 
usual distinction is collapsed. The simple abstract category is both form and instance. 
The social form, commodity producing labour, has only one kind of instantiation. Still, 
the duality of labour' means that here too there is also a duality of instance-fonn identity 
and non-identity. Concretely, the ensemble of commodity producing labour can take on 
many and varied configurations.
3. Form-form identity.
Finally, as the social form is a simple, rather than complex category, it lacks the internal 
space, as it were, required for internal differentiation or real change. Its categorial 
simplicity means that its form is strictly singular and that its nature is essentially static 
and fixed over time and space. Once again, though, the duality of identity and non­
identity is preserved. While commodity producing labour retains its abstract form over 
time, its concrete configurations, the global ensemble of concrete labour within the
21 Being ‘identical to’ means having a common identity, while being ‘identical 
with’ means being the same thing as another tiling.
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social formation, has a complex and differential temporality. The abstract relational 
qualities are, as it were, ahistorical within the epoch they define. They constitute a fixed 
dimension around which the concrete is continually reconfigured.
On all three counts, then, the socio-historical relation is ‘analytic.’ It is this simple, 
abstract and analytic relation that makes it possible to speak of the social mediation by 
capital in terms of the irrealist category of ‘totality’.
The analogy between the characteristics of the narrowly conceived theoretical aspect of 
the analytic problematic and the qualities of its relational dimension can be developed 
further still. In parallel with its significance for semantics, the analytic characteristics of 
social relations similarly imply a series of real categorial collapses and closures. That is 
to say, the social processes which establish these analytic relations also entail the 
production of real absences and contradictions characteristic of the dialectical processes 
of discursive development. For instance, where the analytic problematic establishes 
illicit universals, foreclosing on absence, depth and real change, the relations of capital 
are tendentially universalising and are oriented towards shutting down historical 
alternatives. The ultimate ‘goal’ or ‘telos’ of universal capital, for instance, is a world in 
which alternative forms of wealth are eliminated. The ‘project’ of capital is to reproduce 
the erroneous categorial forms of political economy, but as socio-historical realities.
There is also a connection to be made between this ahistorical, illicitly universalist, 
conception of wealth and the universalising expansion of capital. The conceptual 
conflation of transhistorical with historically specific categories appears as a 
prefiguration of the realisation of the historical project which is practically oriented 
towards achieving the actual eradication of that distinction. The conceptual subsumption 
of the analytic problematic is directly analogous to the real subsumption of social 
wealth by the commodity form.
The internal relations between these analogous forms can also be developed. Social 
domination, the institution of a totality of real abstractions and impersonal imperatives, 
is a consequence of mediating society and nature by the abstract human category of 
labour. This transfiguration of a category of human activity into a social relation 
projects the natural human quality into the domain of social history. Conversely, it then
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seeks to establish this as a natural feature of social existence. This is an 
anthropomorphisation of cultural life. The scientific, technical and commercial 
penetration of nature insinuates human causes into nature, while the mediation of social 
relations by things desocialises the inner causes of social life. This is a form of 
anthropocentrism of social existence. Against this, the normal, desirable, state of affairs 
is for people to make things because they are useful to them, because they contribute to 
and enhance life. However, capitalism alienates individuals, subjecting them to the 
demands of their own creations. Socially dominated individuals are not only 
subordinated to the things they make, they are also subject to them as bearers of 
abstractions. They create a world constituted by an inverse hierarchy, with abstractions 
at the top, things in the middle and people at the bottom. Social domination, then, 
embodies the anthropic forms of illicit identification and constitutes a set of internal 
contradictions of social existence.
Historically, the universalisation of capital is of course a highly complex process, or set 
of processes. While the institution of analytic identities is one of its defining features, it 
also involves the relations between the various moments of analytic identity and non­
identity: the problematic of capital involves more than simply establishing its analytic 
universal. The latter requires, as a condition of its own possibility, the establishment and 
maintenance of the dominance of analytic identity over non-identity. From the 
perspective of capital, that is, the non-identity relations between concrete things, and 
between persons, should be functionally reduced to the requirements of identity 
relations. Capital engenders pressures to render the concrete forms and configurations of 
production, exchange, distribution and consumption entirely consistent with the further 
expansion of capital. However, this is the source of further contradictions within the 
problematic of value and generates its needs to develop defensive mechanisms and 
strategies. Broadly speaking, the development of these mechanisms and strategies and 
their exercise, along with resistance to them, fall under the category of hegemonic 
struggles. Hegemony is the terrain on which projects of universalisation are pursued and 
contested, on which struggles over the nature and fact of universalisation are fought out, 
again very broadly, on three fronts: the subsumption of pre-/non-capitalist fonns of 
production; the re-configuration of capitalist production; the curtailment of post- 
capitalist fonns. It is also, as discussed in previous chapters, the tenain of struggles over 
the institution of visions of the ethical economy.
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IV, The Europic Problematic
The concept of the Europic problematic, as it emerges in these pages, develops through 
a critical realist critique of modem universals. This chapter has shown how the 
categorial structures of irrealist discourse, notably those of anthropism, the analytic 
problematic and dialectic all have their analogies in the forms of modem social relations 
and processes. This has been demonstrated by taking the idea of the analytic 
problematic, as developed by Bhaskar, and the broader idea of the problematic as 
intimated by Althusser, and drawing them together with a conception of the dialectical 
universalisation of capital.
This, conception of the Europic problematic situates its more narrowly conceived 
theoretical dimension within a wider account of a practical problem-solution set. On this 
account it becomes an ensemble of (i) praxiologically mediated practices which are 
oriented to the (ii) reproduction and expansion of abstract universal social relations 
necessitating (iii) hegemonic struggles over projects of universalisation which (iv) 
unevenly combine a multiplicity of related dialectical processes.
The connections between the theoretical discourse of Europic universalism and social 
formation are two-fold. On the one hand we have the praxiological mediation of social 
practice. Universalist discourses are oriented towards the objective transfiguration of 
their master categories by instituting them as abstract social relations. This connection 
between social theory and social formation is exemplified by the development of the 
capital relation. That is, the praxiology of political economy, organised around the 
category of exchange value, propels the formation of a social totality mediated by the 
social relation of abstract labour. On the other hand, the objectivation of these abstract 
relations reinforces their significance for traditional social theory as they appeal' to it as 
its categorial givens. The ‘unproblematic’ nature of these presuppositions and 
preconditions, the absence of any sustained concern with their contradictory form, is a 
defining feature of traditional, Europic, theory.
These considerations, though, are but a contribution. A further step in the expansion of 
tliis concept of the Europic problematic would bring have to take the above comments 
on hegemony and set about a detailed conceptual integration. Carrying this through
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would entail a final broadening out of the dialectics of universalisation to encompass 
other modern European universals, as the concept of hegemony marks a decisive shift 
away from any kind of economic reductionism and takes us onto the wider terrain 
encompassing the state and civil society, law and culture. That is to say, the concept of 
hegemony draws together the different modes of modem universalisation, recognising 
them as so many aspects of modern social formation, and seeing them as both the 
condition and object of collective identity formation and political struggle. Hegemony is 
the terrain formed by combined and uneven dialectical universalisations and the 
struggles over them.
A fuller account of Europic universalisation, then, would involve an account of the 
many modes of universalisation; their differential sequential development in different 
times and in different places; their articulations, contradictions and overdeterminations. 
So, while capital is a fairly obvious candidate for the land of treatment given here, there 
are a number of other candidates which are a little less obvious because they have not 
been subject to the same kind theoretical dialectisation to which Marx subjected capital, 
or else such treatment is less well known. First amongst these are the categories of 
reason and law. Reason, in the form of the illicit universalism of the modern tradition, 
exemplified by positivism, has of been addressed in some detail already. While there is 
not the space to deal with this here, it can be argued that law needs to be understood 
both in terms of praxiology and as one of the fundamental social relations constituting 
modem social formations, and one which also bears striking analogies to the categorial 
forms of capital.22
More surprisingly, perhaps, is that such self evident and seemingly unproblematic 
everyday categories as ‘time5 and ‘space5 can be understood in these terms. Time, for 
instance, as measured by clocks, appears to us as an independent reality. There appears 
to be little doubt that it is a given feature of the world. If any of our categories is a truly 
ahistorical universal, then it is most probably ‘time5. Yet, the modem category of time 
does have a history, dating back only to thirteenth century Europe. What is more, on 
closer inspection, it too is a generalised abstraction. ‘Time5, it turns out, is only the
22 Pashukanis, E., Law and Marxism: A General Theory, Pluto Press, London, 1989: 
Alan Norrie, ‘Pashukanis and the Commodity Form Theory -  A Reply to 
Warrington’, International Journal o f the Sociology) o f  Law, 10 (4), 1982.
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generalised abstract identity of all individual concrete durations.23 All these concrete 
durations are rendered identical thanks to the invention of clocks and to the way they 
have become a general mediation of social relations. The claims made for the 
universality of abstract and homogeneous time cannot, after all, stand: it is yet one more 
abstraction, grounded in social relations, illicitly posing as a universal. What is more, 
the processual universalisation of time has much in common with that of value, and 
while it cannot be explained wholly in.terms of the spread of value, the development of 
time is intimately connected to it. It does seem that the social institution of this form of 
time prepares the way for that of value, while the institution of value propels that of 
time. Abstract time, after all, is the real measure of abstract labour.
These considerations, while they cannot be pursued in depth here, reinforce the initial 
intuition that any theory of Eurocentrism must have the theoretical object of the form of 
life as a whole as its concern, and that the form of modem universals is what defines the 
modern, Europic, social formation. This is due to the fact that each modem universal 
institutes a distinct social totality, unifying disparate aspects of the social formation on 
the basis of a particular, universal, category. A more precise account of the nature of 
such relations is the subject of the next, and final, chapter.
23 The remarks follow Postone’s account of categories of time. Also see the next 
chapter.
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I: Immanentism in theoretical Eurocentrism
This final substantive chapter secures an adequate distinction between two kinds of 
abstract universal. It clearly marks the separation between the categories of philosophy, 
on the one side, and those of historical social relations, on the other. One of the 
principal errors of theoretical Eurocentrism is its identification of the social relations of 
modernity with the transhistorical categories of its philosophical anthropology: 
modernisation is identified as the historical process through which philosophical 
categories are realised as social ones. The kind of universalism to which this gives rise 
is a form of immanentism. One version of an immanentist argument was encountered at 
the end of Chapter 4 in the comments 011 Charles Taylor. At the same time, some 
comments of Marx’s were also cited, comments which appeared to affirm a similar 
commitment. Against this, it also suggested that immanentism is effectively rejected in 
Capital: developing his theory of value as a social relation, advanced in terms of 
abstract labour, Marx decisively rejects the conflation of the philosophical with the 
socio-historical and, in so doing, inaugurates a novel social ontology.
The problem of immanentism is in fact a familiar one within debates on Capital, though 
not necessarily always understood as such. It is posed, for instance, in what has become 
known as Rubin’s dilemma: Marx uses what appears to be a transhistorical category, 
abstract labour, as the basis of an avowedly historically specific social relation. 
However, this dilemma only appears as a consequence of interpretative presuppositions 
which obscure those actually informing Marx’s writing. This chapter explores those 
presuppostions and offers an account of Capital as having successfully provided a 
theory of the specific form of the universality of modern social relations. The 
distinctiveness of this theory of universals draws on the social ontology of Capital, a 
social ontology which, once properly understood, makes an invaluable contribution to 
theoretical anti-Eurocentrism.
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II. The ‘religious’ or irreal nature of capital.
It was acknowledged in earlier chapters that there is some ambiguity in Marx’s work in 
respect of Eurocentrism. His work does express a sense of the cultural superiority of 
capitalism over pre-capitalist forms, even replicating some of the common sense of the 
times in his depictions of the non-European. However, Marx’s language does not 
express the superiority of capital in the common parlance of the times. There is nothing 
essentially European about either the bourgeoisie or commodity production more 
generally. Nor, despite the fact that modem forms possess unrivalled and still 
developing, capacities for mediating and transforming society and nature, can their 
immediate consequences be greeted with anything other than the most profound moral 
ambivalence. Even his most apparently Eurocentric works are filled with a sense of the 
inevitably horrific side of Europic universalisation and with compassion at the miseries 
it inflicts, as a matter of course, on its victims. Capital appeal's as a civilising process 
only in a very peculiar sense: it entails an extraordinary expansion of human powers, 
but at the same time those powers bring about terrible distortions of cultural existence. 
This duality, the intimately entwined heightening of capacities with the deformation of 
those so endowed, and subject to them, is essential to capital. The civilising potential of 
capital can only be realised once those powers are subsumed within a post-capitalist 
form of life. If Marx’s evaluation of the modem in these terms can still be called 
Eurocentrism then, at the very least, it is a Eurocentrism of the most unusual kind.
Running against any Eurocentric tendencies are powerful counter currents. Indeed, 
Postone argues, it is possible to read Marx’s Capital as a generalisable critique of 
modernity.
[The] opposition between the abstract universality of the Enlightenment and 
particularistic specificity should not be understood in a decontextualised 
fashion: it is an historically constituted opposition, rooted in the determinate 
social forms of capitalism. [...]
The form of domination related to the abstract form of the universal is not 
merely a class relation concealed by a universalistic facade. Rather the 
domination Marx analyzes is that of a specific, historically constituted form of 
universalism itself, which he hies to grasp with his categories of value and 
capital.1
1 Moishe Postone, Time, Labour and Social Domination, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1996. p. 163.
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Reading Capital, then, should be oriented towards drawing out its critique of both 
theoretical and relational universalism. This, in turn, makes it possible to draw on 
Capital to reinforce the critique of Eurocentrism by giving an account of the structural 
contradictions of capital in terms of the dialectical critical realist conception of 
anthropism.
One justification for reading Marx’s account of social contradictions through the prism 
of philosophical irrealism is a consistent position Marx took throughout, his life with 
respect to the relation between the structures of forms of thought and social relations. 
From ‘On the Jewish Question’ to Capital, Marx insisted that the religious character of 
forms of thought, including avowedly secular thought, had to be understood in relation 
to the religious or philosophical form of the social order to which that thought belongs: 
the specific forms of contradictions found in forms of thought could be analogous to 
those belonging to social relations.2
The later Marx’s account of abstract labour', indeed, should be read as the culmination
of the younger Marx’s attempt to speak about the modern, ‘secular'’ world as having an
essentially ‘religious’, ‘philosophical’ or ‘metaphysical’ character. These are all
pejorative terms for Marx, indicating problematic and absurd forms of both
philosophical speculation and social reality. The importance of this is recognised by
Chris Arthur, who writes:
The most important single influence on [my work] is Marx’s insight into the 
‘metaphysical’ character of capitalist commodity production. Throughout the 
first chapter of Capital there are references to ‘ghostly objectivity’; ‘sensuous 
supersensuousness’; ‘mysteriousness’; ‘turns into its opposite’; ‘stands on its 
head’; metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’; ‘fantastic’; ‘absurd’; 
and so on. This language I take to be much more than rhetoric. Many have 
complained that Marx’s concept of value is metaphysical. They have not seen 
that Marx himself said this, but saw it as a feature of reality. Such a 
‘metaphysical theory of value’ is what I aim to vindicate. Capitalism is marked 
by the subjection of the material process of production and circulation to the 
ghostly objectivity of value.3
Marx’s earlier writings on the state propound a similarly metaphysical theory of the 
political. For instance, the 1843 ‘On the Jewish Question’ repeatedly refers to the
2 There are strong affinities between this way of understanding the social and Peter 
Winch’s claim that social relations are more like language than they are like 
anything else.
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religious or philosophical character of the bourgeois forms of social relations. He 
writes: “When the political state has achieved its true completion, man leads a double 
life, a heavenly one and an earthly one, not only in thought and consciousness, but in 
reality, in life.”4 Also: “Of course the bourgeois, like the Jew, only remains in the life of 
the state sophistically speaking, just as the citizen only sophistically remains a Jew or 
bourgeois; but this sophism is not a personal matter. It is a sophism of the political state 
itself.”5 Again: “The fantasy, dream and postulate of Christianity, the sovereignty of 
man, but of man as an alien being separate from actual man, is present in democracy as 
a tangible reality and is its secular motto.”6
The forms of metaphysical thought, having been exposed for what they are, possess 
theoretical value because those same forms may be applicable to real world structures. 
He affirms, in practice at least, an ‘objective idealism’, the conviction that the social 
relations of bourgeois, rational, secularism really embody the same forms of 
contradiction as does its metaphysics.
Such forms of thought, indeed, so ‘reflect’ those of the world from which they arise, 
that they provide an essential resource for understanding it.7 Marx consistently sustained 
the idea of a strong, internal, link between the character of contemporary religion and 
the analogously ‘religious’ structures of bourgeois life. In “Towards a Critique of 
Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right: Introduction”, one of his famous epigrams on religion 
declares that:
This state, this society, produces religion’s inverted attitude to the world,
because they are an inverted world themselves. Religion is the general theory of
this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular' form, its spiritual
point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its
universal basis for consolation and justification. It is the imaginary realization
of the human essence, because the human essence possesses no true reality.
Thus, the struggle against religion is indirectly the struggle against the world 
* 8 whose spiritual aroma is religion.
3 Chris Arthur, 'The Spectral ontology of value’, in Critical Realism and Marxism, 
p. 216.
4 Marx, ‘On tire Jewish Question’ in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, David 
McLellan (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977. p. 46.
5 Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’, p. 46.
6 Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’ , p. 50.
7 See the discussion of Andrew Brown’s work, below, for an examination of the 
term ‘reflection’ in relation to Marx’s mature works.
8 Marx, Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right: Introduction” in Karl
Marx: Selected Writings, David McLellan (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1977. p. 63-4.
206
Chapter 8 - Capital and Europic Dialectical Universalisation
While the later works were no longer concerned with religion in its more obvious forms,
the earlier critique of idealism was fleshed out in terms of the deep structures of capital.
As a persistent critic of the limitations of bourgeois quasi-secularised self-
understanding, Marx struggled for a realist account of how these limitations were firmly
grounded in bourgeois existence:
In the capital-relation what is characteristic is the mystification, the upside- 
down world, the inversion of the subjective and the objective. ... Corresponding 
to the inverted relation, there necessarily arises, already in the actual 
production process itself, an inverted conception.9
The contradictions previously ascribed to explicitly religious thought are here 
transferred to its secular rivals, which remain, as a result, ‘religious’ through and 
through. This translation, however, does not leave things quite as they were. As Marx’s 
ideas develop so does the form they take. The theoretical form in which the dual 
character of commodity producing labour is presented requires a novel categorial 
structure, one much more adequate to the task of expressing the constitutive, 
metaphysical, contradictions of modem reality.
III. Labour, value and philosophy
There are two sets of problems associated with abstract labour. The first relates to the 
historical status of the category as Marx uses it, the second to the question of 
commodities being the ‘embodiment’ of this category. In respect of value, Marx appears 
to create difficulties by affirming its historical character, only to specify it in terms of 
the apparently transhistorical category of ‘abstract labour’. In relation to embodiment, 
Marx unequivocally declares the identity between abstract labour and its products to be 
an absurdity, yet repeatedly deploys that very absurdity to elucidate the nature of value.
Patrick Murray and Geert Reuten have debated rival accounts of these questions.10 
Despite their many differences, though, their debate begins from a common stalling
9 Economic Ms. of 1861-63, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Marx-Engels Collected 
Works (MECW), Vols 30-34, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1988-1994. Vol.
33, p.72.
10 Patrick Murray ‘Marx’s ‘Truly Social’ Labour Theory o f Value: Pail I, Abstract 
Labour in Marxian Value Theory, in Historical Matej'ialism, No. 6 Summer 
2000, pp 27-66; ‘Marx’s ‘Truly Social’ Labour Theory of Value Part II: How is
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point. They agree that the interpretation of ‘abstract labour’ as a reference to the 
common, i.e. transhistorical, physiological character of all forms of labour gives rise to 
‘ Rubin5 s dilemma’.11
One of two tilings is possible: if abstract labour is mi expenditure of human 
energy in physiological form, then value also has a reified-material character.
Or value is a social phenomenon connected with a determined social form of 
production. It is not possible to reconcile a physiological concept of abstract 
labour with the historical character of the value it creates.12
For Murray, there can be no simple deduction from the validity of the distinction to the 
conclusion that Marx either held or confused the two kinds of theory. He argues, 
instead, that when Marx declares all commodity producing labour to have the 
qualitative identity of ‘abstract labour’ he actually means that it is all ‘practically 
abstract labour’. This should not be understood ‘physiologically’ but as the real social 
efficacy of what I call an ‘indifference principle’: from a proletarian perspective, the 
intrinsic worth of concrete forms of labour, arising from what it produces, is 
extinguished; the mediation of production and consumption by money, and the 
mediation of producer and production by the wage relation, reduces work to no more 
than a means to an externally related end. Reuten, for his part, agrees that evidence of 
such an indifference principle is indeed to be found in Marx’s work, but argues that not 
all of every use of ‘abstract labour’’ can be interpreted in this way. So while Murray 
argues that Rubin is right about the antinomy but that it is not to be found in Marx’s 
mature theory, Reuten holds both that,the antinomy is correct and that Marx reproduces 
it.
When it comes to the language of ‘embodiment’, by which abstract labour is identified 
with value, our two writers are in greater accord. Marx writes: “If I state that coats or 
boots stand in a relation to linen, because the latter is the imiversal incarnation of 
abstract human labour, the absurdity of the statement is self-evident.”13 It is plainly 
absurd that commodities, or money for that matter, are identified with the social 
character of the labour which produced them. Given this ‘self-evident’ absurdity,
Labour that is under the sway of Capital actually Abstract? in Historical
Materialism, No. 7, Winter 2000, pp. 99-136. Geert Reuten, ‘The Interconnection
of Systematic Dialectics and Historical Materialism, in Historical Materialism,
No. 7, Winter 2000, pp. 137-166.
11 Isaak I. Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theoiy o f  Value, Black Rose Books, Montreal,
1973.
12 Rubin, p. 131.
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Murray suggests that we can make sense of Marx’s references to such identification 
only if we treat them as ‘metaphorical’, as rhetorical gestures pointing out the absurdity. 
This, though, is too much for Reuten. There is insufficient warrant for us not to take 
Marx at his word. The problem is that Marx means what he says, and that he must stand 
condemned for it.
Neither of these sets of questions can be resolved as it stands, for both kinds of problem 
arise from the failure to recognise that the structures of identification constitutive of 
capital are really analogous to the metaphors found in religion. Where religion gives 
rise to imaginary symbolic relations, however, Marx discloses the objective symbolic 
structures of capital. Once this symbolic dimension of social relations and social 
practice is established as a fundamental aspect of Marx’s social ontology it becomes 
clear that Rubin’s dilemma is premised on a misapprehension. From the perspective of 
objective symbolic relations it is quite right to say that there are contradictions in 
Marx’s writing on labour and value. However, contrary to both Murray and Reuten, it 
makes complete sense to recognise those contradictions as belonging to the world, and 
that Marx expresses them quite coherently. Murray is right to insist that Rubin’s 
dilemma does not apply to Marx, but he is right for the wrong reasons. Reuten is right to 
argue that Marx is not using language metaphorically, but fails to recognise his use of 
analogy. On the other hand, Murray fails to see that Marx uses the language of ‘abstract 
labour’ in a third sense, and one for which we have more than adequate warrant to 
attribute to Marx: the abstract quality of commodity producing labour simply denotes 
that a relation of formal identity is established, through commodity exchange, between 
all its forms. Finally, both Murray and Reuten are wrong about embodiment, for it is 
quite reasonable to speak of this social quality as being symbolised by, i.e. ‘embodied’ 
in, the commodities which constitute and mediate this relation of formal equality.14
13 Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 169.
14 The previous chapter made this argument. Also, see Moishe Postone for a similar 
reading. Time, Labor and Social Domination, pp. 144-8. Postone, speaking of 
Lucio Colletti’s argument as to the centrality of the category of abstract labour 
suggests that ‘Colletti’s argument parallels some aspects of that developed in this 
work. Like Georg Lukacs, Isaak Rubin, Bertell Oilman, and Derek Sayer, he 
considers value and abstract labor (sic) to be historically specific categories and 
regards Marx’s analysis as concerned with the forms of social relations and of 
domination that characterize (sic) capitalism.” p. 147.
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The question that needs to be asked of Marx, then, is not Rubin’s. The proper question 
is whether or not he succeeds in specifying ‘abstract labour’ (i) as a non-discursive 
feature of reality, as against a ‘mental generalisation’ and (ii) as the quality of a specific 
form of social identity, rather than a transhistorical characteristic, and (iii) whether this 
identity is symbolically mediated. Answering this requires a reinvestigation of how 
Marx uses the term in accounts of commodity-producing labour which, in turn, 
demands that we are able to reconstruct the theoretical contexts in which it used.
Bert ell Oilman provides an account of how such contexts can be reconstructed. He 
shows how Marx’s intellectual reconstruction of capital requires a continuous, self- 
conscious, use of perspectival switches.15 Marx shifts perspective by moving along and 
between three axes: level of generality; extension; vantage point.16 The first of these, the 
level of generality, has been a theme running throughout the discussion up to this point 
and needs no more attention here. As far as extension is concerned, abstractions are 
limited to the degree that spatial and temporal boundaries are put on the abstracted parts 
of the concrete. Lastly, changes in vantage point can be understood subjectively, i.e. 
roles and positions in relationships can be adopted as perspectives on the world, but 
these are by no means the most significant land of perspectival vantage point in Capital. 
Oilman writes that abstraction establishes ... a vantage point or place within the 
relationship from which to view, think about, and piece together the other components 
in the relationship”.17 That is, in writing about a social relation, Marx identifies various 
points from which to investigate the internal relations between a circumscribed set of 
determinations and relations.
Marx’s writing carefully delineates the theoretical context within which categories are 
used, and through which meaning is imparted to them. Interpretations of meaning must 
remain alive to continually shifting perspectives as it alters the parameters of theoretical 
context. Oilman draws this out in his discussion of Pareto’s jibe that Marx’s use of 
language was characterised by inconsistency: one moment things appear like bats, the 
next like mice.18 Pareto’s commitment to analytics meant that a consistent identification
15 Bertell Oilman, Dialectical Investigations, Routledge, London, 1993.
16 Bertell Oilman, Dialectical Investigations, pp. 39-77.
17 Oilman, p. 40.
18 Oilman, Alienation, Routledge, London, 1993. Sometimes it looks like a bat, at 
other times like a mouse.
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of terms with given meanings was essential, so Marx’s inconsistency in this regard was 
sufficient reason for damning him. For Oilman, though, each category has to be 
understood as being conditioned by its theoretical context, and meaning has to be 
understood as a function of how it is integrated into that context. Marx’s terminology is 
therefore less susceptible to being pared down, dictionary-style, to determinate 
meanings floating free of context, and is likely to be distorted if externally defined, pre­
given fixed meanings are imposed onto his use of categories. Such imposition blocks 
off the hermeneutic efficacy that theoretical context has in the generation of meaning. 
Abstracting meaning from context prevents the work of framing from making itself felt.
Much of Murray’s effort is devoted to showing how Marx sustained a clear sense of the 
precise level at which his abstractions are pitched. Indeed, this concern with generality 
explains why Rubin’s dilemma is of such significance for him. However, as Oilman’s 
reading suggests, focusing on this dimension of theoretical context at the expense of 
others might limit any interpretation. Murray puts the problem like this: “If one equates 
the concept of value-producing labour with the (general) concept of abstract labour, an 
asocial, naturalistic concept of value is inescapable. That’s one hom of Rubin’s 
dilemma.”19 Alternatively, “if we equate abstracted labour with a historically specific 
sort, what can we make of Marx’s lack of a generally applicable concept of abstract 
(physiological) labour?”20 Murray argues, in a vein similar to Oilman’s, that the problem 
only arises if one fails to recognise that Marx’s terms are used to convey a variety of 
meanings. For Murray, Marx “sorts three concepts: (i) the (general) concept of abstract 
labour, (ii) the (determinate) concept of ‘practically abstract’ labour, and (iii) the 
general concept of labour.”21
Building on Oilman’s work to develop a sense of theoretical context, these distinctions 
can be expressed as follows. The most significant difference between (i) and (iii) is their 
relative complexity. In Chapter Seven of Capital, Marx embarks on a discussion which 
shifts between two uses of ‘labour’ at different levels of generality, comparing and 
contrasting as he does so. At one level we have the category of labour-in-general. 
“Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man,
19 Murray, pp 31-32.
20 Murray, p. 32.
21 Murray, p. 49
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through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between 
himself and nature.”22 In this instance, (iii), the extension is all of human existence, i.e. 
the scope of this category is coterminous with that of ‘culture*. This transhistorical 
concept is pitched at the highest level of generality. It necessarily lacks specificity, 
being open to both form and content. It serves as a vantage point from which to explore 
social existence in general, and is the point from which related, similarly general and 
broad, categories are investigated. This kind of discussion is a bounded exercise in 
philosophical anthropology, detailing generalities that will be fleshed out and organised 
in the more specific discussion of commodity-producing labour.
At this level, Marx stresses the concrete, historical character of all actual foims of
labour and the distance between social labour and animal activity.
Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this 
way he simultaneously changes his own nature. He develops the potentialities 
slumbering within nature, and subjects the play of its forces to his own 
sovereign power. We are not dealing here with those first instinctive forms of 
labour which remain on the animal level.
The reductive abstraction, (i), ‘labour pure and simple’, ‘labour as such’, associated 
with the ‘physiological’ account of labour, is one of Marx’s ‘simplest determinations’. 
From the perspective of labour-in-general, this category appears as one of its internal 
relations: labour-in-general relates to the way that social activity puts our physical 
natures to work, thereby giving it a concrete reality it could not otherwise possess. 
However, although ‘labour’ is pitched at the same level of abstraction as labour-in- 
general it does not have the same extension: the stripping away of sociality reduces it to 
a more general, animal, quality: “it abstracts altogether from the sociality, conscious 
purposive, and natural conditions characteristic of all human labour.”23 Murray calls this 
“‘analytical’ because it identifies an aspect of any sort of labour rather than identifying a 
sort of labour' as the concept of practically abstract does.”24 However, Murray does not 
notice that it is pitched at a level of generality higher than anthropology. Using this 
category, without further specification, is sufficient to alert us that, when it is used by 
Marx, something far from straight forward is going on.
22 Marx, Capital, p. 283. The language of human labour and transitivisation 
completely coincide at this point.
23 Murray, p. 48.
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The third use of ‘labour* concerns the indifference principle. Murray limits its extension 
to commodity-producing labour and, as an abstract feature common to such labour, it is 
pitched at a high level of generality. Here, though, it is the vantage point from which 
this characteristic appears that is the most interesting thing about it. Murray argues that 
capitalist social practice treats labour as abstract. ‘“Practically abstract’ labour is 
socially validated in a way that shows society’s actual indifference towards labour’s 
specific character, that is, towards labour’s specific ways, of transforming nature and 
towards the specific use-values characteristic of its end products.”25 A society in which 
use-values tend to be reduced to no more than bearers of value is a society which tends 
regards the concrete dimensions of production with complete indifference or pure 
instrumentality. Murray also refers to ‘Johnny Paycheck’, i.e. to workers’ indifference 
to the way they earn their living. The perspectives from which this category appears, 
then, are those of either the direct proletarian producers or the indirect bourgeois 
managers of production. For either party, the concrete character of labour, from their 
respective subject positions, is of no significance: an attitude of subjective indifference 
is generated by bourgeois class relations.
Once ‘labour’ is understood in these various ways, the solution to Rubin’s dilemma is 
straightforward. Marx, Murray argues, does have a historically specific sense of the 
abstract character of commodity producing labour, so there is no need to read 
‘physiological’ labour for every use of ‘labour’. Rubin’s unpalatable choices can be 
sidestepped.
Reuten fully agrees with using ‘labour* in these various ways. His objection is that 
Murray illicitly reads them all into Capital Specifically, on the claim that ‘practically 
abstract labour’ can be read into every otherwise problematic use of ‘labour’, Reuten 
says:
Murray makes the astonishing move of delivering this as an interpretation of
Marx’s theory. He interprets Marx’s one term of abstract labour to have two
separate meanings, one general and one determinate (can we choose at will?).
For an interpretation of the current text of Capital this rims too fast.26
24 Murray, p. 32.
25 Murray, pp. 43-44.
26 Reuten, p. 155.
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Reuten supports this by raising the problem of ‘embodiment’. He sees no problem with 
regarding commodities as objectifications of the specific kinds of labour which produce 
them. However, Marx’s use of ‘embodiment’ suggests that the peculiarity of commodity 
producing labour is that its abstract quality is somehow transferred to those 
commodities through the process of production. Reuten insists that using this language 
preserves the errors of Ricardian, ahistorical, value theory. Value cannot, without 
absurdity, be identified with the abstract quality of the labour that produces it. 
Nevertheless, Marx consistently affirms this identity throughout Chapter One of 
Capital, and Reuten cites several passages in which Marx progressively specifies this 
identification.27
Reuten specifies the difficulty this appears to create.
Murray agrees that the concept of labour set out here is indeed a general,
transhistorical, instead of a historically determinate notion. We also agree that
both the concepts of value and use-value are meant to be determinate. However,
the concept of value especially suffers here from the general abstract labour
notion. If so, we cannot say we are on the track of a theory of the particularly
28capitalist kind of social form.
For both Reuten and Murray, then, there are two, irreconcilable, idioms in which Marx 
could be speaking about commodities. The first uses the idea of commodities as 
embodied labour’, sustaining essentially pre-Marxian conceptions of political economy. 
The second uses concepts of value forms, breaking from and superseding the first. 
Murray’s position is simply to deny that Marx really uses the first idiom: the language 
of ‘embodiment’ simply should not be taken literally.
27 Reuten, p. 154.
If we make an abstraction from its [the commodity’s] use-value, we abstract 
also from the material constituents and forms which make it a use-value. ... The 
useful character of the kinds of labour embodied in them also disappears; this in 
turn entails the disappearance of the different concrete forms of labour. They can 
no longer be distinguished, but are altogether reduced to the same kind of labour, 
human labour in the abstract.
Let us now look at the residue of the products of labour. There is nothing left 
of them in each case but the same phantom-like objectivity; they are merely 
congealed quantities of homogeneous human labour, i.e. of human labour-power 
expended without regard to the form of its expenditure. All that these things now 
tell us is that human labour-power has been expended to produce them, human 
labour is accumulated in them. As crystals of this social substance, which is 
common to them all, they are values - commodity values.
How is the magnitude of this value to be measured? By means of the quantity 
of lvalue-forming substance’, the labour contained in the article. This quantity is 
measured by its duration, and the labour-time itself is measured on the particular' 
scale of hours, days, etc 
Marx, Capital, p. 129
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Still, why does Marx talk about ‘embodiment’ and ‘substance’? I believe that
Marx expects us to be shocked by the ludicrousness of the proposition that
abstract labour is ‘embodied’ in commodities: how can abstract labour be
29embodied? Is not the bodily the antitheses of the abstract?
Nevertheless, Murray suggests that we are stuck with the peculiarity of this language.
When speaking of capital we have to resort to such oddities “because of the absurdity of
thinking that tailoring just is abstract labour incarnate. Talk of ‘embodiment’ and
‘substance’ cannot be avoided in writing a critique of capitalist society, but lets not lose
the irony”.30
From the perspective of a dialectical critical realist reading of Marx all of this amounts 
to an extraordinary, not to say somewhat perplexing, mistake, for there is nothing at all 
ironical or metaphorical about Marx’s language. When Marx puts quotation marks 
around these seemingly out of place terms, he draws attention to them as analogies. 
Marx was a skilled rhetorician, but to suggest that his references to a ‘phantom-like 
objectivity’ are at best merely rhetorical, ironical, turns of phrase is to impose on 
Marx’s work an implicit social ontology shorn of all its distinctiveness.
IV. Marx and Dialectical Critical Realism
The problem here is that, despite the concerns for methodological and presentational 
matters, there is an absence of appropriate socio-ontological considerations. Generally, 
there is a need for a social ontology that accommodates real contradictions. More 
specifically, there needs to be an ontology that is capable of providing the theory of 
commodity fetishism with its appropriate significance. Otherwise all that is left is a 
meagre theory of fetishism which reduces the relevance of the categories of the ‘absurd’ 
and the ‘distorted’ to phenomenal forms alone and denies their relevance to deeper and 
non-linguistic aspects of reality. Such an ontology, of course, entails a realist conception 
of contradictions, but, as the previous chapter showed, it extends and clarifies the range 
of forms that real contradictions can take. In particular, it needs to be able to adequately 
encompass the primary social contradiction disclosed by Capital: that between the 
abstract universal and the concrete particular. Murray’s and Reuten’s positions, though, 
appear to deny the possibility that social relations can assume abstract qualities. Take
28 Reuten, p. 154.
29 Murray, pp. 57-58.
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the above quotation from Murray in which he asks: “how can abstract labour be 
embodied? Is not the abstract the antithesis of the bodily?” But let us turn this around. 
What would it mean to speak of any real abstract quality as entirely disembodied? It. 
should go without saying that once abstract social qualities are accepted as possible 
realities then they must be, in some sense, the characteristics of concrete forms. The 
problem of their embodiment is secondary to that of their existence.
Whether or not to include real abstractions in our conception of the world is, in part, a 
matter of our philosophical presuppositions. Jonathan Joseph reiterates the point that 
“the main errors of Marxist theory tend to flow from the attempt to impose a 
philosophical schema onto its analysis.”31 That is, Marx’s presuppositions need to be the 
starting point for interpretations of his work. This demands a critical elaboration of the 
immanent philosophical implications of his mature work. Fortunately, a number of 
important contributions have already been made, and I shall be arguing that the 
(qualified) interpretation of dialectical critical ir/realism (provided in previous chapters) 
can be interpreted as just such an elaboration.
As already discussed, the most obvious relevance of Bhaskar’s account of ir/realism is 
to the realm of theoretical discourse, where it provides the general theory of the internal, 
essentially contradictory, categorial structures of modem social theory. Of course, 
theory is not the only mode of communicating meaning, and in addition to the efforts of 
philosophy and science to come to grips with structures of meaning we also have the 
psychoanalytic disclosure of the processes through which symbols are structured in 
dreams, and critical, historical cultural theoretical disclosures of the changing forms 
embodied in the novel, cinema, documentary, etc. Each of these disciplines is concerned 
with the more or less deliberate, more or less mediated, social activities which produce 
the various forms assumed by concepts and symbols. The general forms and dynamics 
detailed by ir/realism are applicable to all of them.
The great significance of ir/realism, though, is that it is also relevant for an 
understanding of the contradictions of modem social relations. It is pertinent here
30 Murray, p. 5 9 .1 have put the emphasis on Murray’s use of ‘thinking’ here.
31 Jonathan Joseph, ‘How critical realism can help Marxism’, in Critical Realism 
and Marxism.
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because of the ‘linguistic’ quality of social relations identified by Winch. The categories 
and relations of capital are, like concepts and symbols more generally, historically 
emergent cultural forms and, up to a point, can be treated in much the same way as the 
forms belonging to the discursive and symbolic spheres. This means that th e . 
contradictory forms of social relations can be approached through analogies with the 
contradictory forms of theoretical knowledge. That is to say, we can best understand the 
forms of the non-discursive aspects of modern social relations by drawing on analogies 
with discursive forms such as religion and philosophy, just as Marx did.
Metaphorical language is essentially poetic in that it likens one thing to one thing to
something quite other, i.e. it intimates the identity of ‘opposites’. From a narrowly
rational perspective, to establish an identity between opposites on the basis of a
metaphor would be absurd. Analogies, by contrast, draw attention to real similarities, to
the (partial) identity of one thing with another. In the context of theoretical knowledge,
analogies are commonplace, even necessary: knowledge develops through the use of
‘scientific loans’, analogies which establish a connection between one area of
knowledge and another in which we find it difficult speak cogently. Through analogy
the intelligibility of one part of the world is transferred to another. Theoretical
knowledge does not stop with analogy, of course. It is only a contribution. It may be no
more than a stimulus, of which only traces are left after theory has developed. In Marx’s
work, though, there is a strong and abiding presence of analogies between the
metaphorical or poetical character of religion and philosophy with the contradictory
structures of social relations,32 Marx says:
... the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within
which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the
commodity and the material relations arising out of this. It is nothing but the
definite social relations between men themselves which assumes here, for them,
the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order therefore, to find an
33analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion.
The value, to critical theory, of religion and speculative philosophy is its metaphorical 
and poetical character. From a rationalist viewpoint, though, these forms embody a host
32 Colletti, for instance, in From Rousseau to Lenin, illustrates this use of analogical 
absurdity to describe real social relations by drawing on Hegel’s work in his 
account of alienation. Lucio Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, New Left Books, 
London, 1972.
33 Marx, Capital,, p. 165. My emphasis.
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of absurd identifications. With the objectification of deities and the positing of a realm 
of supernatural beings, religions can bring a range of imaginary entities into cultural 
existence, such that social life is thoroughly mediated by practically efficacious poetic 
fictions. Indeed, within the realm of the imagination, all manner of peculiar relations 
can be created: deities might have incarnations or avatars; one being may take many 
forms without becoming essentially different - such as in the holy trinity; there is 
transubstantiation, as tilings transmogrify into alien forms which nevertheless remain 
identical with their origins. And so on. Many such fictions assume the anthropic form of 
fetishes, human creations whose powers depends on their social or communal origins 
having been effaced. There is plenty of scope here for describing such beings in 
anthropomorphic terms, of course, but to stop there would be to neglect their 
sociological dimension. The fetish is imbued and invested with meaning and 
significance, i.e. its exists within social relations and acquires real social powers and 
social qualities as a result, and such powers and qualities bear little if any relation to its 
existence as a natural object as understood from the point of view of the sciences. Social 
relations confer on the fetish powers, which, within those relations are seemingly 
autonomous and at the very least, cannot usually be brought entirely under control. The 
effective power of the fetish, then, always depends on a hidden displacement of social 
characteristics. The fetish has to be integrated into social life as a special conduit of 
symbolic significance, as a means of amplifying and transmitting symbolic and 
psychical energies. The process of symbolic integration itself must be self-disguising. 
All of which means that the anthropism attaching to the fetish, then, is very much a 
practical matter as well one of description. The fetish is a symbolic and causally 
efficacious (medium of) social power, whose efficacy depends on, but is irreducible to, 
the way it is described and understood.
Drawing on the two previous chapters, it is clear that Marx’s theorisation of the 
commodity relation in terms of fetishism reveals the possibilities for extending 
conceptions of anthropic contradictions to the forms of capital. At first glance it is fairly 
clear that capital embodies the basic anthropic contradictions: the anthropocentric 
subordination of subjects to cultural institutions endowed with human powers and the 
anthropomorphic domination of the concrete by socially instituted abstractions. The 
alienation engendered by capital, the social constitution of alien powers, entails both 
kinds of anthropic contradiction: domination of people by things and the domination of
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the concrete by the abstract. Two tasks now remain. The first is to show how the social 
domination this entails is a distinctive form of anthropism. The second is to show that 
this form of anthropism is a non-immanent form of universalism and to relate this to 
Eurocentrism.
The anthropic ir/realist contradictions of capital can be approached from four internally 
related sub-perspectives. Firstly, the epistemic or hermeneutic aporia and antinomies of 
traditional theory; secondly, actual contradictions, such as those of the market and its 
crises; thirdly, those which appear from the perspective of ontic depth, which Andrew 
Collier refers to as ‘ontological inversions’ and which are primarily associated with the 
centric axis of anthropism; fourthly the kinds of abstraction addressed by Moishe 
Postone and Chris Arthur, and associated with the morphic axis of anthropism.34 Capital 
is constituted by the relations between all these different modes of contradiction, and 
Bhaskar’s conception of anthropic irrealism provides a systematic grammatical 
elaboration of its formal structural dynamics. In order to substantiate this position it will 
be necessary to draw out the connections between the irrealist forms of anthropism and 
the structures of religious thought. To do this I want to show, firstly, that Maix draws on 
the possibility of using philosophical and religious metaphors in the way already 
suggested, by showing that irrealist forms have an essentially metaphorical character, 
and by showing how such metaphors can be analogous to the forms of social relations.
Marx uses the category of labour-in-general to frame an account of the labour process 
under capitalism in a way that allows these two dimensions of capital to be brought out. 
Labour-in-general, as the above discussion shows, provides a philosophical- 
anthropological perspective on social existence. At this level of generality, all forms of 
human labour entail a common set of features, i.e. practical, creative and purposive 
social relations with the social and natural context. However, the substantive forms in 
which these qualities are actually organised are open to historical development, with the 
formal range of possibilities including people’s anthropic subordination to a world of 
their own creation, i.e. to the things onto which social qualities and characteristics have 
been displaced.
34 Andrew Collier, “Dialectic in Marxism and critical realism’, in Critical Realism 
and Marxism; Chris Arthur, ‘The Spectral ontology of value’, Critical Realism 
and Marxism.
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Fleshing out the range of structural variation, Marx shows how the characteristics and 
locations of creativity and purposefulness have, historically, been organised in very 
different ways. In Chapter Seven of Capital, he contrasts the natural activity of bees 
with construction projects guided by architects. Bees have all the necessary capabilities 
to build their hives instinctively, without the aid of blueprints; the architect, on the other 
hand, conceives of the building before is it built. Architecture is an objectification of 
imaginative and creative cultural powers that mediate and direct social activity. 
However, the level at which this contrast between natural and human sociality is pitched 
can easily be mistaken. It might, mistakenly, be assumed that the example is merely an 
illustration of labour-in-general and that labour-in-general is simply an abstract 
generalisation from architectural practice. If this was the case then labour-in-general 
would be a straightforward universalistic humanist account of what distinguishes 
humanity horn the rest of the animal world.
This would, though, be an over-simplification.35 The general concept of transitivisation, 
of labour-in-general, must accord with the hermeneutic critique of positivism, and insist 
on language and thought as essential aspects of human culture. Cultural production 
always is the objectification of imaginative powers mediated by capacities for 
practically transforming nature. The architect, however, cannot be taken as a 
transhistorical character, as an ahistorical representative of humanity. On the contrary, 
this role exemplifies Hie heights to which specifically bourgeois civilisational 
achievement aspires. The bourgeois era has been witness to an extraordinary 
condensation of imaginative and creative powers into single individuals. The great 
ecclesiastical monuments of pre-modem Europe, for instance, were constructed without 
architects, as we have come to know them.
In addition, the social distinction between architect and builder embodies a division of 
intellectual and manual labour which only emerged in the urban context of the early 
modem era.36
Construction and production tasks of such dimensions and novelty stretched the
craftsmen to the limits of their resources and inventiveness. By the necessity to
35 I would like to thank Kathryn Dean for our discussions on the significance of 
these passages.
36 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour, MacMillan, London, 1978.
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tackle the problems there rose from the ranks of ordinary producers the great
Renaissance craftsmen, the 'experimenting masters’, artists, architects, and also
37engineers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
There are intimate connections between the specific forms of intellectual creativity and 
the forms of socially creative power emerging, at this time. Specialist knowledge 
acquired its characteristically abstract, 'purely intellectual’ form, while changing 
production techniques led to new forms of organisation and management. These forms 
of abstract knowledge and labour management have been essential forces of production 
ever since. Given all of this, the true implications of the architect for humanism concern 
the potential they suggest, rather than any affirmation of the class relations and division 
of labour of bourgeois society. On the one hand their existence signifies a historically 
specific promise of a wider expansion of the capacities of members of the species. On 
the other hand, it also embodies the betrayal of this promise as creative capacities are 
subsumed under the value form and as capitalist labour processes simultaneously throw 
the processes which brought the architect to the fore into reverse. Subsumed under the 
value form, both creativity and constructive powers are displaced into institutions and 
technologies which become the determinant locus of the creative energies of the few, 
while the powers of the many are alienated and underdeveloped. Capitalist labour 
processes continue to demand and shape high levels of creativity, but increasingly entail 
modes of real alienation, abstraction and reification.38
Andrew Collier identified some of the anthropocentric contradictions this involves with 
what he calls the ‘ontological inversion’ entailed by this displacement of human 
purposes and relating it to Marx’s conception of “the domination of producer by product 
or living labour by dead labour”.39 The distinction is between living, productive, labour, 
and the dead labour embodied in its products; between activity-in-process and its 
products. To speak of their relationship as an inversion is to disclose the subordination 
of the former to the latter. The implied ‘right way .up’ would be a wholly different kind 
of living process to which products were subordinate, i.e. in which they would their be 
invested with their full status as use-values.
37 Sohn-Rethel, p. 112.
38 See Georg Lukacs, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, in 
History and Class Consciousness, Merlin Press, London, 1971 and Moishe 
Postone, Time, Labour and Social Domination.
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Collier not only conveys a clear sense that capitalist labour processes are structured by 
these ontological inversions;, he is also clear about their being distortions of reality 
which are constituted by the absences of real necessities: “There is an absence of 
reason, sentience and life at the heart of power in a capitalist society, and the 
ontological reality of these absences can be verified by their deep and wide effects.”40 
The absenting of human imaginative and creative capacities, and their displacement 
onto institutions and technologies, generates absences at the very heart of contemporary 
power relations, an accomit of modernity readily understood in terms of irrealism.
With this domination of living by dead labour' we have sufficient reason to attribute 
anthropism to Marx, but this is only one part of it. This account so far' remains 
incomplete in the absence of an adequate account of its anthropomorphic dimension. 
Social relations and their bearers, i.e. the people or things which mediate them, acquire 
socially specific abstract qualities, such that the absurdities to which Marx refers are not 
solely, nor even primarily, a linguistic phenomenon. When Marx declares the universal 
equivalent to be the “universal incarnation of abstract human labour” it is not ideas 
about reality which he is seeking to expose as absurd, but the reality itself.
The case for the significance of the indifference principle to an interpretation of Marx
rests heavily on the Grundrisse, where Marx comments on its prevalence in the United
States at the time.41 However, Marx runs those comments together with the following:
This example of labour shows strikingly how even the most abstract categories, 
despite their validity - precisely because of their abstractness - for all epochs, 
are nevertheless, in the specific character of this abstraction, themselves 
likewise a product of historic relations, and possess their full validity only for 
and within these relations.42
In this passage, Marx draws a clear distinction between two kinds of abstraction. On the 
one hand there are abstract categories with transhistorical validity whilst, on the other 
hand, there are those abstractions which have historically specific qualities. He also
39 See Andrew Collier, 'Dialectic in Marxism and critical realism’, in Marxism and 
Critical Realism, p. 157.
40 Collier, p. 166. Collier makes his case in terms of the absence of transhistorical 
necessities, but a more consistently Marxian case would do so in terms of the 
constraints on the realisation of historical possibilities.
41 Grundrisse, p. 104.
42 Grundrisse, p. 105.
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expressly draws attention to the way that historical context confers validity on the latter. 
However, the passages from the Grundrisse do not suggest the dual character of labour 
in the same way that Capital does. While Marx retains the idea that abstractions acquire 
a peculiar social validity within the most modern relations, the essential social character 
of all forms of commodity producing labour is the emergence of their qualitative 
identity: a socially objective identity which is irreducible to how they appeal* from the 
subject positions they entail. Capital confers an abstract identity of universal validity 
onto all its diverse concrete forms of production. Through their subsumption under the 
capital relation, all forms of labour* are effectively reduced to their most basic common 
element. For this reason the abstraction 'labour’, acquires its social validity. All forms 
of commodity producing labour are both heterogeneous concrete forms of labour* whilst 
also being homogenous and identical. Their identity arises from the fact that given 
quantities of every diverse kind of labom* are exchanged for given quantities of every 
other kind, regardless of the concrete forms they take. This qualitative abstract identity 
is distinct from the attitudes of those involved, and is therefore irreducible to the 
indifference principle. The latter, rather, has to be seen as one of the phenomenal, overt, 
effects of the deeper, covert, character of this relation of universal identity.
The category of 'abstract labour’, acquires its meaning within the precise theoretical 
context in which it is deployed. That context is bounded, firstly, by the conception of 
labour-in-general, which retains the social character of the physiological aspect of work, 
and only then is it bounded by commodity producing labom*. Then, within this context, 
the category is used to refer the consequences of commodity production and exchange 
in bringing about the equality, homogeneity or identity of all forms of labom*. It is only 
within this context that the social character of labom* is defined by the absence of social 
specificity! This 'paradox’, the abstract quality of a specific social relation, is what 
lends labom its appearance of universality. Meanwhile, the processual universalisation 
of capital means the tendency towards the universal mediation of all foims of 
commodity production by commodity exchange, and it is this process that establishes 
the specific relational identity between them. Within this universal relation qualitative 
differences are stripped away, leaving only qualitative identity, i.e. labom* pure and 
simple. Concrete differences .remain, of course, engendering the dual quality of this 
foim of labom: qualitative differences coexist with the relation of qualitative identity.
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Marx deals with this in the section of Chapter One of Capital dealing with commodity
fetishism. He writes there that as soon as commodities are produced, i.e. as soon as the
product of labour is intended as an exchange value, the labom' which produces it
assmnes its twofold character:
On the one hand, it must, as a definite useful kind of labour, satisfy a definite 
social need, and thus maintain its position as an element of the total labour, as a 
branch of the social division of labour, which originally sprang up 
spontaneously. On the other, it can satisfy the manifold needs of the individual 
producer himself only in so far as every particular kind of useful private labour 
can be exchanged with, i.e. counts as the equal of, every other kind of useful 
private labour.
Thus, the specific social quality of commodity producing labour is its universal abstract 
identity: a universality which emerges when every form of labom can be exchanged for 
every other. We can express this relation of universal identity with the simple formula:
A labom x = B labom y
(where A and B stand for some quantity; x and y for any two forms of labour)
In order to express this relational abstract identity Marx goes on to say that it is only so
far as different forms of labom are mutually exchangeable on the basis of their common
identity that they take on the form of abstract labom.
Equality in the full sense between different kinds of labom can be arrived at 
only if we abstract from their real inequality, if we reduce them to the 
characteristic they have in common, that of being the expenditure of hmnan 
labour-power, of hmnan labom in the abstract.44
Strictly within this context, abstract labour is the simple category that expresses the 
qualitative identity of exchangeable forms of labom. The reduction occurs because, 
within the relation of identity between forms of commodity producing labour, their 
overt characteristics simply do not count for anything.
Now this relation of qualitative identity is both constituted and mediated by the 
production and exchange of commodities, i.e. it is mediated by forms of value. 
Commodity producers “by equating their products to others in exchange as values, 
equate their different kinds of labour as human labom. They do this without being
4j Marx, Capital,, p. 166.
44 Marx, Capital,, p. 166.
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aware of it.”45 Marx repeatedly stresses the objective, covert, character of this equality
of labour. Indeed, the whole point of the language of fetishism is that this quality is
transmogrified into that of the commodities themselves. Once it is clear that we are
dealing with a historically specific and socially generated relation of abstract equality,
Marx can be understood to be consistent in his rejection of value as the physical
embodiment of any kind of labour, whether concrete or abstract. There is no physical
trace of value in a commodity because value is 110 more than the displacement of the
social quality of the labour which produced it onto its products. That is, the equality
which exists between diverse forms of labour is displaced onto the equality, the
qualitative identity, of all commodities:
Whence, then, arises the enigmatic character of the product of labour, as soon as 
it assumes the form of a commodity? Clearly it arises from the form itself. The 
equality of the kinds of human labour takes on a physical form in the equal 
objectivity of the products of labour as values; the measure of the expenditure 
of human labour-power by its duration takes on the form of the magnitude of 
the value of the products of labour; and finally the relationships between the 
producers, within which the social characteristics of the labours are manifested, 
take on the form of a social relation between the products of labour.46
The relation of equality, of abstract identity, between commodities is overt: they are 
obviously mutually exchangeable in certain proportions. Different forms of labour, on 
the other hand, are equalised because of this mediation. Products therefore ‘represent’, 
or ‘objectively express’, the relation of equality between producers. Indeed, Marx uses 
all these terms, not just ‘embody’, to describe this. Drawing 011 Marx’s own use of 
algebraic symbolism in his discussion of money, we can represent the mediated relation 
of equality between commodity producers in the following expanded form:
Labour = commodity = money = commodity = labour.
(The series of A, B and x, y has been removed for clarity’s sake.)
Relations between producers are mediated by this series of transactions and exchanges. 
As relations of production, circulation and exchange develop so there emerges the 
relation of equality between producers. These mediations between producers are also 
the ‘bearers’ of this relation, transmitting the equality of their labour from one to the
45 Marx, Capital, pp. 166-7.
46 Marx, Capital, p. 164.
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other. As with an algebraic equation, the terms on either side can be substituted for one 
another. This means that we can replace each of the terms of the above equation with 
‘labour5 to give us:
labour = labour’ = labour' = labour = labour’
It is in this representative sense that commodities, and of course forms of money 
‘embody5 equal, i.e. abstract, labour’. These are all forms of value, and they are all 
representative embodiments of the relation of abstract labour. Money, as the universal 
equivalent of all commodities, really represents the universal identification of all forms 
of labour’. This is to advance an absurdity of even greater obviousness than when Marx 
spoke of the absurdity of identifying a specific conunodity with human labour. Despite 
their self-evident absurdity, however, there is no question that these relations of identity 
do not exist as such. The relation establishes a logical absurdity, in the sense that all 
value forms are identified with abstract labour. Yet the absurd identification is by no 
means an error: it belongs to reality and has a universal, and universalising, social 
presence. Given all this, there is no contradiction at all between an abstract labour 
embodied theory of value and value foim theory: all forms of value are really absurd 
embodiments of abstract labour as they all representative of the same quality - labour.
Now, the emergence of abstract labour as the really universal identity of all concrete 
forms of commodity producing labour gives rise to an anthropomorphic relationship 
between its two dimensions. This has two aspects. On the one hand, there is the 
development of the duality, of the split between the abstract and concrete, which 
establishes the abstract dimension as a distinct reality with its tendencies towards 
independence. It is this split that gives rise to “the two-fold character of the labour 
embodied in commodities55. 47 On the other hand, anthropomorphism is more than 
reification. The anthropomorphic character of capital develops in several ways: as its 
abstract dimension comes to dominate its concrete: as tendencies towards the 
subsumption of the concrete under the abstract are realised; with the functional
47 Title of section 2 of Chapter 1 of Capital
226
Chapter 8 - Capital and Europic Dialectical Universalisation
reduction of all concrete forms of production to the accumulation of value; through the 
tendencies towards the annihilation of the concrete by the abstract.48
This formulation provides a general account of the dynamics of capital in terms of
anthropomorphism. This can be both illustrated and clarified by examining Chris
Arthur’s related account. As noted above, Arthur presents capital in terms of its
‘metaphysical’ character, i.e. what I am here calling its anthropic irrealism. Arthur, like
Collier, takes the tendencies towards real abstraction and towards the intensification of
absences to be constitutive of capital. He does so, however, in a way which develops the
anthropomorphic dimension of fetishism:
Although our1 implicit starting point, ‘the commodity produced by capital’, 
appeal's as a concrete one, the real abstraction, imposed in exchange, from eveiy 
given feature of it leads to a dialectic of ‘pure form’ homologous with the ‘pure 
thoughts’ of Hegel’s logic. Whereas Hegel abstracts from everything through the 
power of thought, exchange abstracts from what is presented to it, a delimited 
sphere of use values. So we have in the dialectic of capital one that is less general 
than Hegel’s in its scope, but with its own terms equally absolute in so far' as it is 
founded on all round abstraction to leave quasi-logical primitives.49
This is a superb use of philosophy as historical analogy. Hegel’s logic of pure thought is 
brought down to earth, as it were, to become the logic of a historical process generating 
real abstractions. For Arthur, the results' of this process are a ‘philosophical’ or 
‘religious’ inversion in which ‘quasi-logical primitives’, i.e. simple abstract generalities,
48 This is not the place to go into details o f each of these dimensions of capital. 
However, it is worth noting how each of these forms of domination can be related 
to the dynamics of capital. The first o f these deals with real subsumption, and is 
addressed by Marx in the appendix to Vol. 1. The second, functional reduction, 
covers both formal and real subsumption, where formal subsumption suggests 
imposing the demands of capital accumulation on pre-existing forms o f labour 
without necessarily bringing about their internal transformation. Conceptions of 
capital which focus on raising levels of absolute surplus can be located here.
The third is related to rising productivity and to raising levels of relative surplus 
value. This last is given central importance by Postone. For Postone, the most 
profound contradiction of capital is between the drive to accumulate value, on the 
one hand, and the drive to reduce the labour time needed to produce those values, 
on the other. Value is the embodiment of an expenditure of labour time, but is 
also related to the average time needed given the prevailing level o f technological 
capacity. The intensive and extensive expansion of technological capacity brings 
about an increase in the total mass of values, but it also reduces the standard by 
which their value is measured, by reducing the average labour time embodied in 
each commodity. Every step taken to accumulate value must further reduce the 
standard of measurement.
For Postone, the progressive tendency here is towards the elimination of the 
expenditure of labour time. Capital, however, demands that labour time is 
preserved as the measure of value. Realising the progressive possibilities of 
capital requires the elimination of abstract labour.
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become real social mediations and which develop as the dominant determinants of 
social being. Capital really does tend to abstract general qualities from substantive, 
concrete modes of being; to hypostatise them in determinate forms of social relations; 
and to do so in a process oriented towards the ultimate subsumption of the entire 
substantive dimension of society under them. With what Marx calls real subsumption, 
or what Arthur describes as the ‘introjection of form’, he presents us with a materialised 
‘idealism’, a mode of social being which grants ontological priority to its form at the 
expense of its substance.50 The characteristically modem form of universality emerges 
with the progressive extrusion of abstract generalities from substantive being, and with 
the constant reorganisation of social existence needed to secure their reproduction and 
expansion. Such reorganisation is increasingly indifferent to the substantive, concrete, 
dimension of social life, which is tendentially reduced to little more than means to an 
end.
The universalisation of capital depends on the enduring distinction and connection 
between its existence as a ‘totality’ and as a ‘whole’.51 As was noted in the previous 
chapter, Postone points out that Marx uses the term ‘totality’ to refer to ideas, to 
conceptions, which embody a “rich totality of many determinations and relations”.52 As 
such totalities belong to the realm of ideas, they are despite all their internal 
differentiation, characterised by abstractness and homogeneity. Similarly, the 
philosophical conception of ‘substance’, a reference to the homogeneous essence of 
things, belongs to an idealistic idiom. Unlike other forms of being, however, commodity 
producing labour* really does possess just such an essence: its unchanging abstract 
reality which, over time, determines its concrete existence. The abstract dimension of 
capital, the totality of value, can then be understood as being constituted by this essence, 
‘value producing substance’, i.e. abstract labour.
Its concrete dimension, the whole, on the other hand, is the more or less organised sum 
of material objects and processes. This world embodies the tendencies towards a 
universal heterogeneous whole of interrelated concrete forms of labour and their
49 Chris Arthur, ‘The Spectral ontology of value’, p. 221
50 Arthur, ‘The Spectral ontology of value’, p. 221
51 Postone,. Labor and Social Domination.
52 Marx, Grundrisse, Martin Nicolaus (trans.), Penguin, Harmondsworth; New Left 
Books, London. 1973. p. 100.
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products and, at the same time, a tendency towards the universalisation of a 
qualitatively homogenous totality. The peculiarly anthropic character of this, then, is to 
be located in the contradictory process of concrete universalisation which is 
constitutively mediated by a process of abstract totalisation. On the one hand, within the 
concrete dimension, we have the anthropocentric subordination of people to things. On 
the other hand this is accounted for in terms of the emergence of the abstract dimension 
of capital and the anthropomorphic subordination of the concrete to the abstract.
V. Concluding Thoughts: Historical Universals and the reified-material character of 
abstraction.
This reading of Capital has drawn out two aspects of its implicit social ontology which 
have not been sufficiently prominent in its interpretation. The first owes a debt to Peter 
Winch for his appreciation of the analogy between forms of language and forms of 
social relations; the second is indebted to Roy Bhaskar’s conception of ir/realism and 
anthropic contradictions. Drawing these two together provides a general account of 
possible forms of social relations, an account, moreover, which can be read back into 
Capital without doing undue hermeneutic damage. The perspective that this generates, 
one that can be called dialecticised critical realist social ontology of modernity, grounds 
the disclosure of capital, the dominant modem social relation, as a form of Europic 
dialectical universalisation.
It only remains to elaborate some of the implications for Europic universalisation that 
can be drawn Rom this reading of Capital, and to make some final comments on 
Rubin's dilemma. One set of remarks concerns the relations between the discursive and 
non-discursive dimensions of Europic dialectical universalisation, while another deals 
with the possibility of generalising from the deep, structured, relational and categorial 
account of commodity fetishism to the Europic problematic of dialectical 
universalisation.
Charles Taylor urges the cautious use of social theory on the grounds that it is 
irreducible to being descriptive or explanatory: theorising about ourselves can be self- 
constitutive, which may have troubling implications. Taylor's concern with instituting 
the imaginary, however, needs to take into account the fact that self-constitution is
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mediated by the forms its institution takes: however abstract social theory appears, it is 
not undertaken in the abstract: there is no theory from nowhere. As Jameson shows us, 
the instituted world is itself taken up into theory, with the real abstractions of this world 
giving our intellectual traditions their ‘philosophical’ or ‘theoretical’ character. We 
inhabit a world which is thoroughly mediated by real abstractions, and these 
abstractions also “serve to define ourselves; and ... such self-definition shapes 
practices,”53 including our theoretical practices.
The significance of this for an account of the Europic problematic is that understanding 
processes of universalisation simply as the objectification of abstract forms of thought is 
inevitably one-sided. Taylor’s contention should be taken seriously: Europic 
universalism does mediate Europic universalisation. Against this, though, universalistic 
theory is historically grounded in the real abstractions of modernity. The development 
of our theoretical traditions and the development of our forms of social relations have 
been mutually reinforcing. Real abstraction provides the historical grounds and the 
conditions of intelligibility of abstract theory; abstract, Europic, universalism mediates 
the praxis of universalisation. The absence of any recognition of this is, almost by 
definition, characteristic of theoretical Europism.
This absence, the absence of an adequately historically reflective critical theoiy, is 
apparent in the formulation of Rubin’s dilemma. The contention that “It is not possible 
to reconcile a physiological concept of abstract labour with the historical character of 
the value it creates”,54 presupposes that the use of the terminology of ‘abstract’ labour 
could only be ahistorical. However, as the above arguments have shown, this judgement 
is too hasty. Any judgement as to how the term is being used, and therefore what it 
means, must first recognise that its use is circumscribed by its frame of reference. 
Against the uncritical readings which pre-judge the use and meaning of historical 
imiversals, Capital provides a fully rounded critique, encompassing its immanent, 
omissive and explanatory dimensions, of precisely those ahistorical readings of 
abstractions which accept them at their desocialised and ahistorical face value.
53 Charles Taylor, ‘Understanding and EthnocentrisnT, in Philosophy and the
Hainan Sciences: Philosophical Papers, 2 , Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1985, p. 116.
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The explanatory critique in Capital grounds the internal relations between forms of 
thought and social relations. That is, it sees intellectual reification co-existing and co- 
developing with real reification. As seen above, Rubin’s dilemma was defended on the 
grounds that “if abstract labour is an expenditure of human energy in physiological 
form, then value also has a reified-material character”.55 The important part of this 
statement is the implication that it must be illicit to speak of value having a ‘reified- 
material character’. This, in turn, presupposes that the analogy betvyeen language and 
social relations is illicit. However, if reification means the attribution to some non-thing 
of qualities and properties belonging to a thing, and it is allowed that this can be a 
matter of social relations and practice at least as much as it can a matter of thought, then 
speaking of the abstract dimension of commodity-producing labour in terms of its 
“reified-material character” can be entirely appropriate. The disclosure of the reified- 
material character of universal social relations provides the historical ground of idealist- 
materialist antinomies; it produces an account of social universals in terms of real 
anthropic abstraction. The historical-processual elaboration of this form of social reality, 
i.e. the development of these relations through processes of dialectical universalisation, 
is also, at one and the same time, the elaboration of the conditions under which these 
Europic-anthropic forms of thought come into their own as social forms of self- 
understanding.
It was argued in previous chapters that theoretical Eurocentrism, typified by the form of 
its universals, needs to be understood in terms of the grammar of anthropism. This same 
grammar has now also been shown to have non-discursive inflections, with modern 
European relations of domination, and processes of transformation emanating from 
Europe, having anthropic forms. Now it has been shown how the universals which 
constitute the totalising dimension of the modern are also to be understood on the 
terrain of this grammar.
54 Rubin, p. 131.
55 Rubin, p. 131.
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Conclusions - The Mutual Implications of Critical Theory and Eurocentrism.
The task of critical theoiy is to disclose, explain and transform traditional political and 
social theory. It discloses the apparent and deep contradictions embodied in that 
tradition; it explains those contradictions in terms of their relations to the contradictory 
social relations they are embedded in; it transforms the nature of theory as it generates 
the categories and forms needed to comprehend and express those contradictions. That 
is, critical theory is driven by the contradictory nature of the modern towards a realist 
theoiy of this form of life. Central to this project is Eurocentrism.
The fundamental contradictions of the modern tradition arise from the structural form 
and significance of its universalism. Despite the fact that the modem secular tradition 
developed a strong sense of history, it has struggled to come to terms with the full 
implications of the historicity of its own form of culture. A systemic feature of the 
tradition is that its forms of thought are caught on the horns of the structural dilemma 
that generates the ambiguities of particularism and universalism. Unable to sustain 
distinctions between the levels of generality, the tradition persistently confuses the 
ontological, the anthropological, the sociological and the historical. Its intellectual 
horizons are shaped by the more or less implicit universalisation of its self-conceptions. 
In other words, its defining feature is its own ethnocentrism: Eurocentrism.
These intellectual problems are compounded by history. The modern form of life 
elevates its intellectual tradition to a central place in its own reproduction. The modern 
is saturated by its traditions as they provide the praxiologies of modernisation, where 
modernisation is the institution of universals. The modem is the ensemble of 
universalist theoiy, practice and institutionalised relation.
This ensemble, the Europic Problematic, provides critical theory with its object of 
inquiry. Critical theory becomes critical-theoretical anti-Europism, while traditional 
theory becomes theoretical Eurocentrism and modern social formation becomes real 
Eurocentrism. Critical theory is the critique of Eurocentrism.
The antinomial nature of theoretical Eurocentrism generates two diametrically opposed, 
but dialectically twinned, strategies for posing and resolving questions of its own
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Eurocentricity. On the one hand, Eurocentrism is seen an instance of cultural 
particularism: dealings with others are necessarily conducted from a specific point of 
view, and are probably geared to securing culturally specific interests. Wherever such a 
bias causes difficulties, counter measures need to be put in place in order to achieve a 
more effective balance. With a sufficient degree of self-consciousness, practices might 
be corrected, as if compensating for the pull of a steering wheel or for poor eyesight by 
wearing the necessary glasses. Dealing with self-serving bias, on this account, means 
accepting that it is an inevitable consequence of engaging with the world with an 
attitude shaped by the form of life, whose undesirable consequences can be avoided 
given an adequate appreciation of its dangers. Richard Rorty’s work on ethnocentrism 
exemplifies this strategy. It recognises the particularity of the European culture of civil 
society, while affirming its moral values. For Rorty, it is precisely these, ethnocentric, 
values which make it possible to minimise the potential ethnocentrism has for 
viciousness towards others.
This strategy usually entails a repudiation of claims to universality. However, this can 
only be at the expense of at least two forms of universality which cannot be avoided, at 
least not without creating insuperable difficulties. Firstly, modem culture is self­
consciously and practically universalising. What Rorty praises as a kind of universal 
openness to others he fails to recognise as one aspect of deeply entrenched tendencies 
towards the universal expansion of modem culture and concomitant subsumption of 
alterity under Europic forms.1 Such one-sided accounts of the cultural realities of 
Europic universalisation fatally undermine all attempts to take refuge in particularity. 
Also, for the very idea of cultural particularity, difference and change to be intelligible, 
some sense of philosophical universality, i.e. ontological and transhistorical categories 
and forms, is needed, albeit one that is cautious, limited and understood as fallible. In 
sum, a stratified and differentiated approach to universalism is an unavoidable 
precondition of coming to terms with particularity.
On the other hand, and more commonly, approaches to Eurocentrism adopt a 
universalist perspective. The counter image of the first, this approach affirms cultural 
claims to universality, thereby seeking to tackle Eurocentrism on its own terms. This
1 In effect, Rorty’s account of the openness of liberal culture to alterity is a 
statement about United States immigration policy.
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way of addressing Eurocentrism fails to disambiguate the different lands of 
universalism it involves. In the absence of an adequate appreciation of the need for a 
dialectics of universalism, Eurocentrism appeal's as a deviation from a universal noun: 
an unethical privileging of the European which can be corrected, or subject to reform, 
without any substantial reconsideration of the nature of the European. Where the first 
strategy was critical of illicit universalism, and asserted particularism in response, 
Eurocentrism appears here as an illicit assertion of particularity, to which the proper 
response is none other than the reassertion of universality. This flight from particularity, 
which takes refuge in the universal, serves only to block off precisely the kind of 
inquiry into the universal which is so necessary for any understanding of Eurocentrism.
Within the terms of theoretical Eurocentrism, then, ‘Eurocentrism’ invokes a problem, 
but not a fundamental one. The term is ‘critical’, implying a sense of bias in favour of 
the European, be it cognitive, ethical, relational, etc. The relevant biases entail a 
practical or theoretical privileging of some aspect of the European over its others: either 
the mediation or subordination of culture or nature by the European, i.e. Eurocentrism 
proper, and/or the imposition of the European onto some area of culture or nature, i.e. 
Euromorphism. What neither strategy is capable of, however, is recognising that all 
such biases are essential aspects of its own social formation, and that the very choice of 
strategies for thinking about it is an effect of its own structures.
The critical-theoretical anti-Europic approach developed here grounds these structural 
antinomies in a social reality whose essential constitution is the developing ensemble of 
structural biases of all these kinds. In so doing it accomplishes what those other 
accounts do not, a critical realist theory of the complex dialectics of Europic 
universalisation.
This critical theoretical perspective accepts the inevitability of partial, limited and 
biased self understanding, but it also opens up the modern tradition to a deeper, 
structural, self-transformation. Critical theoretical anti-Eurocentrism fully embraces the 
moment of particularism, but cannot accept any simple reliance on techniques designed 
to compensate for one’s own bias. Instead, it embarks on a thorough historicisation of 
its own particularity, one which forces apart the universal and particular', comes to a 
new understanding of them both, and establishes a new sense of the relations between
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them. Historicisation succeeds not by reducing itself to repudiating the universal, but by 
grasping the moment of particularity in relation to a new sense of universality.
Against the claims for Europic universality, then, critical theory fully accepts the need 
for a turn towards the true self, but only if that turn is also a repudiation of the conceits 
of its forms of universalism. Critical theoretical anti-Europism depends on developing 
and sustaining a clear distinction between historical and transhistorical universals, both 
of which emerge out of the critique of Europic universals. The project of critical theoiy 
is the ongoing development of the resources needed to make this move, one that can 
only be realised through cognitive and practical self transformation.
The central concept developed here, the Europic problematic, refers to something 
considerably more than just one aspect of Western modernity amongst others. Rather, 
the strong position formulated here is that the Europic problematic identifies a general 
and essential dimension of modernity, a dimension constituted by the contradictory 
forms and dialectics of the ‘Europic universals5 of civil society. These universals are 
abstract relations with a tendency to develop in contradiction to the concrete realities 
they mediate; their dialectics of universalisation involve the institution of such 
abstractions, in both the real and imaginary dimensions of social life.
A claim of this order, inevitably, has many ramifications, not the least of which relate to 
the nature of critical theory. Conventionally, for the most part, critical theory, especially 
the critique of civil society and political economy, is treated as distinct from, even 
antagonistic to, concerns with Eurocentrism. In keeping with this, the most that might 
have been expected from this kind of work would have been that it could have 
developed a keener awareness of the problems of Eurocentrism, helping critical theory 
to become more aware of its own Eurocentricity. What would not have been expected is 
that this project would have identified the project of critical theory so closely with the 
problems of Eurocentrism. Rather than simply being an investigation of Eurocentrism 
from a critical theoretical perspective, this work has developed through the mutual 
transformation of both terms, disclosing the deep-seated internal relations between 
them.
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One effect of the Europic Problematic for critical theory has been to reinforce attempts 
to shift the terms of its self understanding into a more historical register. One, general, 
consequence of Europism for modem theoretical forms of reflexivity is that they tend to 
be overly ‘philosophical’. Critical theory too, in common with traditional theory, is 
historically grounded intellectual practice which struggles against reproducing Europic 
forms, forms which tend to make intellectual work appear detached from its historical 
and social ground. The elaboration of critical theory in relation to the Europic 
problematic, however, means that this can be addressed, to some extent. For instance, 
Horkheimer’s attempt to drive a wedge between traditional and critical theory has been 
preserved, but it has also been developed thanks to the re-worlcing of both terms in 
relation to Eurocentrism. Similarly, the intimacy of the relation between critical theory 
and Eurocentrism has been expressed here through a development of some of 
Althusser’s terminology: Critical theory has been understood as critical theoretical anti- 
Europism, while the concept of its theoretical opposite has been developed in terms of 
theoretical Europism.
Also preserved here is something of Althusser’s account, elaborated in Reading Capital, 
of the motivating force that the contradictory and absence-ridden raw material of 
ideology provides to critique. Bhaskar’s systematisation, too, of the connections 
between immanent, omissive and explanatory critiques, which make explicit how the 
identification of conceptual contradictions and theoretical incompleteness are vital first 
steps on the way to the theorisation of polyvalent causal structures, has also been 
retained. However, all these terms, and their respective meanings, have undergone some 
alteration under the pressure of asserting a thorough-going historicity of both 
Eurocentrism and critical theory. In each case these concepts of critical theory, 
originally pitched at an abstract, philosophical level, have been reinvested with 
historical content.
This historicisation of critical theory emerges out of confrontation with the essential 
ambiguity towards historicity, or even its systematic disruption, in theoretical Europism. 
More positively, it has also been an attempt to conceptualise the ontology of this 
specific form of social existence. The ‘Europic problematic’ provides a general theory 
of the real nature of the historical ground from which critical theory emerges. At the 
same time, its historical ground also turns out to be critical theory’s real object of
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investigation, with the theoretical object of the Europic problematic providing it with its 
true aim and purpose. This project has therefore retained the methods of immanent 
critique: enhancing and realising the possibilities immanent within the Europic 
problematic for knowledges which are formally and substantively distinct from those 
which remain tied to the reproduction of the horizons of theoretical Europism.
Critical theory, though, remains strongly bound to this form of life. The theoretical 
contradictions grounded in the experience of Europic realities provide critical theory 
with its teleonomic push, driving it on towards their disclosure and explanation. At the 
same time, the search for its theoretical object, the Europic problematic, gives critical 
theory its teleological pull. Conversely, the Europic problematic also acts as a constraint 
on critical theory, generating a complex intellectual field constituted by countervailing 
forces and tendencies. Of course, this field is historical, and its dynamics are internal to 
the ongoing development of Europic social formation. For this reason, if no other, the 
present work makes no claim to bring critical theoiy to a point of completion. Rather, it 
provides a strong indication of the direction in which work can be taken. Nevertheless, 
the main point still stands: far from being opposed to one another, critical theory and the 
Europic problematic are intimately tied together, with the latter providing the former 
with its socio-historical conditions of existence, its intellectual significance and its 
moral purpose.
The bond uniting theoretical Europism and critical theoretical anti-Europism, then, is an 
antagonism, the essence of which is a struggle over the nature, form and status of 
universals. Indeed, it is the twin failures to either recognise the need for a critique of 
Europic universals and/or push that critique through to its full extent that account for the 
persistence of theoretical Europism in work otherwise interested in developing critiques 
of Eurocentrism. This issue was raised at the outset, by pointing to the cognitive 
problem of ‘Eurocentrism’ in terms of the fragmentary and incoherent nature of existing 
conceptions. It was noted then that universalism was indeed recognised as one of a 
number of problems associated with Eurocentrism, but it was quite unclear whether 
universalism or its lack was the real problem. On the terrain of theoretical Europism, 
universalism is profoundly ambiguous and essentially antinomial. The solution to such 
problems meant filling a theoretical void: and what was needed was to impose a wholly 
new structure onto the problem/solution set of Eurocentrism.
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The fact that ‘Eurocentrism’, in the existing field, appeared incoherent, fragmentary and 
contradictory has to be taken seriously as symptomatic of inadequate structure of the 
conceptual framework from which it emerged. The critical-theoretical solution to this 
could not rest with simply adding yet another conception of Eurocentrism to an already 
confused field. Instead, there has been a vital shift in perspective, focusing on the 
Eurocentricity of the field itself, thereby making it possible to deal with the problem of 
Europic universalism by disclosing the differentiated, stratified and structured nature of 
the existing field as a whole.
This shift entailed a considerable expansion of the scope of ‘Eurocentrism’, but one that 
did not stop there. The reflexive impulse of critical theory, embodied in explanatory 
critique, demanded a further expansion. This expanded the concept of Eurocentrism still 
further by relating the structure of discursive universals to the form and development of 
relational universals. It was in order to draw all these elements together that the 
expanded concept of the problematic was put to work, giving us the Europic 
Problematic.
The other, omissive, moment of critique also had its place, and this too was reworked in 
relation to Eurocentrism. In particular, the absence of a theory of Europic universalism 
has been exposed as the central reason for why traditional conceptions of Eurocentrism 
are theoretically inadequate. Or, to put it another way, in order to play its social function 
in relation to the Europic problematic, the social ontology of theoretical Europism is 
necessarily contradictory. The structural causes of its contradictions are its constitutive 
absences, and what it primarily lacks is the realist social ontology.
The project of critical theory, then, is prompted by recognition of the real nature of the 
cognitive problem of Eurocentrism. Quite simply, it is a problem of self-understanding. 
What makes this a special kind of problem, however, is that it cannot be addressed 
without transforming the horizons of the Social Imaginary in which the world is 
understood. The only adequate response to the problem of theoretical-Eurocentrism is a 
self-transformation, i.e. the critical transformation of the internal structures of the 
general forms that self-knowledge of this society takes.
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The focal point for this work of self-transformation was identified by further 
understanding Eurocentrism as a special version of a problem related to ethnocentricity. 
While any account of ethnocentrism must confront the problem of (implicit) illicit 
universality, in the Modern European case this problem is mediated by the expressly 
universal character of its ethnocentrism. That is to say, the issues arising from Europic 
ethnocentrism are peculiar because they crystallise in the form of its universals. 
Meaningful cognitive self-transformation begins with this.
There is a tremendous advantage in focussing critique on universals: thanks to their 
strategic position, Europic universals are the ‘Achilles Heel’ of Eurocentrism. They 
provide a weak point in the ideological armature of Eurocentrism, such that a successful 
blow struck at this point has systemic implications of great significance. Yet another 
reason for focussing on universals is that, in addition to being a point at which the 
problems of Eurocentrism condense, Europic universals are also the prime location 
from which critique emerges. Take Marx’s observations 011 the obstacles in the way of 
Aristotle’s attempt to theorise commodity value.
There was [...] an important fact which prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to 
attribute value to commodities, is merely a mode of expressing all labour as 
equal human labour, and consequently as labour of equal quality. Greek society 
was fomided upon slavery, and had, therefore, for its natural basis, the 
inequality of men and of their labour powers. The secret of the expression of 
value, namely, that all kinds of labour are equal and equivalent, because, and so 
far as they are human labour in general, cannot be deciphered, until the notion 
of human- equality has already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice. This, 
however, is possible only in a society in which the great mass of the produce of 
labour takes the form of commodities, in which, consequently, the dominant 
relation between man and man, is that of owners of commodities. The brilliancy 
of Aristotle’s genius is shown by this alone, that he discovered, in the 
expression of the value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar 
conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from 
discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality.2
Aristotle, then, discovered in exchange value a ‘relation of equality’ between 
commodities. That is, he drew attention to the relation of qualitative identity on which 
exchanges mediated by money must be based. He also recognised that this universal 
essence, the common quality of commodities, was not grounded in their nature as 
material objects, but was instead imputed to them in the course of social activity.
2 Marx, Capital, Ben Fowkes (trails.), Hannondsworth, London, 1976. pp 151-2.
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However, the absence of a similar abstract universal imputed to persons prevented 
Aristotle from making further progress in his inquiry into the nature of value. His work 
had to end with what might now be thought of as a variety of conventionalism or social 
constructionism. For the most part, debates over value continue to resort to the twin 
possibilities of naturalism and constructionism, albeit in a variety of ways.
It was not until the social development of a universal abstract human essence had 
reached a certain level thanks, in no small measure to the development of capital, that 
the real nature of the qualitative identity of commodities could be discerned.3 Put 
another way, the conditions of possibility of knowledge of capital were not present until 
capital itself had developed to a certain degree. In this case, at least, the development of 
the social relation has conditioned the ways in which it can be understood. However, it 
also needs to be recognised that while ‘the notion of human equality [having] acquired 
the fixity of a popular prejudice’ is a necessary condition for the resolution of the riddle 
of value, it is by no means a sufficient one. Rather, it provides some of the necessary 
raw materials from which a genuine solution can be fashioned, and it is only through the 
kind of critical transformation just discussed that that the immanent conceptual 
possibilities of such universals can be realised. The critique of commodity fetishism is, 
after all, a complex one involving more than disclosing the attribution of social qualities 
to things. It also involves a theory of the nature of those social qualities, one that 
accoimts for their social character in non-constructionist terms. The denaturalising of 
value has to be accompanied by a similar- denaturalising of the form in which the 
universal human essence appeal’s.4
3 There is a strong case for commercial capital being one of the primary drives 
towards the institution of modern capitalism. (See for instance Jairus Banaji's 
‘Islam, the Mediterranean and the Rise of Capitalism’ in Historical Materialism 
15 (2007) pp. 47-74.) However, while the prevalence of commercial capital 
appears to have embodied tendencies towards the institution of abstract labour, it 
might not necessarily be an embodiment of it, nor might there be a necessity for it 
to become so. The relation between commercial capital and modern capitalism 
could well be a matter of evolutionary, but not structural, identity. That later 
forms provide clues to the anatomy of those from which they emerge does not 
mean that truths about the former apply to the later. This raises questions about 
the transhistorical validity of Marx’s theory of value to all forms of commerce, 
but ones that cannot be explored here.
4 Althusser’s insistence that Marxism is opposed to all forms of humanism and to 
all conceptions of human essence can be read as an affirmation of this negative 
critique of the form o f universals characteristic of theoretical humanism. His 
affirmation of real humanism, on the other hand, can be taken to be compatible 
with some account of human essence. What matters is precisely the question at
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The possibility of Marx’s critique, of course, was not solely dependent on the 
development of social universals, but also relied on other social and intellectual 
developments taking place within the wider social formation. Similarly, the more 
general critique of the Europic universals of civil society developed here has been 
conditioned by and made possible by a range of social processes. As was pointed out in 
Chapter 2, this work relies heavily on political and intellectual history, including the 
fall-out from major episodes such as the demise of colonisation and the institution of 
post-colonialism, the development of ‘globalisation’, and the contested elaboration of 
critical realism.
A final kind of reason for organising the critique of Europism around universals is their 
centrality to the theoretical elaboration of the Europic Problematic. The critiques of 
Europic universalism developed here have remained consistent with the established 
form of critique of civil society. That is, it has subjected these categories to a 
transformation whose consequence is a non-preservative sublation, retaining the 
category of the universal but in a new form. Wholly distinct forms of universality, 
irrealist forms, are integral to the general account of the dynamics of the Europic 
problematic: ‘Universal,’ from this critical theoretical perspective, remains the term 
required for describing the real nature of irrealist modern social relations; these irrealist 
universals are subject to processes of dialectical universalisation; ‘universal’ is also 
needed for the account of how theoretical Europism operates, i.e. the play of universals 
in the dialectics of ideology and utopia of the Ethical Economic Imaginary. The term 
remains, but its meanings, their referents and their moral significance are all changed.
Foremost amongst these changes is the need for a distinctive categorial and theoretical 
language in which they can be communicated, in which the forms and dynamics of the 
Europic problematic can be understood. The greatest part of the present effort has been 
devoted to developing this language, and central to this has been the use of dialectical 
critical realist conceptions of anthropic irrealism and dialectical universalisation. So, for 
instance, Bhaskar’s concept of irrealism, i.e. of anthroporealism and its contradictions, 
has been used to provide an account of the polyvalence of both universalist conceptual
hand: the conceptual form in which conceptions of essence are developed; the
relations between transhistorical concepts and historical ones.
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structures and universal social relations, showing how they are, in their own ways, 
constituted by the co-presence and co-evolution of constitutive absences and presences.
A crucial aspect of this theoretical development has been the ‘translation’ of the 
categories of ‘anthroporealism’ from where they have been most clearly elaborated, i.e. 
the sphere of discourse, ideas and meaning, into the non-discursive dimensions of 
history and sociology. This is not an entirely original move, as far as theoretical 
production is concerned: the warrant for such a translation of philosophical categories 
into sociological ones was taken from Marx’s oeuvre, and his work on capital was also 
used to exemplify this crucial quality of the Europic problematic.
However, this conceptual borrowing in the context of Europic universal social relations 
is both novel and significant. This part of the work develops an analogy between the 
symbolic nature of language and some of the qualities of social relations. It marks a 
significant contribution to the philosophical anthropology, or social ontology, needed to 
understand Europism, by drawing out the possibilities of ‘objective idealist’ forms of 
social reality. Against this background, socially instituted universals can be understood 
to emerge through the practices of establishing real relations of identity between 
concrete entities, regardless of any naturalistic essence they might possess. The 
resulting relations are ‘symbolic’, such that the concrete entities they mediate all 
become representatives, or embodiments, of the relations in which they are enmeshed.
Identifying such universals as really symbolic relations in this way makes it possible to 
arrive at a coherent understanding of really abstract mediations of concrete cultural 
forms. By drawing on the categories and concepts of irrealism, it has become possible 
to sustain the account of universals as relations whose institution entails real 
contradictions between them and the concrete forms they mediate.5 By advancing these 
socio-ontological considerations, this work has helped to consolidate an understanding 
of the constitutive contradictions of modernity as those between socially instituted 
abstract, irreal, essences, and the naturalistic essences of concrete social and natural
5 This meant addressing those controversies over the nature of the value relation, 
which have long dogged Marx’s work, by confronting the socio-ontological 
presuppositions underpinning them. The contention here being that debates over 
value have continually foundered on the absence of a sustainable concept of 
historically specific (Europic) abstract universals.
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beings. Given these categorial presuppositions, it becomes possible to sustain a 
conception of the common tendencies of all forms of Europic universalisation as the 
subsumption of real concrete essences under socially irreal ones. This conserves the 
established understanding of universalisation as a process in which the concrete is 
extensively and intensively fragmented and reconstituted as subordinate moments in the 
formation of a social whole mediated by an abstract totality. It also points the way for 
an extension of this understanding horn capital to other social relations, such as the state 
and law.
The final important conceptual transformation concerns the nature of universalisation 
and modernity. The Europic problematic takes up Althusser’s formulation of historical 
processes in terms of their ‘differential and complex spatio-temporality’, and affirms the 
irreducibility of historical universalisation to any simple, single or linear conception. In 
this context, the spatio-temporalities of the Europic problematic are adequately 
expressed in terms of an uneven and combined, multiplicity of dialectical 
universalisations, in which the categories of the theory, practice and relations of civil 
society are themselves being continually fragmented and recombined in the emerging 
social formation of modernity. The complex spatio-temporalities of dialectical 
universalisation mean that the ongoing processes of civil social formation produce a 
tremendous variety of both historical and structural relations between its many aspects. 
One result of this, in the ontic dimension, is that the specific configurations of 
contradictions between the abstract and concrete dimensions of social life will always 
be understood as a matter of historical contingency. The result in the epistemic 
dimension is that this conception of the complex universalisation of the Europic 
problematic provides the theory of social ontology that is the defining absence of 
theoretical Europism: it is what has been missing all along.
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Appendix: The Blind Men and the Elephant - a Stoiy from  the Buddhist Sutra
Several citizens ran into a hot argument about God and different religions, and each one 
could not agree to a common answer. So they came to the Lord Buddha to find out what 
exactly God looks like.
The Buddha asked his disciples to get a large magnificent elephant and four blind men. 
He then brought the four blind to the elephant and told them to find out what the 
elephant would "look" like.
The first blind men touched the elephant leg and reported that it "looked" like a pillar. 
The second blind man touched the elephant tummy and said that an elephant was a wall. 
The third blind man touched the elephant ear and said that it was a piece of cloth. The 
fourth blind man hold on to the tail and described the elephant as a piece of rope. And 
all of them ran into a hot argument about the "appearance" of an elephant.
The Buddha asked the citizens: "Each blind man had touched the elephant but each of 
them gives a different description of the animal. Which answer is right?"
"All of them are right," was the reply.
"Why? Because everyone can only see part of the elephant. They are not able to see the 
whole animal. The same applies to God and to religions. No one will see Him 
completely." By this parable, the Lord Buddha teaches that we should respect all other 
legitimate religions and their beliefs.
American poet John Godfrey Saxe (1816-1887) based the following poem on this fable.
It was six men of Indostan 
To learning much inclined,
Who went to see the Elephant 
(Though all of them were blind),
That each by observation 
Might satisfy his mind
255
Appendix
The First approached the Elephant,
And happening to fall 
Against his broad and sturdy side,
At once began to bawl:
“God bless me! but the Elephant 
Is very like a wall!”
The Second, feeling of the tusk,
Cried, “Ho! what have we here 
So very round and smooth and sharp?
To me ’tis mighty clear 
This wonder of an Elephant 
Is very like a spear!”
The Third approached the animal,
And happening to take
The squirming trunk within his hands,
Thus boldly up and spake:
“I see,” quoth he, “the Elephant 
Is very like a snake!”
The Fourth reached out an eager hand, 
And felt about the knee.
“What most this wondrous beast is like 
Is mighty plain,” quoth he;
“ 6 Tis clear enough the Elephant 
Is very like a tree!”
The Fifth, who chanced to touch the ear, 
Said: “E’en the blindest man 
Can tell what this resembles most;
Deny the fact who can 
This marvel of an Elephant 
Is very like a fan!”
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The Sixth no sooner had begun 
About the beast to grope,
Than, seizing on the swinging tail 
That fell within his scope,
“I see,” quoth he, “the Elephant 
Is very like a rope!”
And so these men of Indostan 
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion 
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right, 
And all were in the wrong!
Moral:
So oft in theologic wars,
The disputants, I ween,
Rail on in utter ignorance 
Of what each other mean,
And prate about an Elephant 
Not one of them has seen!
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